We analyze welfare under reference-dependent preferences. We decompose the first-order welfare effects of reference point and price changes into direct and behavioral effects. The sign of these effects depends on the form of reference-dependent payoffs; which effects are welfare relevant depends on whether reference dependence reflects a bias. We characterize corresponding social welfare effects in terms of estimable reduced-form parameters and normative judgments. We apply our framework to reference dependence in German workers' retirement decisions. We find positive welfare effects of local increases in the normal retirement age (NRA) but ambiguous effects of financial incentives to postpone retirement. (JEL D91, H55, J26, J32)
Changes in political boundaries aimed at devolving power to local governments are common across many countries. We examine the economic impacts of government unit creation through splitting. Exploiting reforms that led to sharp increases in the number of municipalities in Brazil, we show that voluntary splitting enlarges the public sector, enhances public service delivery, and stimulates long-term economic activity in new local governments. These gains are not offset by losses elsewhere and are stronger in peripheral, remote, and underdeveloped areas neglected by parent governments. Higher fiscal revenues and decentralized decision-making contribute to the positive effects on local economic activity. (JEL D72, H41, H75, H76, H77, Q53, R51)
US firms hiring foreign workers in low-skill nonfarm jobs face a binding quota on the "H-2B" visa, allocated in part through a randomized lottery. We evaluate the quota's marginal impact using the lottery, a novel firm survey, and a pre-analysis plan. Firms exogenously employing more H-2B workers in low-skill jobs increase production (elasticity 0.20-0.22), investment (1.5-2.1), and profits (0.15). The elasticity of substitution between H-2B and US workers is very low (0.8-2.2). Thus, the effect on US employment is zero or positive overall, and positive in rural areas. Forensic analysis suggests similarly low substitutability of black-market labor. (JEL J15, J24, J46, J61, J82, K37)
We examine the effect of intergroup competition on within-group violent conflict in Indonesia. Using a triple-differences design, we find that higher competition for national government transfers between villages reduces within-village conflict. These effects persist regardless of the competition's outcome, are stronger in ethnically fractionalized and segregated villages, and are accompanied by higher attendance in village meetings. Our results are consistent with external competition favoring participation and cooperation within otherwise divided communities, suggesting that economic incentives to compete with out-groups combined with forms of civic engagement can be important mechanisms to reduce violence within communities.
Received wisdom holds that income rank matters for life satisfaction, but causal evidence on the nature and impact of income comparisons is limited. We randomize individuals from a representative sample of mid-career Finns to receive personal rank information from one of several reference groups. We find strong evidence of the effect of rank information on income satisfaction, but weaker effects on life satisfaction, and some evidence of real effects in experimental and administrative data. Effects are strong in narrow reference groups and weak and insignificant in the national one. Finally, we discuss the implications for income transparency policies. (JEL D31, D63, D83, D91, I31)
