
Motivated by the high prices of branded/patented pharmaceuticals in many parts of the world, this paper analyzes price regulations in a two-country (home and foreign) model where a single home firm serves both markets and its R&D investment determines product quality. We study two types of price regulations: direct price controls (PCs) and external reference pricing (ERP) under which the price that the firm is permitted to charge locally depends upon its price abroad. We show that although ERP undermines R&D incentives, its implementation can raise home welfare. However, home’s optimal ERP policy is too restrictive from a joint welfare perspective. Furthermore, if the foreign market is subject to a PC, home prefers ERP to a PC due to strategic considerations that come into play due to the international price linkage created by ERP.
We evaluated both the demand for and impact of a prevention tool against malaria that requires repeated purchase and overcomes the limits of mosquito bed nets. We used a randomized experiment to examine the effects of subsidies for a mosquito repellent ointment that protects against mosquito bites and malaria on product use and malaria cases in Burkina Faso. Around 3100 households were randomly allocated to one of the three experimental groups defined by level of subsidy: 0, 50 or 100%. Subsidies strongly and significantly increase the probability of acquiring a jar of mosquito repellent ointment and using it regularly during the rainy season. We find no substitution with bed nets, but a strong effect on the use of mosquito coils. The treatment effects on usage are heterogeneous, including more positive outcomes for young children as reported by their caregiver. The impact on use continues even after the end of the subsidy, with effects on demand and willingness to pay elicited through a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak approach eight months after the end of the intervention. Our intervention induces a significant reduction in declared malaria occurrence during the rainy season, but no effect at the very end of the rainy season when blood tests were taken. The seemingly discrepancy will be partly explained by timing and sample size.
Choosing a physician who can deliver high-quality care at a reasonable cost can improve health outcomes and reduce spending on healthcare. I study a disclosure program that classifies physicians based on quality and cost. I use a regression discontinuity design and find that physicians who score higher on both quality and cost effectiveness see 38% more new patients, and that younger patients are more responsive than older patients. Evaluating claims of patients who switch physicians following physician exit, I find that middle-aged patients experience larger reductions in spending than younger patients when switching to higher-quality, lower-cost physicians.