Swedish Defence University

Military doctrine can function as a tool of change by articulating a vision of the future force. However, how and under which conditions this occurs is contested. This study is structured as a theory-testing process-tracing case study on the use of doctrine by the Royal Norwegian Air Force 1999-2011. Following its perceived irrelevance during Operation Allied Force in 1999, the Norwegian Air Force shifted from a defensive to an offensive posture, culminating in extensive bombings during Operation Unified Protector in 2011. However, Norway did not use doctrine as a tool of change, despite having all the theorised preconditions for doing so. This was due to a tradition of writing descriptive, rather than prescriptive doctrine. Yet, while not having direct effect, doctrine served as a platform for internal debate, influencing changes in force employment, organisation, and equipment indirectly. These findings challenge conventional assumptions about doctrine as a driver of military change, highlighting its indirect role in shaping military discourse and institutional adaptation. The study contributes to the study of international security by demonstrating that the direct impact of doctrine on military transformation is contingent on doctrinal traditions.

A specific set of challenges facing the intelligence community in a contemporary environment is characterized by composite and dynamic hybrid threats. An understanding of the reciprocal interaction is required between the intelligence actors responsible for intelligence analysis and dissemination, and key societal actors responsible for crafting responses to hybrid threats and building societal resilience. Three processes are identified as critical for the intelligence community's ability to proactively counter hybrid threats: intelligence analysis; aggregation and communication of intelligence; and reception and absorption of intelligence among key societal actors. The interconnections between these areas are visualized in the Intelligence Analysis Interaction Model, intending to provide a framework for understanding the dynamics of hybrid threats and their evolution over time, and the intelligence community's interactive engagement with societal actors aiming to counter hybrid threats and build resilience. The framework contributes to improved tools for identifying and analyzing the nexus between threats and vulnerabilities, building resilience, and devising whole-of-society responses to hybrid threats.

Generative artificial intelligence now synthesizes photorealistic imagery, audio, and video at a cost that defeats traditional forensic intuition. The legal consequences span three regimes studied so far in isolation: international operational law, domestic procedure, and product regulation. This article presents a unified evidentiary framework that maps cryptographic content provenance, robust statistical watermarking, and zero knowledge attestation to the proof requirements of each regime. We define a five tier threat model spanning naive regeneration, adversarial laundering, cross model regeneration, active watermark removal, and insider provenance forgery. We release a public benchmark of 12000 generated items across image, audio, and video modalities under six laundering pipelines for 72000 evaluation samples. We evaluate four representative schemes and report true positive rate at fixed false positive rate, robustness area under the curve, computational overhead, and a regime conditioned legal sufficiency score. We translate empirical detection bounds into legal sufficiency thresholds for command decisions under the law of armed conflict, for criminal and civil admissibility under domestic procedure, and for persistence audits under the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act and analogous regimes. The result is a reproducible reference pipeline, a public benchmark, and model annexes that lawyers, engineers, and operators can deploy together.

Tämä artikkeli käsittelee militarismin ja sotilaallisen voiman esittämistä Venäjän presidentinhallinnon virallisissa valokuvissa laajamittaisen hyökkäyssodan alusta helmikuussa 2022 vuoden 2025 voitonpäivään. Hyökkäyssodan ajalta nousevia teemoja kontekstualisoi presidentinhallinnon aiempi militarismin ja sotilaallisen voiman esittäminen sivustolla ”Putin. 20 Years”. Artikkelin puitteissa militarismilla viitataan sen kulttuurisiin ilmentymiin, kuten sotahistorian glorifiointiin, ”sotilaallisen voiman” taas viitatessa tapoihin, joilla hallinto esittelee omaa sotilaallista kyvykkyyttään. Presidentinhallinto on perinteisesti keskittynyt erityisesti historian korostamiseen ”muistamisen” teeman kautta. Historian muistamiseen liittyy vahvasti uhrauksen ja kärsimyksen glorifiointi. Samanlainen glorifiointi voidaan nähdä nyt laajamittaisen hyökkäyssodan kontekstissa. Sotilaallinen voima on esiintynyt presidentinhallinnon materiaaleissa erilaisin voimannäytöin. Aiemmin näiden voidaan katsoa suuntautuneen tulevaisuuteen esitellen Venäjän potentiaalia. Hyökkäyssodan kontekstissa Venäjän kyvykkyys on edelleen keskiössä, tosin enää kysymys ei ole potentiaalista vaan sotateollisuuden resilienssistä. This article discusses the ways in which militarism and military power are depicted in official photographs of Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation from the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to Victory Day 2025. The themes that come up are contextualized by the Presidential Administration’s previous depiction of militarism and military power on the website “Putin. 20 Years”. In this article, militarism refers to its cultural manifestations, while ‘military power’ refers to the ways in which the Administration presents its own capabilities. The Presidential Administration has traditionally focused on emphasizing history through the theme of ‘remembrance’. Remembrance is associated with the glorification of sacrifice and suffering. A similar glorification can now be seen in the context of the full-scale war. Military power has appeared in the materials of the presidential administration in various shows of force. Previously, these shows of force were more future-oriented and focused on Russia’s potential. Now, in the context of the war in Ukraine, Russia's capabilities are still at the center, although the question is no longer about potential but about the resilience of Russia’s military industry.