The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (informally referred to as the San Francisco Fed) is the federal bank for the twelfth district in the United States. The twelfth district is made up of nine western states—Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington—plus the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and Guam. The San Francisco Fed has branch offices in Los Angeles, Portland, Salt Lake City, and Seattle. It also has a cash processing center in Phoenix.The twelfth district is the nation's largest by area and population, covering 1.3 million sq mi (3.4 million km2), or 36% of the nation's area, and 60 million people. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco is the second-largest by assets held, after New York. In 2004 the San Francisco Fed processed 20.8 billion currency notes and 1.5 billion commercial checks.[citation needed]The Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco has one of the largest collections of US paper money in the United States, which is displayed in the American Currency Exhibit.[citation needed]Mary C. Daly serves as the President and CEO as of October 1, 2018. Notable former Presidents include John C. Williams (2011-2018), who now holds the same role at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and is Vice Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, as well as Janet Yellen (2004-2010), who held the role of Chair of the Board of Governors from 2014-2018.
We present a dynamic quantitative trade and migration model that incorporates downward nominal wage rigidities and show how this framework can generate changes in unemployment and labor participation that match those uncovered by the empirical literature studying the China shock. We find that the China shock leads to average welfare increases in most US states, including many that experience unemployment during the transition. However, nominal rigidities reduce the overall US gains by around two-thirds. In addition, there are 18 states that experience welfare losses in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity that would have experienced gains without it.
The energy transition away from fossil fuels presents significant transition risks for communities historically built around the fossil fuel industry. This paper uses the decline in the Appalachian coal industry between 2011 and 2018 to understand how individuals are harmed by a reduction in local fossil fuel extraction activity. We use individual-level credit data and exogenous variation in coal demand from the electricity sector to identify how the coal mining industry’s decline affected the finances of Appalachian households. We find that the decline in demand for coal caused broad-based negative impacts, decreasing credit scores and increasing credit utilization, delinquencies, amounts in third party collections, bankruptcy rates, and the number of individuals with subprime status. These effects were broad based and cannot be explained solely by individuals who lost coal mining jobs. Individuals with the lowest pre-period credit scores were more likely to end up in financial distress and experienced a greater deterioration in credit scores. Quantile regressions show that the drop in credit scores from the coal decline was most pronounced between the 30th and 50th percentiles of the credit score distribution. Our results provide evidence that people living in fossil fuel extraction regions are likely to experience declines in financial well-being from the energy transition even if they do not directly work in the affected industry.
Using CPS microdata, 1976-2024, we estimate trend and cyclical components of un employment and labor force participation for 44 age-gender-education groups. We fit a parsimonious state-space model in which each series is the sum of latent cohort and time-varying age effects and a latent cyclical factor shared across unemployment and participation, without imposing structural covariates. Aggregating group trends with observed population shares, we find that population aging and educational upgrading explain most long-run movements in aggregate trends, while cohort effects drive large gender differences in participation. Combining our estimates with demographic projec tions and an estimated cohort model of education shares, we forecast that over the next two decades, trend participation declines by about 1.5 pp and trend unemployment falls by about 0.4 pp, remaining historically low.
In the past two decades, a number of banks joined global initiatives aimed to mitigate climate change by “greening” their asset portfolios. We study whether banks that made such commitments have a different emission exposure of their portfolios of syndicated loans than banks that did not. We rely on loan-level information with global coverage combined with country-industry information on emissions. We find that all banks have reduced their loan-emission exposures over the last 8 years. However, we do not find differences between banks that did and those that did not signal their sustainability goals, with the exception of early signers of Principles of Responsible Investments (PRI), who already had lower exposure to emissions through their syndicated lending. In addition, banks that signed PRI shortened the maturity of the loans extended to highly-emitting industries but only temporarily. Thus, we conclude that banks reduced their exposure to climate transition risks on average, but voluntary climate commitments did not contribute to syndicated loan reallocation away from highly-emitting sectors.
Following decades of secular decline, many estimates of r∗—the natural or steady-state short-term real interest rate—have risen roughly 1 percentage point since 2020 in the United States. The most prominent explanations attribute this reversal to heightened expectations of rising government debt and faster productivity growth from artificial intelligence (AI). However, a high-frequency event study finds that news about fiscal and AI developments does not explain this increase. Furthermore, contrary to earlier evidence that persistent shifts in longer-term yields occurred around monetary policy meetings, we find that monetary policy news does not account for the recent rise in r∗.
