This Introduction presents the framework and summarises the main empirical results of the special issue about the 2024 European Parliament elections in Southern Europe. It argues that Southern Europe is a crucial setting for assessing whether the European Parliament elections remain second-order in an era of heightened EU politicisation. Drawing on the six country studies in this special issue - Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain - we show that, consistent with recent comparative research on broader EU election results, the 2024 elections preserved core second-order traits, above all lower turnout and recurrent advantages for challengers. However, these mechanisms operated through remarkably fluid party systems, selective incumbent sanctioning and increasingly salient EU-related conflicts.
The 2024 European Parliament elections in Greece tested both New Democracy's (ND) trajectory towards predominant party status and the second-order election (SOE) model's relevance. Drawing on aggregate results and survey data, this article examines the election's macro-patterns and micro-foundations. The election aligned with SOE expectations - low turnout, underperformance by major parties, and gains for smaller and radical parties - yet diverged from the model's honeymoon effect, which predicts modest governing party losses early in the electoral cycle. Despite its 2023 legislative victory, ND suffered unprecedented setbacks. Our findings suggest these losses reflected retrospective economic and political evaluations rather than durable partisan realignment, indicating that ND's support may recover in future first-order contests, though space for emerging challengers remains.
This article examines the fifth European Parliament election since Malta joined the European Union through the lens of second-order election (SOE) theory. Drawing on party manifestoes, media, citizens' priorities, electoral results, and preference transfers under single transferable vote system, we assess the extent to which the campaign and outcomes were shaped by domestic rather than European political dynamics. Campaign debates and media coverage were overwhelmingly domestically framed. Turnout remained high by EU standards but lower than in national elections. While the governing party experienced losses, small parties and independent candidates performed better than in national contests. Overall, the Maltese case provides support for SOE theory, while highlighting the growing role of abstention and ballot exhaustion as channels of second-order protest.
In Turkey's 2023 elections, the incumbent Justice and Development Party and President Erdo & gbreve;an retained power despite the severe economic crisis and the devastation caused by the earthquakes. Employing pre-election survey data from the Turkish Election Study 2023 and presenting a comparative and longitudinal account since 2002, we investigate the effects of long- and short-term factors on Turkish voters' party preferences in general elections. We argue that the electoral campaign and behaviour were primarily defined by the ongoing Kulturkampf, rooted in three distinct yet intertwined divisions: ethnic, religious and sectarian, and cultural. The regression analyses suggest that, along with voters' stronger ideological preferences, these long-term divisions were the primary drivers of vote choice, largely overriding negative economic evaluations in May 2023.
Portugal's 2024 election marked a major electoral shift, driven by the radical right populist Chega. This article examines religious voting in 2024, situating it within trends since 2002. Crucially, 2024 changes previous patterns. Rather than separating the Socialist Party from the centre-right and the radical left, the religious divide is relocated, distinguishing Chega from other parties. Despite its religious populism, Chega fails to mobilise practising Catholics, suggesting a vaccine effect, whereby regular churchgoers are comparatively resistant to voting for the radical right. Instead, it draws disproportionate support from cultural Catholics, who identify as Catholic but do not attend church. Overall, the study demonstrates how religious populism can reconfigure religious voting.
In the 2023 election cycle, the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) long-lasting dominance was challenged by emerging Islamist parties, including the New Welfare Party (YRP), the Free Cause Party (H & Uuml;DA-PAR), the Felicity Party (SP), and the Future Party (GP). This article examines the growing polarisation within Turkish political Islam, which split into two main blocs in 2023: populist Islamists in the ruling People's Alliance and liberal Islamists in the opposition Nation's Alliance. These five parties diverged on three core issues: a) the meaning of democracy, b) the political system and horizontal accountability, and c) the role of elections and meaning of dissent. The study shows how ideological convictions shaped these alliances, highlighting Islamism's flexible, pluralistic, and evolving role in Turkish politics.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, governments adopted emergency measures to protect public health, intensifying communication efforts and centralising decision-making authority. In Greece, this involved a close alliance between the government and the scientific community, presented as an evidence-based response to an unprecedented crisis. This article examines how pandemic management was contested in Greek online and social media, and how authorities justified restrictions through strategic framing and appeals to individual responsibility. Contrary to expectations based on Greece's traditionally confrontational public sphere, marked by partisan divides and frequent protest mobilisation, the findings show that contestation remained comparatively marginal. Instead, a paternalistic communication scenario prevailed, in which state authorities and scientific experts dominated public discourse, effectively monopolised the crisis debate, reinforcing state authority during the emergency period.
The article examines the impact of regionalisation on the Italian National Health Service (NHS). Using hierarchical cluster analysis, the study identifies four Regional Health System (RHS) models based on organisational features such as institutional stability, healthcare spending, public-private mix, the role of general practitioners, and coverage of new social risks. These models are then evaluated using performance indicators, including LEA (Essential Levels of Care) scores, avoidable mortality, and patient mobility. The analysis shows significant variation in performance and raises questions about the effectiveness of uncoordinated regional governance. While regional diversity can be beneficial, the article advocates for better coordination, especially considering new challenges like population ageing, health inequalities, and the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan.
