It is no secret that international law has been under strain in recent years given the global rise of populism, authoritarianism, protectionist policies, and states’ strategic retreat from multilateral institutions, including, notably, various international dispute settlement (IDS) mechanisms. This trend includes states withdrawing from international tribunals 1 and from provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in recent international investment agreements (IIAs) or from treaties altogether. 2 The withdrawal from such mechanisms, which some publicists dubbed an “assault on international adjudication,” has reinforced the fundamental assumption that the international legal order’s success remains inextricably tied to states’ submission of their international disputes to adjudication or other peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms. 3
Canada has had a meaningful impact on international law through its participation in the development of the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Several arbitral awards involving Canada, even before the establishment of the ICJ's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, were instrumental in shaping subsequent jurisprudence in different areas of international law. Canada's participation in proceedings before the Court, as a party and intervener in contentious cases and as a participant in advisory proceedings, has been rich in legal arguments on fundamental issues, such as the functioning of the United Nations, the ICJ's jurisdiction, the law of the sea, environmental law, and the law of state responsibility. Perhaps even more significantly, the activities and statements made by Canada's courts, executive, and legislature are frequently relied-upon examples of state practice in pleadings before the Court. Finally, although Canada has had only one elected judge on the bench of the ICJ, Canadian jurists have frequently served as judges ad hoc and as counsel and advocates for states.
In its 2021 Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Canada has sought to preserve regulatory flexibility by using terms like "legitimate policy objectives," "legitimate public policy objectives," and "legitimate public welfare objectives." How can this threefold distinction of "legitimate objectives" impact the interpretation of international investment obligations? Through an analysis of the content of international investment agreements and awards from tribunals that have expressly referred to these terms, this article argues that various forms of "legitimate objectives" do not encapsulate distinct legally significant terms and could lead to unintended consequences.
The right to food, which is a vector of food security, has long been the subject of contradictory debates, on the one hand, on its belonging to the category of human rights and, on the other hand, on its justiciability. However, in view of its importance to human life, awareness of the issue seems to have evolved. Legal texts at both the national and international levels are increasingly incorporating it. In addition, theories such as Henry Shue's three levels of obligation in human rights implementation, and the general theory of rights in watermark, can be used to prove its existence and justiciability. It could therefore be argued that, as a sovereign legal entity under public law, the state has a responsibility to combat food insecurity and promote the enjoyment of the right to food by its population. However, this reality cannot be allowed to marginalize the existence of difficulties in such implementation. Such is the case with the lack of universal recognition of this right, the inadequacy of binding legal texts to support it, and the marginalization of certain branches of international law that are nonetheless instrumental in realizing this right and ensuring food security. This is the case for international agri-food law and international soil law. In addition, there are other challenges. These are linked not only to the existing disparities between states in terms of their differing economic situations but also to increasingly pronounced scourges such as climate change and armed conflict. As a result, food insecurity remains an international problem requiring collective action by the entire international community (states, international organizations, and international non-governmental organizations) if it is to be eradicated.
On 8 June 2023, Canada and the Netherlands brought a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging violations by the Syrian State of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In a situation often described as a zone where law and justice have no place, this initiative represents the first attempt to hold the Syrian State accountable for alleged violations of international law. Beyond the ICJ's potential, as the institutional embodiment of state responsibility, to narrow the "impunity gap" in the Syrian context, this case also sheds light on the persistent tension between two opposing visions of international law - the "universalist" and "sovereigntist" models - which are called to coexist in the fight against impunity. While this case aligns with a jurisprudential trend favouring the expansion of the ICJ's judicial function - notably, through the extension of locus standi and the evolution of its mandate to address contexts marked by large-scale human rights violations - it would be a mistake to conclude that the sovereigntist paradigm has been erased or replaced.
On 28 August 2023, Canada amended and substantially narrowed its unilateral declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The combined effects of its various reservations - notably, Canada's new requirement that states must have provided at least six-month advance written notice before instituting ICJ proceedings against it, coupled with its ongoing rights to amend or terminate its declaration with immediate effect - have now rendered Canadian acceptance of Optional Clause jurisdiction compulsory in name only. Canada now appears to control whether any future ICJ cases can ever be brought against it in this way.
