
Why do international regimes persist when rival powers clash over their norms instead of replacing them with alternatives? This study introduces a neorealist explanation of regime persistence during power transitions. The concept of norm ownership captures competition over the authoritative interpretation of regime norms. I argue that high-stakes norms function as power resources linked to legitimacy. To examine this dynamic, I trace the evolution of the Arctic regime across two critical junctures: its post-Cold War formation (1987–1996) and the post-2022 period marked by fragmentation, as well as the path-dependent dynamics between them. At both points, the core norm of Arctic peace was linked to security arrangements that proved decisive for the regime’s survival. The study shows that U.S. and Russian strategies of norm ownership shape the resolution of institutional uncertainty. The findings suggest that in regimes where major powers face prohibitive exit costs, contestation over norm ownership may contribute to institutional continuity.
The growing prevalence and institutionalization of state apologies imply a shared moral consensus that countries should acknowledge and apologize for past human rights violations. Empirical evidence, however, on whether this moral expectation is shared by people across the world and whether people value state apologies in the wake of human rights violations remains limited. This is surprising, given that existing evidence on interpersonal apologies suggests that people across countries may value state apologies differently. To investigate this further, we implemented a mixed-method vignette study to systematically explore to what extent we see commonalities or differences in how people in eight culturally diverse countries ( N = 533) think about and value state apologies to or by their country. On one hand, we find that apologies (vis-à-vis other response strategies) are indeed largely seen as an appropriate course of action across all countries, whereby people report common expectations in terms of what they expect apologies to signal or achieve. On the other hand, some variation across countries and conditions is observed. People’s expectations often reflect the importance of local cultural norms, values, and practices as well as socio-political narratives and priorities, reiterating the need to consider the wider socio-cultural context when it comes to understanding how people value apologies.
This article asks how far German strategic culture shifted between 1953 and 2021 and whether strategic-subcultural competition inside the Bundestag conveyed external shocks into observable change. Adopting a historical-institutionalist lens that treats strategic culture as an institution of rules, ideas, and norms, the study focuses on the rules pillar-the legal and procedural framework governing the use of force. Using a new word-embedding model (conText), it analyses the entire corpus of security-related Bundestag speeches from legislative periods 2-19 to calculate cosine distances between party-specific vectors, producing a longitudinal, party-pair dataset spanning both Cold- and post-Cold War eras. Findings show a pattern of prolonged stability interrupted by episodic disruption: rhetorical divergence spikes after German reunification (1990) and Russia's annexation of Crimea (2014), driven by ideological outsiders, before floor-time rules, committee scrutiny and budget cycles restore a modified consensus. Integrating strategic-subcultural competition with historical-institutionalist mechanisms clarifies why unification, more than Kosovo or Crimea, marks a critical juncture. Methodologically, the study demonstrates how large-scale, reproducible text-as-data techniques can trace strategic-cultural change and deliver a baseline against which the post-2022 Zeitenwende can be evaluated.
Trauma has become an increasingly prominent concept in international relations, yet we still know relatively little about the mechanisms through which traumatic experiences shape foreign policy. This introduction to the Special Issue advances a trauma-informed approach to Foreign Policy Analysis by conceptualizing trauma as a multilevel phenomenon that influences state behaviour through three interconnected mechanisms: shaping identities and threat perceptions, becoming institutionalized in political and societal structures, and being strategically mobilized in discourse. Building on constructivist scholarship while engaging with insights from political psychology and foreign policy analysis, we distinguish between individual and group trauma and demonstrate how each affects foreign policy through different pathways. We argue that trauma should be understood not merely as a legacy of past violence but as an active political resource that influences strategic choices, national identities, and international interactions. The introduction also highlights the Special Issue's broader conceptual, methodological, and empirical contributions through diverse case studies spanning Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, including Israel, Ukraine, South Korea, Russia, and post-communist Europe. Collectively, the contributions demonstrate that trauma can generate both conflict and restraint, that its effects are contingent on political interpretation and institutionalization, and that understanding trauma is essential for explaining contemporary foreign policy behaviour.
This analysis unpacks how interstate conflicts change the scope and function of memory laws. Following diplomatic ruptures, memory entrepreneurs deploy conflict-time memory laws to essentialize adversaries, cause them reputational damage, and communicate specific interpretations of the conflict to both domestic and international audiences. At the same time, conflict-time memory laws also recalibrate collective memory narratives by linking past grievances to contemporary conflicts. Developing the concept of conflict-time memory laws, the article evaluates Greece’s 1996 recognition of the Armenian Genocide following the Imia crisis with Turkey (1995–1996). The study reveals how the conflict provided a diverse group of Greek MPs with a strategic opportunity to recognize the Armenian Genocide, shame Turkey, and characterize it as immutably transgressive to both domestic and international audiences. The concept of conflict-time memory laws introduces novel insights into the interactive dynamics between memory politics and interstate conflicts.