This study examines how candidate gender influences voter choices alongside other candidate attributes and assesses whether the modest premium for women documented in comparative research also extends to Portugal. The analysis draws on a conjoint survey experiment simulating local elections, conducted with a nationally representative sample of over 1200 Portuguese voters. The results indicate no evidence of voter bias against female candidates and, under certain conditions, a slight preference for them. While initial analyses suggested somewhat higher support for female candidates among women voters, further tests revealed no statistically significant differences across voter subgroups. Overall, the findings suggest that female candidates are not electorally disadvantaged in Portugal, offering new insights into a less-studied Southern European context.
This article investigates whether a more equal gender distribution of power has emerged in Italian governments. Applying the newly developed 'Political Power of Roles' model, which measures the power of cabinet positions, we analyse the share of government power held by women senior and junior ministers from 1992 to 2024. The three most recent governments (Conte II, Draghi, and Meloni) are those exhibiting greater feminisation in terms of an overall increase in women's power. In the Meloni government, this increase is largely driven by her appointment as Prime Minister, but also by the inclusion of a substantial share of women among junior ministers. Overall, our findings reveal a feminisation process slower than implied by the mere share of women ministers.
Coordination among opposition parties is crucial for effective electoral mobilisation in electoral authoritarian regimes, yet deep societal cleavages complicate this process. Using the Turkish case, this article examines how Turkey's main opposition party, the Republican People's Party-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), navigated these divisions to form ideologically diverse pre-election alliances. The study identifies CHP's dual strategy: (1) a Downsian defence approach, which involves moderating positions on divisive issues to appeal to a broader electorate, and (2) deepening the democracy-autocracy cleavage to unify opposition forces. The findings highlight the agency of opposition parties in forming electoral alliances and promoting democratic values, illustrating that the rise of regime cleavage is not merely a structural phenomenon, but a deliberate process strategically driven by opposition leaders.
Contemporary politics face rising affective polarisation - hostility and distrust across partisan lines. This study examines the contours and consequences of polarisation in Turkey ahead of the 2023 general election. While Turkey ranks among the world's most polarised societies, individual-level analyses remain scarce. Using nationally-representative survey data, we reveal significant variation in polarisation across party supporters, with notably high levels among incumbent AKP and pro-Kurdish HDP supporters. Polarisation increases with age, political interest, and social media use, while decreasing with education. Crucially, affective polarisation significantly bolstered AKP voter loyalty, likely contributing to the party's electoral success despite severe economic and social challenges. These findings have important implications for understanding electoral accountability in polarised societies and affective polarisation's role in democratic backsliding.
This study examines long-term patterns of political trust in Southern Europe through a comparison of Greece, Portugal, and Spain- countries that led the third wave of democratisation. Drawing on data from 45 Eurobarometer surveys (1997-2022), it tests four explanations of political trust: macroeconomic performance, corruption, ideological congruence, and party-system polarisation. The analysis highlights the varying importance of these factors across countries. Economic performance and political polarisation consistently influence trust, while corruption is a significant factor in Greece and Spain. Ideological congruence shows no substantial effect, except in Portugal. The study demonstrates that countries exposed to a common systemic shock may nonetheless develop divergent trajectories of political trust, shaped by the interaction of economic and political conditions.
This article evaluates the potential impact of the 'premierato' reform - currently under debate in the Italian parliament - on government stability. Promoted by the Meloni government, the reform proposes the direct election of the prime minister and aims to increase the stability of Italian cabinets. Using comparative data and a competing risks survival analysis, we estimate the risk of termination for Italian cabinets in various constitutional scenarios. Results suggest that the reform would reduce inter-electoral cabinet replacements but increase the risk of early elections. While overall cabinet duration would improve with the 'premierato' reform, greater stability could be achieved through the implementation of a constructive vote of no-confidence.
While disproportionality is traditionally attributed to the confluence of electoral system dynamics and the distribution of party support, this article identifies an additional mechanism: the allocation of candidacies among pre-electoral coalition partners. We analyse the 2022 Italian election and show that intra-coalition disproportionality (especially on the right) resulted from an ostensibly proportional bargaining agreement, which was later undermined by shifts in party support between the time of candidate allocation and election day. We reflect on the broader implications of intra-coalition disproportionality for parliamentary representation and government formation and outline which parts of our argument extend beyond the 2022 Italian election.
The article examines the 2024 European elections in Italy, using aggregate and original survey data to assess the relevance of the second-order election model. It explores electoral rules, campaigns, results and public opinion. The findings are mixed: while low turnout and the success of a small opposition party (AVS) align with the second-order model, the good performance of both the governing party (FdI) and the main opposition (PD) contradict it. Despite EU issues being salient for public opinion, the electoral campaign focused on domestic and non-policy issues, and evaluations of government performance influenced voter behaviour more than EU-related issues.
The Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), often regarded as an exception to the decline of social-democratic (S-D) parties across Western Europe, has recently shown signs of vulnerability. This article explores, from a demand-side perspective, how the profile of its defectors (2002-2024) differs from dominant narratives about the challenges faced by S-D parties. Using original data, we show that the PS's resilience relies on a stable base of loyal voters, but we also identify two patterns of defection: towards the radical left and, more recently, the radical right, driven, respectively, by cultural and economic concerns. These findings highlight the importance of both cultural and economic dimensions in the strategies of S-D parties, particularly for younger voters, as a path for renewal.
