In the 1990s, Michal Viewegh's Bliss Was It in Bohemia and Irena Douskov & aacute;'s B. Proudew achieved cult status, prompting other Czech writers to revisit normalization-era childhoods. In the early twenty-first century, both authors returned to their protagonists - now adults navigating life in the democratic Czech Republic - in Wonderful Years with Klaus and Darda. Rather than responding solely to market demands, Viewegh's and Douskov & aacute;'s sequels emerge from a deeper personal need to continue the stories of protagonists whose maturation was disrupted by the political and social constraints of the 1970s and 1980s; the original novels end inconclusively, leaving Kvido and Helena fragmented and incomplete. By undermining the Bildungsroman's demand for coherent identity and linear development, the authors not only paved the way for sequels but also challenged the very notion of narrative closure. The author argues that these coming-of-age novels and their continuations articulate a generational perspective on the transition from late socialism to democracy, emphasizing parent-child role reversal (parentification), in which parents traumatized by normalization transmitted anxieties and emotional burdens to their children, stunting their development. Concluding with open endings like the originals, the "post-Communist" sequels mirror the protagonists' developmental stasis and the lingering effects of normalization after 1989. Dans les ann & eacute;es 1990, B & aacute;je & ccaron;n & aacute; l & eacute;ta pod psa (Les belles ann & eacute;es de mis & egrave;re) de Michal Viewegh et Hrd & yacute; Bud & zcaron;es (Fier tu seras) d'Irena Douskov & aacute; sont devenus des romans cultes, incitant d'autres & eacute;crivains & agrave; revisiter leurs enfances pendant la normalisation. Au d & eacute;but du vingt-et-uni & egrave;me si & egrave;cle, les deux auteurs ont retrouv & eacute; leurs protagonistes adultes dans la R & eacute;publique tch & egrave;que d & eacute;mocratique avec B & aacute;je & ccaron;n & aacute; l & eacute;ta s Klausem (Les belles ann & eacute;es avec Klaus) et Darda. Plut & ocirc;t que de c & eacute;der aux pressions du march & eacute;, ces suites r & eacute;pondent & agrave; un besoin intime de prolonger des r & eacute;cits dont la maturation avait & eacute;t & eacute; interrompue par les contraintes politiques et sociales des ann & eacute;es 1970 et 1980. Les romans originaux se terminaient inachev & eacute;s, laissant Kvido et Helena fragment & eacute;s et incomplets. En sapant l'exigence du Bildungsroman d'une identit & eacute; coh & eacute;rente et d'un d & eacute;veloppement lin & eacute;aire, les auteurs ont pr & eacute;par & eacute; le terrain aux suites et remis en cause la cl & ocirc;ture narrative. L'auteure avance que ces romans d'apprentissage et leurs prolongements offrent une lecture g & eacute;n & eacute;rationnelle de la transition du socialisme tardif & agrave; la d & eacute;mocratie, en soulignant la parentification : des parents traumatis & eacute;s par la normalisation ont transmis anxi & eacute;t & eacute;s et charges & eacute;motionnelles & agrave; leurs enfants, entravant leur d & eacute;veloppement. Se concluant par des fins ouvertes, les suites post-communistes reproduisent la stagnation d & eacute;veloppementale des protagonistes et les effets durables de la normalisation apr & egrave;s 1989.
The past is our only guide to the present. Troubled times, therefore, invite historical comparison. This introduction to the CSP forum "When History Rhymes Too Much: Lessons for the Present from Central and Eastern Europe" makes the case for sound historical comparison and summarizes methodological principles that must inform it. It reviews levels of generalization that can be formulated or tested on the basis of comparison and the respective roles of theory and concepts in mediating comparison. The introduction explains how contributions to the forum variously approach comparison and highlights some of their key findings.
The revolution of 1917-20 has become a prominent reference point in discussions of the current Russo-Ukrainian war in both countries, in part because Vladimir Putin blames Vladimir Lenin for the creation of an "artificial" Ukraine from "historical" Russian lands. This article argues instead that the Bolshevik conquest of Ukraine was, in many respects, similar to Putin's war. Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks operating in Ukraine shared many cultural assumptions and policies with their ideological nemesis, the Russian White Army, and ultimately with Putin's ideologues. Paramount among these was an "imperial ambiguity" about what Ukraine was in relation to Russia, reflecting uncertainty about Russia's own identity. Some Ukrainian Bolsheviks at the time viewed Moscow's policies in Ukraine as colonialist. The article demonstrates that it was the international situation and Ukrainian resistance that forced Lenin to adopt the notion of ethno-linguistic Ukrainian territories, which he acknowledged as a useful foreign policy tool. Rather than "creating" Ukraine, Lenin can instead be credited with the creation of a "Russian" Crimea, which a century later would serve as a launchpad for Russian aggression.