Canada is widely regarded as a pro-arbitration jurisdiction. Yet the role of domestic judges in investor-state dispute settlement remains significant, particularly in arbitrations that do not take place at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Unlike ICSID, which provides a self-contained system for enforcement and annulment, investment treaty arbitration conducted under other arbitration rules are subject to judicial oversight. This article examines how Canadian judges have approached set-aside proceedings in non-ICSID cases, with a particular focus on the standard of review applied under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The article contends that Canadian judges play a pivotal role in shaping the interface between international investment law and domestic legal principles. In this context, this article argues that the degree of deference shown by Canadian judges to investment arbitral awards should be understood not as judicial restraint per se but, rather, as respect for the distinct legal order constituted by investment treaty arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model Law - a legal order that is international in nature and grounded in a shared global understanding of review standards. Through an analysis of key judicial decisions reviewing investment awards - specifically, the North American Free Trade Agreement Chapter 11 awards, this study explores the extent to which Canadian judges have embraced an internationalist perspective. The article concludes that, while Canadian judges claim to be pro-arbitration, this does not necessarily equate to deference towards investment arbitral awards.
On 20 March 2024, Canada submitted a written statement to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of a Request for an Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change. This was followed by Canada's oral submissions on 3 December 2024. On 20 December 2024, Canada also submitted replies to questions posed by judges at the conclusion of the oral hearings.
Abstract In the late nineteenth century, increasing demand for sealskins by the fashion industry led to an expansion of the seal hunt in the open waters of the Bering Sea. This practice of pelagic sealing was blamed for a severe drop in the population of the north Pacific fur seal herd that bred on the Pribilof Islands off Alaska and was harvested on shore by US interests. US officials began seizing Canadian ships and crews in international waters in contravention of the accepted principle of freedom of the high seas. After years of diplomatic stalemate and jingoistic sabre rattling, the United States and Great Britain, which still controlled Canadian foreign affairs, agreed to put the legality of the seizures before an international tribunal. The so-called Bering Sea Arbitration , held in Paris in 1893, built on the legacy of the Alabama Claims Arbitration from twenty years earlier and was a major step in Canada’s emergence as a fully independent nation with Canadians playing significant roles as arbitrator, counsel, and agent. The tribunal found the seizures contrary to international law and also found that, while the seals bred on US soil, the United States had no property rights in them. However, to restrict the size and scope of the seal hunt as a means of preserving the species from extinction, the tribunal also set down regulations that are now seen as an early foundation of modern environmental law.
Q: Why does nationality matter? Why does it matter from the perspective of the state and why does it matter from the perspective of the parties to the dispute? Former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada Bertha Wilson wrote an article in 1990 entitled “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” 1 in which she examined the perspective one’s gender gives to framing and deciding legal issues. I think one’s nationality plays a similar role. There is a collective experience with, and perspective on, international law (fostered by conferences like the CCIL’s annual conference and the mere existence of the CYIL ) that is distinctly ours. To the state, the legitimacy of a decision in a dispute to which the state is a party is probably enhanced by having a national on the court (with the International Court of Justice [ICJ], this perception can be accomplished with the appointment of ad hoc judges where the disputing state does not have a judge of its nationality on the bench). However, this would not account for the contribution that Canadians can make to international courts and tribunals involving other states on international law issues generally. For as you all know, international law is not just made by treaty making but also through judicial interpretations of those treaties and state practice.
Au sein de l’Organisation des États américains (OÉA), 1 la Commission interaméricaine des Droits de l’Homme (CIDH) et la Cour interaméricaine des Droits de l’Homme sont les deux principaux organes chargés de veiller à la protection des droits de la personne dans les Amériques. 2 Ces instances sont habilitées à instruire des recours individuels intentés contre des États membres et portant sur des allégations de violations de la Convention américaine relative aux Droits de l’Homme ( CADH ) 3 et d’autres instruments interaméricains applicables. 4 La présente chronique portera sur certaines décisions rendues par la Cour pendant l’année 2024.
