
Abstract In a “hired gun” killing, who do ordinary people consider more responsible—the person who instigated or the person who executed the killing? We explored the attribution of causal and moral responsibility in a causal chain, where an agent A instructs an intermediate agent B to execute some action harming victim V. Across four studies (two preregistered), we consistently found that participants attributed more causality and blame to the intermediate agent B. In Study 2, we manipulated proximity by adding a third, more direct contributing cause that occurred after A and B's involvement. Participants judged both agents to be less causal, blameworthy, and deserving of punishment when they were less proximal to the outcome, but still rated B more responsible than A in all conditions. In Study 3, we manipulated the intentionality of both agents, and in Study 4, we jointly manipulated intentionality and proximity. We showed that higher intentionality largely drove harsher judgments for each agent, and A's high intent also reduced blame for B. We also found that intentionality had a larger effect on judgments than proximity. We discuss explanations for our findings and their implications for moral and legal decision‐making.
Abstract Human thought unfolds in patterns that vary across individuals; some move fluidly across ideas, whereas others return to narrower or more repetitive paths. Here, we asked whether structural aspects of associative thinking—its breadth, trajectory, and temporal pace—can account for individual differences in repetitive thought styles such as rumination. Participants completed brief free‐association tasks, and their responses were quantified using a model trained on large‐scale free association data to derive individual structural profiles of associative flow. Across two independent samples, these profiles predicted self‐reported measures of rumination and repetitive thinking, with nonlinear models accounting for meaningful inter‐individual variation and showing generalization across tasks and datasets. These findings suggest that individual differences in repetitive thought are reflected not only in what people think about but also in how associations are organized and unfold over time. Structural modeling therefore provides a viable approach to characterizing spontaneous cognition through patterns of associative organization.
Abstract Despite the prevalence of multi‐codal narratives—such as comics consisting of pictures and text—in everyday life, little is understood about how individuals integrate information across different codalities to form cohesive mental representations. In the present study, we explored when processing costs emerged during cross‐codal integration of bridging event information in multi‐codal narratives. Participants were presented with uni‐codal (i.e., consisting only of pictures or of text) and multi‐codal stories in which the bridging event information was presented in the other codality. We measured viewing times for the bridging event and end‐state panels to reflect the cognitive costs associated with integration. The results showed a significant interaction between codality switch and panel position. While the presence of a codality switch increased viewing times for both panel positions, there was a much larger increase for the bridging event panel than the end‐state panel. This result supports a hypothesis suggesting that during narrative understanding, information of a different codality is integrated into the mental representation of the narrative upon encountering it. Our results underscore the influence of codality on narrative integration, indicating that understanding may be affected by the format in which information is presented. Future models of event cognition should incorporate codality as a factor in narrative comprehension.
Viewing language as a dynamic system shaped by interaction raises questions about how Hockett's design features should be interpreted.While this shift successfully broadens the functional and semiotic scope of language, we argue that it leaves key questions about internal cognitive architecture insufficiently specified. In particular, the proposed framework underestimates the role of temporally structured event representation, hierarchical syntax, and displacement as cognitively enabled phenomena rather than purely pragmatic or interactional achievements. We suggest that without an explicit account of how linguistic forms interface with memory systems that support event indexing and temporal organization, the generative core of language-digital infinity and stable reference beyond the here and now-remains unexplained. Drawing on recent neurocomputational and biolinguistic work, we outline minimal theoretical commitments required to integrate interactional perspectives with mechanistic accounts of compositional structure and reference.
Fabricius argues that the results of a recent study of ours speak for a deflationary competence limitation account of Theory of Mind development. According to this account, children do not operate with proper mental state concepts until age 6-7 or older. However, the original findings are, in fact, incompatible with such competence limitation accounts, but compatible with the standard picture of Theory of Mind development: According to this picture, children acquire proper mental state concepts by age 4, but this competence is sometimes masked by performance factors.