The first active American involvement in the Kurdish unrest took place in 1942 in Iran. American strategy in the aftermath of the Second World War, which was designed to prevent Soviet expansionism towards the Persian Gulf, triggered the collapse of the first Kurdish political entity Mahabad Republic in 1946. These American involvements were not analysed in scholarly in the literature although they established the pillars of America's Kurdish policy. The creation of the Mahabad Republic in January 1946 drew American interest more towards the Kurdish separatist movements, while the geopolitical considerations appeared during the crisis continued during the Cold War era. Therefore, there is congruence between trace of American foreign policy and classical geopolitical thinking in this case. This article aims to illustrate foundation of America's Kurdish policy based on British and American archives. America's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, played a significant role, which should be noted in this context.
With the successful handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the UK under the newly elected Labour government sought to engage in a 'new chapter' of relations with China. Despite much effort, the stated goal of a 'thick relationship' was not fully realised during this time. To understand the process more closely, this article focuses on the policies adopted by the Labour government under Tony Blair with a focus on his trip to China in October 1998. Using recently released Cabinet Office documents, it shows how perceptions played an important role in forging an approach that was too narrow in scope to address the more difficult challenges that emerged such as human rights and the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy. The conclusion is that these policies were not sustainable to set the path towards a deeper partnership.
Can individual diplomats clear the path to d & eacute;tente between adversaries? The litany of failed overtures between the United States and Cuba, and the sheer duration of official hostility from the Dwight Eisenhower administration to Barack Obama's second term, present compelling puzzles about peacemaking. Were structural obstacles insurmountable, or did failures stem from personnel and process? I analyse a negative case through archival research, presenting a revisionist account of Che Guevara's August 1961 meeting with Kennedy staffer Richard Goodwin. During a crucial opportunity for conflict resolution between the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, the personal characteristics of diplomatic envoys (not domestic opposition, mistrust, or incompatible preferences) chiefly explain the failure to negotiate a modus vivendi. Further, although the Kennedy administration, the press, and scholars have downplayed this encounter while emphasising continued U.S. covert operations against Fidel Castro, I argue that the Goodwin-Guevara meeting held significant promise, that its failure affected regional security and the Cold War in Latin America, and that it offers lessons for analysts and practitioners of international conflict resolution.
