This article presents a tripartite theory of the nature of dark creativity. It argues that there are three kinds of dark creativity that tend to be conflated but that have different ethical bases. The first part of the tripartite theory is based on the deontic notion of a universal system of principled ethics, which makes it possible to label creativity as dark without regard to when or where it takes place. The second part is one of sociocultural principles of ethics, where different systems of ethics (consequentialism, social-contract ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics) lead to different sociocultural views of what constitutes light or dark creativity, depending on one’s ethical principles. The third part is one in which there are no general principles, but rather one based on individual labeling views of ethics, which vary widely across individuals. On this view, dark creativity is in the eye of the beholder. Although the three kinds of dark creativity in the tripartite theory form a unified framework for levels of ethical violation in dark creativity, they each have different properties and implications, which are explored in the article.
In recent years, the case has been made to move from narrative accounts of psychological theories to rigorous mathematical descriptions thereof. Yet, a persistent tension remains in how the models that result from the formalization of psychological theories are to be evaluated - whether by their theoretical elegance, their ability to reproduce established phenomena, or their quantitative fit to empirical data. This paper challenges an exclusive use of validation paradigms that are based on phenomena or data alone as evaluative unit by reexamining the relationships between theory, phenomena, and data. We argue that testing the tenability of a theory or model while placing too much emphasis on only phenomena or data is inherently fallible. Instead, we argue that both phenomena and data should occupy a central role in theory testing. This perspective demands that models make substantive and explanatory claims while engaging with the full structure of empirical observations. This perspective not only clarifies the dynamic interdependence among theory, phenomena, and data, but also establishes a principled basis for cumulative, iterative scientific progress in psychological science.
This commentary presents a joint critical perspective in response to the article “Social representations as objects of knowledge: New horizons for Piagetian constructivism” (Barreiro & Castorina, in press). We commend the authors for their theoretical ambition, and particularly for their explicit articulation of the similarities between Piagetian constructivism and social representations theory, as well as for their decision to relocate the problem of social representations to the level of ontogenesis rather than considering it from the perspective of sociogenesis alone. Our commentary then aims to bring focus to several points of tension emerging from this proposal (e.g., concerning the relation between psychogenesis and ontogenesis and the status of critical realism). Of particular concern is the reception and stabilization of a “Piaget” that only partially reflects the heterogeneity of Piaget’s corpus, which we then use reflexively to engage with the theory of social representations as historiography by other means. By making these questions explicit, however, we seek not to criticize but rather to situate the article within a broader theoretical and historical and epistemological problem space. Our commentary deliberately mobilizes historical analysis not as contextual background, but as an epistemic tool for examining how theoretical objects themselves become socially represented.
Drive theory is a cornerstone of psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy. Motivation, affect, and bodily intensities are all tied to the notion of drive, especially in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. However, orthodox drive theory has been criticized for its arcane, unquestioned status, despite inconsistencies with clinical experience. Recent advances in affective and computational neuroscience also challenge some tenets of drive theory. Here, I discuss criticisms of the postulate that drive exerts a “constant pressure.” I then propose a revision to Freudo-Lacanian drive theory through contemporary neuropsychoanalysis (namely, the work of Mark Solms) and theoretic neurobiology (Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle). This leads me to claim that the investment in a drive trajectory through (belief) space is constant. Stressing the constancy of the drive trajectory leads to an emphasis on unique homeorhetic trajectories, each subject’s unique solution to the universal problem of emotional contradictions and the felt uncertainty arising therein.
The growing emphasis on “positionality” in academic research—where authors disclose personal characteristics thought to influence their work—has sparked significant debate. In this article, we critically examine the concept of positionality, tracing its assumptions, implications, philosophical roots, and potential pitfalls, particularly in psychology. We conclude that positionality statements lack theoretical support, may reinforce biases, and risk fragmenting scientific discourse. Instead, we advocate rigorous, transparent methodologies and critical evaluation of research, independent of authors’ identities. Discussing solutions, we suggest that if positionalities are unavoidable in research, they must be considered as part of the knowledge claims, considered as auxiliary elements to be tested like other auxiliary (or measurement) hypotheses. Also, we briefly discuss anonymity or pseudonymity as alternative solutions for other sources of positionality biases. Our aim is to contribute to open and critical science and improve upholding ideals of critical science.
In this paper, we examine two early and underexplored texts: Fanon’s 1951 thesis and Lacan’s 1946 presentation ‘On Psychical Causality.’ Their theoretical understanding of madness and freedom in these texts has important clinical consequences and resonates in the clinical testimonies of people experiencing psychosis today. To contextualize their ideas, we consider both authors’ understanding of alienation in psychosis. Rather than taking sides, we explore the tensions within and between their work, as well as their overlaps to develop a more nuanced and responsive framework beyond a simple progressive/conservative binary for thinking about psychosis.
