This Special Issue examines the persistence of AfD's electoral success and the party's strong regional entrenchment in Eastern Germany more than a decade after its foundation. Bringing together ten contributions, it explores the socio-economic, cultural, and political foundations of AfD support, transformations in party competition and generational dynamics, and the party's strategic expansion into new issue areas such as gender, climate, foreign policy, and memory politics. The 2024 elections in three Eastern German states constitute a key, though not exclusive, empirical focus. By focusing on subnational contexts, the Special Issue sheds light on processes of normalisation and the distinct trajectories of far-right politics in Eastern Germany, while contributing to broader debates in international research on the far right.
Citizenship policy in Germany has been highly contested, particularly regarding dual citizenship. Nearly 25 years after the failed attempt of the SPD and B & uuml;ndnis 90/Die Gr & uuml;nen coalition to fully adopt dual citizenship, the principle of avoiding multiple citizenship was abolished with the Citizenship Modernisation Act of 2024. This paper examines the long-term policy change using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which is well-suited for analysing both policy stability and change over extended periods, especially with regard to contested policy issues. The policy change took place in three central stages: the introduction of ius soli with temporary limited dual citizenship (1999), the abolition of this limitation (2014), and the full acceptance of dual citizenship (2024). Key factors explaining policy change and stability between 1999 and 2024 are strongly linked to the federal system. These are the shifts in power at federal and L & auml;nder level as well as relatively stable parameters lying outside the policy subsystem and the related and changing coalition opportunity structures due to the federalism reform of 2006. Further aspects are public opinion, a brokered compromise, changing beliefs as well as empirical issues concerning the seriousness and causes of the policy problem.
Under the Traffic Light Coalition government formed in 2021 by the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens and the FDP, the electoral system for the German Bundestag was changed in 2023 for the fourth time since 2011. This article analyses the process and the outcome of this electoral system reform. On the one hand, the reform proposed by the Traffic Light Coalition appears more convincing in conceptual and technical terms than the corresponding attempts made by previous federal governments. On the other hand, the emergence of 'vacant' constituencies also has significant side effects that undermine the reform's political acceptance. Given that the new federal government formed in 2025 and led by the CDU/CSU wants to reverse the 2023 reform, the institutional stability of the electoral system required for a representative democracy remains at risk.
Research shows that combining elections increases voter turnout. What has largely been neglected, however, is that combining can also shift the balance of power between parties. This paper aims to fill that research gap. It examines how synchronising European Elections with local and other elections affects electoral outcomes in Germany. Germany provides an ideal case for analysing the partisan effects of electoral concurrency: in some states European elections coincide with local contests, while in others they do not. This variation allows the use of panel data regression models to estimate the effects. The findings suggest that combining European and local elections particularly benefits parties with a Eurosceptic electorate, which struggle with voter mobilisation in standalone European elections. Meanwhile, parties whose voters are predominantly pro-European are losing vote shares as most of their supporters are taking part in the European elections anyway.
The first green-black state government in Baden-W & uuml;rttemberg, formed by an ecological and a conservative party, was not only the first of its kind but also adopted a new approach to coalition management. The coalition parties postulated not to exhaust each other in fruitless consensus rounds, but to give each partner in this cross-camp coalition leeway to stress its own programmatic profile. As a so-called 'complementary coalition', each coalition partner should be allowed to highlight its 'brand cores' in policy areas of particular importance. We examine whether elements of a complementary coalition were implemented by green-black coalition partners and determine whether they were implemented as a government. Our investigation shows that only the junior partner, the CDU, was able to shield one of its key salience fields (domestic security policy) against infiltration. In contrast, the Greens were less successful in steering their objectives in an unrestricted way. They only succeeded (partially) with participation policy. We show that intra-party coherence has been a central factor in shielding salience areas. In contrast, unfavourable institutional settings, structural factors and strong path dependencies served as a gateway for the coalition partner to exert influence, slowing down coherent reform activities in a policy field.
