英格兰银行是英国的中央银行。1694年由英国皇室特许苏格兰人威廉 · 彼得森(WilliamPaterson)等创办。初期主要为政府筹措战费，并因此而取得货币发行权。1844年根据新银行法(《皮尔条例》) 改组，分设发行部和银行部，后逐渐放弃商业银行业务，成为中央银行，1946年由工党政府收归国有。其主要职责是：发行货币；管理国债；同财政部和财政大臣协作，执行货币政策；对贴现行进行票据再贴现；代理财政金库；通过国际货币基金组织、世界银行及国际清算银行等机构办理同其他国家有关货币方面的事项；代理政府保管黄金外汇储备等。
This article studies how cash holdings at the onset of the global financial crisis affected the investment behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) after the shock. Using balance sheet data for UK SMEs, we find that cash-rich SMEs maintained their capital stock during the global financial crisis, while cash-poor rivals reduced theirs. This gave cash-rich SMEs an advantage when the economy rebounded, resulting in a persistent investment gap that grew over the recovery period. Competition dynamics, borrowing constraints, and adjustments in cash balances contributed to this amplification effect. The amplification effect was more pronounced for younger and smaller firms and in industries for which credit conditions tightened more. We do not observe a persistent effect of cash in non-crisis periods or for publicly listed firms. Our findings show that when financial constraints tighten after crises, cash holdings are a key determinant of investment by SMEs in the long term.
Using a unique regulatory data set with disclosed counterparty identities, we show that sophisticated clients in corporate bond markets outperform when splitting their orders across multiple dealers. The effect is stronger for informationally sensitive clients, for high-yield bonds, and during informationally intensive periods including COVID-19. Identifying clients who simultaneously trade in government and corporate bonds reveals that connections have larger and more persistent effects in the corporate bond market. (JEL G12, G14, G23, G24)Received: December 9, 2022; Editorial decision: September 25, 2025Editor: Norman Sch & uuml;rhoffAuthors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
We estimate the causal effects of macroprudential policies on the entire distribution of GDP growth for advanced European economies using a narrative-identification strategy in a quantile-regression framework. While macroprudential policy has near-zero effects on the centre of the GDP-growth distribution, tighter policy brings benefits by reducing the variance of future growth, significantly boosting the left tail while simultaneously reducing the right. Assessing a range of channels through which these effects materialise, we find that macroprudential policy particularly operates through ‘credit-at-risk’: it reduces the right tail of future credit growth, dampening booms, in turn reducing the likelihood of extreme GDP-growth outturns.
In this article, we examine the response of earnings and employment to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity (GDP) across the income distribution. Using data from the UK's Labour Force Survey, we present evidence that aggregate fluctuations have economically significant but heterogeneous impacts across the income distribution. While the earnings response is broadly similar across the distribution, further decompositions reveal important differences in the channels of transmission. Changes to hours worked and employment better explain the earnings response in the bottom half of the distribution, whereas changes to the hourly wage are more important in the top half. We incorporate these empirical estimates into the calibration of a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model for the UK and find that the heterogeneity we document amplifies the consumption response to aggregate shocks by around 10 per cent.
We study how banks’ capital level affects the extent to which they engage in liquidity transformation. We first construct a simple model to develop testable hypotheses on this link. Then we test our predictions and establish the causality using a confidential Bank of England dataset that includes arguably exogenous changes in banks’ capital requirement add-ons. We find that banks engage in less liquidity transformation when their capital increases, which suggests that capital and liquidity requirements are at least to some extent substitutes. We also find that this substitution is mostly driven by small banks. These results have interesting implications for the optimal joint calibration of capital and liquidity requirements and for the proportionality of prudential regulations.
