Decentralization of Ethereum's Builder Market
arxiv(2024)
摘要
Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with their strong
security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's
blockchain really decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of
the {\em least decentralized} parts of Ethereum -- the most used blockchain
system in practice -- and shed light on the decentralization issue from a new
perspective.
To avoid centralization caused by Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), Ethereum
adopts a novel mechanism that produces blocks through a {\em builder market}.
After two years in operation, however, the builder market has evolved to a
highly centralized one with three builders producing more than 90% of blocks.
{\em Why does the builder market centralize, given that it is permissionless
and anyone can join?} Moreover, {\em what are the security implications of a
centralized builder market to MEV-Boost auctions?} Through a rigorous empirical
study of the builder market's core mechanism, MEV-Boost auctions, we answered
these two questions using a large-scale auction dataset we curated since 2022.
Unlike previous works that focus on {\em who} wins the auctions, we focus on
{\em why} they win, to shed light on the {openness, competitiveness, and
efficiency} of MEV-Boost auctions. Our findings also help identify directions
for improving the decentralization of builder markets.
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