This paper advocates for an epistemic reclassification of the field of psychology to be considered not just as a science, but also as an art. I situate my vision of psychology-as-art within the burgeoning movement of the psychological humanities, and I perform a literary argument for this vision that embodies the psychological humanities itself. Through literary prose, I narrate my 15-year journey as a psychologist-artist-mystic, weaving phenomenological philosophy, Hindu cosmology, and depth and liberation psychologies with examples of my artistic projects to demonstrate how subjective lived experience—and the depths of the human soul—find expression best through psychological literature, poetry, paintings, and film. In the discussion section, I then conceptually elaborate upon four claims: (1) some forms of psychology are better understood as art rather than science, and artwork itself may constitute empirical knowledge; (2) some psychological truths may emerge through spiritual or revelatory epistemologies, legitimizing decolonial and non-Western ways of knowing; (3) reclaiming emotional, sensual, irrational, and passionate modes of knowledge can serve as a feminist corrective for psychology; and (4) embracing psychology-as-art is an ethical and social justice imperative in this current historical moment. Ultimately, an epistemic vision of psychology-as-art invites readers to reflect on what a more beautiful psychology might offer our wounded world.
The Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP), or “subclinical” autistic traits found in relatives of autistic individuals and the general population, has mainly been studied as a genetic endophenotype. Three decades of heritability research have developed reliable measurement tools and deepened understanding of autism’s genetic architecture, but they have left a fundamental question largely unasked: what is it like to have BAP? This paper argues that BAP is not just a “mild” form of autism, and that the structural dynamics causing disadvantages for diagnosed autistic individuals also affect those who carry these traits without a diagnosis. Recognizing this has direct implications for how researchers, clinicians, and policymakers approach this population. Using Bourdieu’s sociology of practice, particularly the concepts of habitus, field, cultural capital, and symbolic violence, along with the neurodiversity paradigm and social model of disability, we propose a social-relational framework for understanding high-BAP experiences. This model explains why individuals with high BAP often experience structural disadvantages as personal failure, why masking is a form of cultural labor rather than symptom masking, and why the lack of explanatory frameworks for BAP experience itself can be harmful. We also address the limitations of familial BAP research samples, explore what lived neurodivergence looks like within neurotypical environments, and outline implications for research methods, clinical practice, and theories of neurocognitive diversity. The paper concludes by applying the Bourdieusian perspective to psychology itself, questioning what it means that a research tradition has spent 30 years measuring traits whose human significance it has largely chosen not to examine.
We argue that a feminist history of psychology is not merely a corrective add-on to existing narratives but a methodology for transforming the discipline’s concepts, practices, and forms of authority. Drawing on sociohistorical and genealogical approaches, we examine how psychological knowledge has been produced through specific dispositifs (laboratories, tests, diagnostic manuals, professional roles) and how these have encoded gendered, racialized, and classed hierarchies. Rather than treating “theory” and “practice” as separate domains, we show how psychological theories are inseparable from the experimental, diagnostic, and institutional practices that enact them, and how these practices shape subjectivities and social order. The paper develops three intersecting genealogies of modern psychology: (1) the construction of sexual difference as a foundational axis of psychological theory and measurement; (2) the experimental production of authority in the laboratory, and the feminist reworking of reflexivity and positionality; and (3) the culture of diagnosis, from hysteria to contemporary happiness and resilience discourses, as technologies of regulation and self-surveillance. Across these domains, we mobilize feminist epistemologies of situated knowledge, ignorance, and critique to denaturalize core psychological categories and to foreground their political effects. We conclude by outlining principles for rewriting psychology as a feminist practice that links knowledge and care, relocates authority in relational and participatory methodologies, and reorients psychological work from individual adaptation toward structural transformation. In doing so, we propose feminist historiography as a crucial resource for imagining other possible (histories of) psychology.
Code Psychology extends Marcello Barbieri's Code Biology paradigm to psychological phenomena, proposing that mental processes operate through organic codes-arbitrary rule-based mappings between neural signals (signs) and subjective experiences (meanings) mediated by adaptors. This theoretical framework addresses persistent epistemological challenges in psychology, including mind-body dualism, the debate between reductionism and holism, and the tension between universal and subjective experiences. I propose to integrate Code Biology's triadic structure with contemporary neuroscience, particularly the free energy principle, affective neuroscience, and biogenetic structuralism's neurognostic structures. The framework reconceptualizes psychological disorders as disruptions in metacode organization, exemplified through autism spectrum disorder, where distinct neural adaptor configurations create systematic cognitive variations rather than deficits. Drawing on thermodynamic principles, we propose that the psyche minimizes variational free energy through codepoiesis-the ongoing generation and conservation of codes that assemble adaptive meanings. This synthesis unifies insights from Marcello Barbieri, Carl Jung, Ross Ashby, Karl Friston, and Jaak Panksepp, revealing the mind as a predictive system that bounds uncertainty via action-oriented inference. Code Psychology offers testable hypotheses for empirical validation through neuroimaging, genomic modeling, and high-dimensional cytometry, providing a mechanistic yet holistic account of mental phenomena that bridges the metaphoric and material at the interface of code, energy, and matter.