Foreign actors often exploit domestic political tensions to influence democratic states, making it important to examine how foreign information campaigns resonate in particularly susceptible regions and populations. In Germany, historical, cultural, and political legacies render the former East German federal states particularly receptive to pro-Kremlin narratives. Drawing on a preregistered survey of 1,308 eligible voters conducted before the 2024 state elections in three East German states, we examine psychological, behavioural, and electoral correlates of agreement with pro-Kremlin narratives. Conspiracy mentality and low institutional trust emerged as the strongest predictors. Platform effects were source-specific: only the use of Telegram and TikTok for political information was positively associated with narrative agreement. Agreement with pro-Kremlin narratives was linked to intentions to vote for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), but not for The Left (Die Linke). Taken together, these findings illustrate the importance of considering domestic vulnerabilities when studying the resonance of foreign information campaigns.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has prompted Berlin to declare a Zeitenwende (a turning point) in its security and defence policy. While Germany's main regional focus arguably has been on Eastern Europe, specifically on the situation in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific has nonetheless featured prominently in debates on the Zeitenwende, and Europe and the Indo-Pacific are increasingly seen as interconnected strategic theatres. Since then, Berlin also repeatedly dispatched units of the German navy, army and air force to the Indo-Pacific. This article investigates Germany's security and defence policy in the Indo-Pacific. It asks whether the changes in Germany's security policy in that region constitute a paradigm shift in the context of the proclaimed Zeitenwende. The empirical study of Germany's engagement at the strategic and operational levels reveals a mixed picture of the relationship between the Zeitenwende and Germany's Indo-Pacific policy. While some changes in strategic and rhetorical terms are detectable, Germany's limited military capabilities give it little influence on the region's balance of power. The article concludes that the Zeitenwende has actually led to few comprehensive changes in Germany's security policy in the Indo-Pacific.
The 'Querdenken' movement was one of the most significant European anti-lockdown movements, attracting a broad range of voters from the far-left to the far-right. Out of this movement, the party 'dieBasis' was founded in July 2020 and achieved remarkable success, winning 1.4 per cent of the vote in the 2021 Bundestag elections, with up to 5 per cent in some strongholds. However, beyond its anti-lockdown focus, there is little academic research on the ideological profiles of anti-COVID parties that could explain their rapid rise during the pandemic. To tackle this, we analyse dieBasis' manifesto, press releases and voting advice application positions from 2020/2021. Overall, we find that dieBasis relied heavily on populist communication, using it as frequently as the populist far-right AfD. However, unlike the AfD, it did not adhere to a coherent far-right ideology. Instead, it supported a wide range of policies, sometimes contradictory, rooted in esoteric beliefs. This ideological thinness was an advantage during the pandemic, as it allowed the party to attract voters across ideological camps; however, this became a disadvantage once the pandemic receded from public discourse. The results offer valuable insights into the mobilisation during a pandemic, something that is currently undergoing political scrutiny.
We examine contemporary Monday Demonstrations ('Montagsdemos') in Eastern Germany, exploring their role at the intersection of social justice activism, peace movements, and anti-establishment politics. Based on field research at protests in Gera and Chemnitz, we analyse participants' grievances, motivations, and ideological positions. Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine challenges democracies and societies in reunified Europe. Against this backdrop, the 'Montagsdemos' have evolved into a convergence point for diverse actors, from left-wing social justice advocates to far-right extremists opposing Germany's energy policies, NATO alignment, and economic strategies. Drawing on 195 interviews, we examine how these protests reflect broader challenges to liberal democracy, including democratic representation, protest dynamics, and political polarisation. Our findings show that these demonstrators are driven by anti-establishment attitudes, critiques of Germany's foreign policy, and opposition to liberal democracy. Scepticism towards the German Green Party is widespread, with many blaming it for economic and geopolitical challenges, alongside broader criticism of U.S. influence and perceived warmongering tied to the Ukraine conflict. The 'Montagsdemos' illustrate evolving cleavages in German and European politics, particularly the rise of an illiberal opposition to globalisation, climate change adaptation policies, and perceived elite rule.