Résumé Le droit à l’alimentation, vecteur de la sécurité alimentaire, a longtemps fait l’objet de débats contradictoires, d’une part, sur son appartenance à la catégorie des droits humains et, d’autre part, sur sa justiciabilité. Toutefois, au regard de son importance dans la vie de l’être humain, la prise de conscience semble avoir évolué sur son sujet. Des textes juridiques tant à l’échelle nationale qu’ internationale l’incorporent de plus en plus. Joint à cela, des théories à l’image de la théorie des trois niveaux d’obligations de Henry Shue en matière de mise en œuvre des droits humains et de la théorie générale des droits en filigrane, peuvent être mises à contribution afin de prouver son existence et sa justiciabilité. Dès lors, on pourrait affirmer qu’en sa qualité de personne morale de droit public qui se présente comme une entité souveraine, l’État a une responsabilité pour lutter contre l’insécurité alimentaire et favoriser la jouissance du droit à l’alimentation par sa population. Toutefois, cette réalité ne peut permettre de marginaliser l’existence de difficultés au niveau d’une telle mise en œuvre. C’est le cas du manque de reconnaissance universelle de ce droit, de l’insuffisance des textes juridiques à valeur contraignante qui l’encadrent ou encore de la marginalisation de certaines branches du droit international qui sont pourtant contributives à sa réalisation et à celle de la sécurité alimentaire. C’est à l’image du droit international de l’agroalimentaire et du droit international des sols. À cela, s’ajoutent d’autres défis. Ceux-ci sont liés aux disparités existantes entre les États au regard de leurs situations économiques différentes, mais aussi aux fléaux de plus en plus prononcés comme les changements climatiques et les conflits armés. De la sorte, l’insécurité alimentaire reste une problématique internationale qui nécessite une action collective de l’ensemble de la communauté internationale (États, organisations internationales, organisations non gouvernementales) pour son éradication.
L’année 2024 est marquée à la fois par la passivité de la pratique conventionnelle du Canada et l’hyperactivité de sa pratique contentieuse. L’apurement de l’arriéré des réclamations fondées sur le régime de règlement des différends entre investisseurs et États (RDIE) de l’ Accord de libre-échange nord-américain entre le gouvernement du Canada, le gouvernement des États-Unis et le gouvernement du Mexique ( ALÉNA ) se poursuit. 1 De nombreuses sentences sont aussi rendues dans des affaires portées par des investisseurs canadiens à l’étranger, des sociétés minières pour l’essentiel. Ces affaires permettent de tester les innovations juridiques visant à renforcer le droit de légiférer de l’État dans les traités plus récents du Canada. Une première sentence très attendue sur la question hautement controversée de la portée temporelle du régime transitoire de RDIE de l’ Accord entre le Canada, les États-Unis et le Mexique ( ACÉUM ) 2 est rendue dans l’affaire TC Energy et TransCanada c États-Unis (II) 3 et se solde en faveur de l’État. La controverse sur la portée temporelle de ce régime transitoire fait l’objet d’une analyse détaillée dans la chronique cette année. Un tour d’horizon des principaux autres faits marquants de 2024 est d’abord effectué en ce qui concerne la pratique conventionnelle et la pratique contentieuse du Canada.
Résumé Le 8 juin 2023, le Canada et les Pays-Bas ont saisi la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ) pour des violations de la 1984 Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants attribuées à l’État syrien. À cette situation étatique, souvent décrite comme une zone où le droit et la justice n’avaient pas leur place, se superposent ainsi de premiers efforts pour que l’État rende des comptes. Au-delà de la possibilité dont dispose la Cour internationale de Justice (CIJ), en tant que visage institutionnel de la responsabilité étatique, de réduire ici le “fossé d’impunité,” cette affaire met également en lumière la tension existante entre deux visions opposées du droit international (“universaliste” et “souverainiste”) qui sont appelées à coexister dans le cadre de la lutte contre l’impunité. Bien que cette affaire, s’inscrivant dans une lignée jurisprudentielle favorable à l’élargissement de la fonction judiciaire de la CIJ, confirme la proximité avec le modèle “universaliste” eu égard à l’extension du locus standi devant son prétoire et à l’évolution de son mandat pour embrasser les contextes gouvernés par des violations massives des droits de la personne, il ne faudrait pas en déduire que le paradigme “souverainiste” a été effacé et remplacé.
It is a privilege to write a preface to this Symposium on Canada before International Courts and Tribunals, which includes many stimulating and insightful contributions. In this preface, I go back to the beginning and focus on Canada’s first cases at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and before international arbitral tribunals.
Bien qu’il soit tentant de s’attarder surtout sur les événements marquant la suite des élections américaines tant les deux derniers mois de l’année ont modifié le paradigme en ce qui concerne le droit du commerce international, cette chronique tentera de décrire et d’analyser l’année 2024 dans sa globalité. On pourrait ainsi diviser l’année en deux: l’avant et l’après 5 novembre 2024.
