Abstract During the interwar period, the Reichswehr planned the air war of the future. The prohibition of air armament by the Treaty of Versailles and limited economic resources lead to a small-scale air armament conducted in secret. The Reichswehr’s air warfare planning is often interpreted in light of the Wehrmacht’s air warfare operations in the Second World War. In contrast, technical planning and development of aircraft, weapons and bombs are usually neglected. However, a greater reliance on these sources helps to clarify the Reichswehr’s guiding principles for air warfare. It becomes clear, that the central focus of its air warfare thinking largely, but not entirely, corresponded to the theories of the air warfare theorist Giulio Douhet (1869–1930). Due to the aforementioned limitations, this thinking was hardly reflected in the actual armament procurement.
Abstract The image of the Reichswehr as an autonomously armed ›state within the state‹ not only includes the blanket rejection of the pacifist movement by the leadership of the German military, but also its categorical ›campaign‹ against critics of illegal armament. According to this image, the Reichswehr was supported by the anti-republican Weimar judiciary in treason trials in order to prevent pacifist journalists from expressing their opinions publicly. In this respect, the demands of the Reichswehr Ministry for a tightening of the treason laws are also seen as a further attempt to advance the criminal prosecution of anti-armament activists. Based on the cabinet deliberations on a general reform of criminal law, this paper aims to examine the extent to which the position of the Reichswehr Ministry expressed its fundamental understanding of German pacifism. Among other sources, two internal memoranda from the Reichswehr Ministry that have not yet been considered in this context will be analyzed in particular to demonstrate that the Ministry advocated a differentiated categorisation of German pacifists, which was always based on the concept of the ›politically convinced offender‹ (»politischer Überzeugungstäter«).
Abstract The development of an efficient mobilization system is considered one of the greatest achievements of the Prussian army in the 19th century. Nevertheless, the first comprehensive Prussian mobilization plan of 1831 has never been analyzed by historians. This essay is intended as an introduction to the topic and is based on an analysis of mobilization in a selected province. Silesia was chosen as an example. The presentation of the topic successively covers the problems of the Prussian defense system after the Congress of Vienna, the work on the Prussian mobilization plan in the years 1815–1830, the role of Silesia in the Prussian defense system during this period and the course of the mobilization itself in the province of Silesia from December 1830 to March 1831.