Although foreign policy is often associated with national unity and national interests, this view overlooks the role of parties as pivotal decision-makers in shaping foreign policy. Political ideologies and party dynamics influence foreign policy decisions, from coalition unity to opposition strategies. We assume that when events requiring a quick reaction occur, parties will act more cohesively. In addition, the legislative and executive parts of government parties will move closer to each other. Opposition parties, on the other hand, will use this opportunity to present themselves as an alternative to the government and express criticism. To test this theory, we look at speeches in parliament about foreign policy in Germany between 1990 and 2021. We differentiate between types of events and their severity. Applying text-as-data methods to scale party positions, governing party members increase intra- and inter-party cohesion, thus showing a rally effect. The same is not true for opposition parties, who generally distance themselves from the government. Our findings shed new light on event-based approaches when explaining party movements and party behaviour in parliament.
This article tests the concept of regional populism to explain the electoral success of the CSU and the Free Voters in Bavaria, two parties that together have governed the state since 2018. It bridges research on populism and regionalism by presenting a new set of survey items that measure regional populism. The CSU and Free Voters are often accused of 'being populist', yet they do not conform to standard definitions of populist parties. However, both pit the interests of their 'Bavarian Heimat' against external elites in 'Berlin' and 'Brussels'. This study analyses the extent to which regional populist attitudes resonate with different voter groups. The items are tested in a novel post-election survey conducted for the 2023 Bavarian state election. While regional populist attitudes are widespread among AfD, Free Voters, and CSU supporters, regional populism is a stronger predictor of support for the CSU and Free Voters than general populism. In contrast, the AfD vote is better explained by general (i.e. non-regional) populism than regional populism. The findings underscore the significance of regional populism in explaining the success of regional parties and advocate for future research to thoroughly investigate the populist dimensions of regional political discourse across Europe.
The AfD, founded in 2013, has become the predominant political party on the far right and an established part of the German party system, enjoying considerable electoral success, especially in Eastern Germany. Studies of the right-wing populist party have so far concentrated on the national level, neglecting the sub-national and especially the local level. We want to address this deficiency and analyse the AfD in local politics in the state of Mecklenburg Western Pomerania (MV), and especially the city of Rostock. An aggregate data analysis for 21 neighbourhoods in Rostock will examine the AfD's election results, combined with qualitative, interpretative studies of motions put forward by the AfD in the city council of Rostock. Guiding questions are: Is the AfD a local party? Where and why is the AfD successful on the local level? What does the AfD do on the local level? Our results show that although the AfD is not (yet) a successful local party, which means gaining majorities in elections and for their motions, the rise of the AfD on the local level contributes to the establishment and normalisation of the party.
Regional elections in multi-level political systems are often shaped by evaluations of national political actors, yet the extent to which national approval dynamics translate into regional electoral outcomes remains contested. Building on the second-order election framework, we examine how changes in the approval ratings of the national Head of Government (HoG) and the HoG's party are associated with the HoG party's regional electoral performance. Leveraging the institutional and political characteristics of Germany as a symmetric federal system, we analyse all state elections between 1990 and 2021, covering the chancellorships of Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schr & ouml;der, and Angela Merkel. We focus on aggregate associations between changes in national approval ratings and the HoG party's regional vote shares. Our findings show that the HoG party is, on average, subject to vote losses in regional elections, consistent with the second-order election model. However, increasing approval ratings of both the HoG and their party between consecutive regional elections are associated with a substantial mitigation of these expected losses. Declining approval ratings, by contrast, coincide with the largest negative vote swings. Our results highlight the importance of national approval dynamics for understanding electoral competition in multi-level political systems.