Research investigating the practices that reinforce women's lower status and power is growing rapidly. Yet, examinations of these practices are scattered across diverse literatures under different conceptual labels, with little intellectual cross-fertilization. We integrate these literatures under a hierarchy reinforcement model of misogyny, which defines misogyny as the social, physical, and economic penalties imposed on women that reinforce hierarchical gender relations. This conceptualization of misogyny has significant benefits for psychology: it unifies interrelated phenomena that have traditionally been studied in siloes; differentiates misogyny from related psychological phenomena; focuses attention on both interpersonal and institutional penalties towards women; and recognizes misogyny within its socio-historical context. By integrating psychological, sociological, and organizational research, we develop a theoretical framework that outlines the key causes of misogyny. Critically, we argue that misogyny is particularly likely to be enacted after threats to the gender status quo. This can help to explain the pernicious nature of gender inequality, as misogynistic penalties become most pronounced when gender hierarchies face disruption. Understanding the many forms of misogyny as interlinked also emphasizes the need for gender equality interventions to be multipronged, as tentative initiatives with a singular focus are at risk of merely displacing misogyny into other arenas.
In this paper, we explore the possibility of radical behaviorism to respond to the challenges posed by Merleau-Ponty to scientific psychology. According to this philosopher, modern dichotomous thinking places every psychological project in a stalemate: it adopts either mentalism, distancing itself from science, or physiologism, distancing itself from psychology. For Merleau-Ponty, the notion of behavior could be a way to avoid this impasse as long as behavior was taken as a phenomenon in its own right. However, the first behaviorist proposals did not follow this path. But what about radical behaviorism? To answer this question, we begin with different understandings of the notion of behavior found both in B. F. Skinner's works and in the behavior-analytic literature. Considering the diversity of positions, we adopt the Merleau-Ponty stance that sees ambiguity as a constitutive characteristic of the behavioral phenomenon. From there, we present an understanding of behavior based on a relational ontology that could respond to the challenges posed by Merleau-Ponty. This proposal updates the philosophical potential of radical behaviorism, allowing it to dialogue with other traditions that have historically attempted to overcome the alternatives of mentalism and physiological reductionism.
Health inequalities remain widespread in marginalized communities despite decades of research on the social determinants of health. This paper introduces the Ecologies of Exposure and Resistance (EER) framework to better explain how culture, community, and psychological processes shape health outcomes in contexts of structural disadvantage. Rather than relying solely on biomedical universalism, EER examines how culturally grounded meaning systems, collective resources, and identity processes mediate the relationship between structural harm and embodied health. The framework integrates three core concepts. First, Exposure Fields refer to the multidimensional and intersecting risks that marginalized groups face, including poverty, discrimination, and environmental hazards. Second, Resistance Ecologies describe the collective systems of cultural support, meaning-making, and action that buffer these risks, including family networks, spiritual practices, and community organizations. This concept recognizes both protective and potentially harmful dimensions of collective resistance. Third, Health Transmutation captures how exposure and resistance interact over time through psychological and biological pathways to produce health trajectories. EER addresses theoretical gaps by integrating structural analysis with cultural insight and psychological mechanisms, moving beyond static models to examine cumulative, dynamic processes. Real-world applications including Indigenous youth suicide prevention, the Latino health paradox, and high-effort coping under racism demonstrate the framework's explanatory value. This interdisciplinary theory offers a culturally responsive approach to understanding health disparities through the lens of lived experience, community resilience, and symbolic meaning while explicitly theorizing the psychological processes through which social conditions become embodied.
This article presents a field-oriented framework for understanding subjective experience through the dynamics of the experiential field. The experiential field is conceived as a morphogenetic space that continuously shifts its states, giving rise to forms of experience. Signification is described as the primary structuring force of this space: through it, the subject organizes perceptual flow and modulates the interplay between presence and absence, understood as two co-implicated topological domains of the field. Presence anchors meaning, providing stability and continuity, while absence opens up a generative dimension that can prompt transformation. Absence is thus understood not as an ontological void but as a force capable of reorganizing meaning trajectories, reshaping the field, and fostering change. Three conceptual propositions are presented to illustrate how presence and absence interact to shape the uniqueness of subjective experience. Clinically, the framework aims to provide a structured lens for framing meaning-making dynamics in therapeutic contexts. A case example illustrates how the integration of absence can open up new possibilities for change.
