Abstract This article examines the evolution of Soviet maritime contraband suppression from the Khrushchev era through the late 1980s, arguing that anti-smuggling campaigns functioned not merely as economic policing but as a site of institutional rivalry, ideological enforcement, and state security consolidation. Drawing on little-known investigative files and internal communications of Soviet policing agencies, it shows that jurisdictional competition between customs authorities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs ( MVD ), and the KGB was structurally embedded by design. Overlapping mandates and fragmented oversight incentivized these institutions to vie for control over the lucrative maritime sector, actively seeking to widen surveillance prerogatives and prosecutorial authority. The expansion of foreign trade and international exchange beginning with détente in the 1970s exposed systemic vulnerabilities that authorities attempted to suppress through show trials, intensified vigilance, and harsh punishments. High-profile cases—including the Great Caviar Scandal and the Mikhail Dahia show trial—reveal how economic crime investigations became not only instruments of repression but also vehicles for bureaucratic infighting and political posturing. These measures failed to address the structural drivers of black-market profitability. Instead, haphazard enforcement campaigns deepened institutional rivalries while illicit exchange expanded dramatically in the final Soviet decade, particularly in the Baltic ports and Leningrad. The final section situates Sobchak-era St. Petersburg at the center of the Soviet-to- post-Soviet transition, showing how late-Soviet enforcement networks and the shadow maritime economy were repurposed rather than dismantled after 1991. The repeal of Criminal Code Article 154 in 1992 reoriented these networks, helping actors embedded in contraband economies to convert illicit capital into political and economic influence. By linking late-Soviet repression to post-Soviet elite formation, the article reframes maritime contraband as a revealing lens for understanding institutional continuity and change, as well as the emergence of early forms of market relations in Russia.