This study examines how party gender quotas operate at the grassroots level by analysing the German Greens' Women's Statute, which regulates candidate lists, delegate selection, executive boards, and speaking order. Based on 63 semi-structured interviews-55 with representatives of 31 district branches and eight with party officials responsible for gender equality-this article traces patterns of compliance and their conditions. Highly visible rules, such as zipper electoral lists and parity on executive boards, are largely enforced, whereas less visible provisions are often bypassed when perceived as ill-fitting or unfair. Organisational capacity proves pivotal: large, resource-rich branches actively recruit women, monitor meetings, and manage conflict, whereas small branches struggle with thin candidate pools and weak enforcement. Although the statute curbs overt male dominance, patriarchal routines persist. Mentoring, training, and women's networks are essential for driving change beyond numbers. This article highlights the obstacles parties face at the local level, even under favourable ideological and regulatory conditions, and clarifies when gender equality policies can take root in decentralised organisations.
The literature on international intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation increasingly covers the strategic challenges and moral hazards that democracies face in their interactions with authoritarian regimes. Against this background, we employ a representative online survey in the first in-depth examination of the conditions under which the public in a European democracy is willing to support intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation with a highly authoritarian regime. Our results confirm that in the case of the German public, reports about human rights abuses and foreign intelligence meddling by the Egyptian government increase concerns over the utility and morality of such cooperation.
In times of societal threat, scientists find themselves in the spotlight - both as providers of information and reassurance, and as targets of distrust, conspiracies, and accusations of immoral behaviour. These conflicting images, as well as the ongoing public discussion about the role of scientists in governance and public life, highlight the remaining open questions about people's appraisals of scientific experts in times of crisis. In this study, we evaluate how negative emotions triggered by large-scale threats shape German residents' views of scientists. Using experimental evidence from a representative online survey (N = 2828), we demonstrate the positive effect of exposure to a simple description of a real-life salient threat on the belief that scientists maliciously manipulate evidence to deceive the public. We further show that this effect is mediated by anger, not fear, and is robust across three different threat scenarios - the COVID-19 pandemic (n = 685), the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (n = 695), and the spread of the Mpox virus (n = 694). Our findings highlight the importance of careful policy communication and suggest that the perception of scientific integrity is severely threatened during crisis - right when expertise and guidance may be needed the most.
The 2025 federal elections confirm the Alternative for Germany's (AfD) above-average success in eastern Germany. Although the AfD is now successful in the whole of Germany, as shown by its strong results in Saarland and Baden-W & uuml;rttemberg, only in eastern Germany the AfD is the strongest party, gaining more than 30 per cent of the vote. But why is the AfD able to win people over in eastern Germany? A multivariate analysis of the 2023 Saxony Monitor reveals a number of independent factors. Party identification with the AfD in eastern Germany is based on chauvinistic prejudices, rejection of Muslim migration and Muslims in general, and pronounced anti-feminism. AfD voters show a greater alienation from politics, more specifically from the German party system. Men are more likely, and individuals with a high level of formal education are less likely to identify for the AfD. Importantly, an additional factor not relevant in West Germany matters for AfD support in the east: A sense of collective disadvantage in Eastern Germany compared to Western Germany, fed by the experiences of the recent past. Mostly not individual experiences lead to identification with the AfD, but rather the feeling of collective disadvantage.
This article analyses the drivers of individual-level support for - and opposition to - renewable energy in general, as well as wind and solar power specifically. We focus on the crucial case of Germany, where climate change has been a particularly salient issue. First, we show that party preferences are more effective in explaining attitudes than socio-demographic variables. Crucially, party support for the far-right AfD and the Greens serves as the strongest predictor but in opposite directions. Second, place matters: support for renewable energy is more likely in urban than in rural areas. Importantly, the German case also underlines the importance of another spatial dimension: in eastern Germany, support for renewable energy is less likely than in western Germany. Third, policy matters: attitudes towards wind power are more strongly linked to partisan identity than attitudes towards solar power, which reflects the stronger politicisation of wind power. We link our findings to key debates on climate-related attitudes, political dissatisfaction in 'left-behind' regions, as well as far-right climate obstruction. Methodologically, we rely on original survey data with over 5,000 respondents collected in 2024, a year when the AfD, a key force of climate obstruction, reached new electoral heights.
