As security demands increase, the importance of secure computation technologies grows, yet these technologies can often seem overwhelming to practitioners. Furthermore, many approaches focus only on a single technology, potentially overlooking superior alternatives. This work aims to address the issue of selecting the right technology for secure computation by presenting a comparative analysis of two highly relevant cryptographic methods and their software implementations, with a particular focus on machine learning. Firstly, we provide a theoretical summary and comparison of the secure computation paradigms of secure multi-party computation (SMPC) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). We outline the advantages and limitations of the protocols, as well as the relevant open-source software implementations. Secondly, we present the results of extensive benchmarking of the main software frameworks identified for machine learning operations and models. Regarding the current state of the art in FHE, we observe that it outperforms SMPC for regressions. Additionally it may be faster for simple dense networks using GPUs or Hybrid Models. Conversely, SMPC showed superior performance for complex models such as CNNs. Our results should pave the way for more technology-agnostic benchmarking of secure computation technologies for machine learning, providing guidance for practitioners looking to adopt these technologies.
The Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) cryptosystem was selected for standardization in the fourth round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project. The goal of the PQC project is to standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we present a single-trace Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack against HQC that exploits power consumption leakage that occurs during polynomial multiplication performed at the beginning of HQC decryption. Using the ChipWhisperer-Lite board, we perform and evaluate the attack, achieving a 99.69
Many business processes currently depend on web services, often using REST APIs for communication. REST APIs expose web service functionality through endpoints, allowing easy client interaction over the Internet. To reduce the security risk resulting from exposed endpoints, thorough testing is desired. Due to the generally vast number of endpoints, automated testing techniques, like fuzzing, are of interest. This paper introduces WuppieFuzz, an open-source REST API fuzzer built on LibAFL, supporting white-box, grey-box and black-box fuzzing. Using an OpenAPI specification, it can generate an initial input corpus consisting of sequences of requests. These are mutated with REST-specific and LibAFL-provided mutators to explore different code paths in the software under test. Guided by the measured coverage, WuppieFuzz then selects which request sequences to send next to reach complex states in the software under test. In this process, it automates harness creation to reduce manual efforts often required in fuzzing. Different kinds of reporting are provided by the fuzzer to help fixing bugs. We evaluated our tool on the Petstore API to assess the robustness of the white-box approach and the effectiveness of different power schedules. We further monitored endpoint and code coverage over time to measure the efficacy of the approach.
Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) grants holders full ownership and control of their digital identities, being the ultimate digital identity model. Operating in a decentralized manner, SSI enables the verification of claims, including privacy-preserving mechanisms. Blockchain, which can be used to implement a Verifiable Data Registry (VDR), is often considered one of the pillars of SSI, along with Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs). Unfortunately, blockchains are mostly siloed, affecting the interoperability and universality of SSI. We investigate the effect of blockchain isolation on blockchain-based SSI. We first define possible scenarios for cross-chain SSI and exemplify with real-life use cases. We then define specific requirements for cross-chain SSI and identify challenges, also in relation to the identified scenarios. We explore various solutions to achieve blockchain interoperability, with a focus on SSI. In particular, we identify the advantages and disadvantages of distinct cross-chain models for cross-chain SSI. Finally, we address the usability of cross-chain SSI and discuss security and privacy aspects, opening the way for future research.
Recently, a considerable amount of malware research has focused on the use of powerful image-based machine learning techniques, which generally yield impressive results. However, before image-based techniques can be applied to malware, the samples must be converted to images, and there is no generally-accepted approach for doing so. The malware-to-image conversion strategies found in the literature often appear to be ad hoc, with little or no effort made to take into account properties of executable files. In this paper, we experiment with eight distinct malware-to-image conversion techniques, and for each, we test a variety of learning models. We find that several of these image conversion techniques perform similarly across a range of learning models, in spite of the image conversion processes being quite different. These results suggest that the effectiveness of image-based malware classification techniques may depend more on the inherent strengths of image analysis techniques, as opposed to the precise details of the image conversion strategy.
. Functional Encryption (FE) is a modern cryptographic tech-nique that allows users to learn only a specific function of the encrypted data and nothing else about its actual content. While the first notions of security in FE revolved around the privacy of the encrypted data, more recent approaches also consider the privacy of the computed function. While in the public key setting, only a limited level of function-privacy can be achieved, in the private-key setting privacy potential is significantly larger. However, this potential is still limited by the lack of rich function families. For this work, we started by identifying the limitations of the current state-of-the-art approaches which, in its turn, allowed us to consider a new threat model for FE schemes. To the best of our knowledge, we here present the first attempt to quantify the leakage during the execution of an FE scheme. By leveraging the functionality offered by Trusted Execution Environments, we propose a construction that given any message-private functional encryption scheme yields a function-private one. Finally, we argue in favour of our construction’s applicability on constrained devices by showing that it has low storage and computation costs.
