
Germany experienced a sharp rise in wage inequality over the two decades leading up to the Great Recession. However, a remarkable trend reversal occurred in 2010—well before the introduction of the minimum wage in 2015—when wages at the bottom of the distribution began to grow more rapidly than those higher up. This paper attributes the reversal to an increasingly tight labor market after the Great Recession, supported by strong domestic demand, and operating through several interrelated and mutually reinforcing channels. Consistent with this hypothesis, job-to-job transition rates and between-job wage growth rose markedly after the recession, especially for workers at the lower rungs of the job ladder. Concurrently, workers increasingly moved from low-paying to higher-paying firms, compressing the worker-weighted distribution of firm wage premia. Tighter labor markets also reduced assortative matching between workers and firms, lowered the skill premium, and weakened firms’ monopsony power.
If unions raise worker wages, who pays? We provide a comprehensive assessment of firm responses to increased unionization, using changes in the tax deductibility of union dues in Norway as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in firm-level union density. In the average private sector firm, higher union density raises labor costs and leads firms to contract employment and production, lowering profits without increasing the labor share. The incidence is shared: consumers bear part of the cost through higher prices, shareholders through lower profits, and the remainder is offset by productivity improvements. The total wage bill falls, with losses concentrated among less attached "outsider" workers. Firm responses vary systematically by the degree of market competition. In manufacturing, where firms operate in less competitive product and labor markets, the response is reversed: the average firm expands employment and production, reduces labor markdowns, and does not experience profit declines. Instead, higher labor costs are largely passed on to consumers through higher prices, with the remainder offset by productivity gains. Workers benefit as both wages and employment rise. These patterns suggest that unions can offset employer monopsony power and that firm responses-and therefore who ultimately bears the cost-depend importantly on market structure. Overall, unionization in this setting primarily redistributes from consumers rather than shareholders and has effects that differ sharply across firms, including a reallocation toward larger and more productive firms. We rationalize these patterns using a partial-equilibrium model of union bargaining with product- and labor-market power.
There is a large latent workforce in developing countries that consists of hundreds of millions of women who prefer to have paid work and yet are out of the labor force. Often, available job opportunities are incompatible with traditional gender roles that encourage women to stay at home. In a randomized experiment with 1,670 households, we partner with a jobs platform to offer short-term data work to women who are out of the labor force. We find three main results. First, flexible work-from-home jobs are highly effective at bringing women into paid work. Job flexibility more than triples take-up from 15% for an office job to 48% for a job that women can do from home while multitasking with childcare. Second, these jobs can act as a stepping stone to less flexible work. Trying paid work from home increases take-up of less flexible jobs two to three months later among women without previous work experience. "Gateway jobs" are especially important for women from more traditional households: their labor supply is more likely to be marginal to flexibility, and in turn, work experience shifts their attitudes to become less traditional. Third, from the labor demand side, remote work comes with trade-offs in worker performance. Working from the office increases accuracy by 3% and speed by 18%. However, these performance drawbacks of work-from-home arrangements may be outweighed by the increase in available workers.
Abstract We measure which economic topics are top of mind using quarterly German household and firm panels from 2020 to 2024, a period that spans the post-pandemic inflation surge and the subsequent disinflation. With these data, we study potential determinants and consequences of having inflation top of mind. In line with goal-directed attention, the likelihood that inflation is top of mind rises with proxies for its true payoff relevance. At the same time, prior experiences predict whether respondents have inflation and energy prices top of mind conditional on a large set of controls for payoff relevance, and this relationship strengthens when the environment becomes more inflationary. Having inflation top of mind predicts stronger increases in information acquisition and inflation expectations over the shock period. At odds with goal optimality, having inflation top of mind is associated with expectations further away from multiple ex ante benchmarks. Finally, both key determinants of having inflation top of mind—payoff relevance and prior experiences—are associated with stronger shifts of expectations away from these benchmarks over the shock period.
This article constructs the first global data set on intersectoral capital service expenditures. I use these data to disaggregate capital services and intermediate inputs in a dynamic multisector trade model. Steady-state allocations and responses to shocks are determined by a capital-augmented global input-output matrix. Two properties of the measured network deliver larger long-run consumption gains from globalization than existing estimates, as well as larger gains in more capital-intensive countries. First, more trade-exposed sectors supply capital to more consumption-influential producers. Second, heterogeneity in the network reallocates sectoral expenditures toward producers with larger declines in capital rental prices. These reallocations raise capital incomes and lower consumption price indices.