Abstract Despite its apparent clarity, the notion of a whole person is deeply polysemic, and covers somewhat contradictory conceptions of the specific purpose education should fulfil. Following Paul Standish, this article distinguishes five main models of wholeness (conformist, essentialist, engineered, peregrine, liberal-individualist), and examines how the idea of an education of the whole person could retain its original progressive value. Through a close reading of Philip Roth’s American Pastoral (1997), wholeness as perfection is discussed in its various dimensions, and dismissed for its problematic consequences. Finally, wholeness as an end-in-view, aiming at sociality, is defended as a more desirable and viable alternative.
Abstract Half a millennium ago, the originally Chinese civilized pastime of drinking tea took on a new form in Japan: influenced by the philosophical practices of Zen Buddhism, it evolved into an art form and one of the ‘paths’ (道 dō) that is meant to help practitioners to obtain a higher awareness of life and to appreciate its transient nature. In this way, the search for meaning took on a new form: not through remembrance of finitude and mortality—that is, the memento mori of the Classic European tradition—did living gain value and worth, but through understanding the value of each moment of life unfolding; instead of propagating a living towards the end, tea ceremony questioned the very idea of time that underlies such strategies of coping. The following argument will outline and analyse the practice of tea ceremony as established by Sen no Rikyū 千利休 (1522–1591) from a pedagogical perspective. Based on a discussion of the practical and philosophical roots of tea ceremony and enhanced by auto-ethnographic observations, tea ceremony will emerge not only as a genuine pedagogical practice of self-formation or Bildung, but also as a specific way of dealing with time and therefore finitude and mortality.
Abstract René Arcilla’s ‘Dying for the World Being Born: The Education of Emersonian Perfectionism’ provides an eloquent attempt to address questions regarding the significance of Emersonian moral perfectionism in education and the relation of the tragic dimension of human experience to this. He leads the reader into difficult territory, powerfully evoking dimensions of human experience that educational institutions for the most part set aside. The moving account of his own experience and the part that philosophy played in it lays the way for a questioning of the extent to which a sense of the tragic plays a part in education, thematizing the dying and being born in his title. My discussion acknowledges a degree of unease regarding thematizations of death and rebirth. In doing this I draw out a contrast in the reception of Heidegger (in the USA) between Hubert Dreyfus and Stanley Cavell: Dreyfus’ emphasis on everyday coping, which he inherits to a large extent from his friend Samuel Todes, avoids death as an ‘existentialist embarrassment’. Cavell is not ‘embarrassed’ by existentialism, and this lays the way for a richer philosophy of human life and world. Heidegger’s own position comes under criticism from Levinas. My assessment of these competing conceptions and criticisms leads to a position more restrained than Arcilla’s and characterized instead by a muted interrogative stance and humility. I close with some practical implications for education.
Abstract Bad beliefs are beliefs that are contrary to settled expert opinion; beliefs like ‘global warming is a myth’ or ‘vaccines cause autism’. Non-experts should defer to experts when they are not themselves able to assess the evidence, so we should reject bad beliefs. Notoriously, though, large numbers of people report believing these things, and even more bizarre assertions. Many philosophers think we can avoid bad beliefs by teaching critical thinking or inculcating virtues. While these strategies have some effect, I am sceptical that they achieve very much. In fact, most people—including those who accept bad beliefs—are already broadly rational and believe what they have most reason to believe. I argue that educators do better to tackle the problem indirectly: by acknowledging the rationality of bad believers and by being realistic about what we can know and about how knowledge is produced.
Abstract This article offers a novel argument in favour of teaching philosophy as a compulsory subject from primary school onwards, the argument from justified curriculum development. This argument supplements a respectable line of reasoning in the existing literature according to which philosophy deserves a mandatory position in school curricula because of its unique capability to equip students to successfully encounter significant and inescapable problems in human life, specifically problems of how to rationally assess whether one is, or would be, justified in obeying various moral, political, religious, emotional, and practical norms with narrower or broader practical consequences. The argument from justified curriculum development identifies a comprehensive set of crucial normative problems that compose the problem of selecting the goals and content of school curricula and that are crucial for determining the justificatory status of obeying various norms. The ability to provide rational answers to such normative problems, and consequently to the problem of selecting the goals and content of curricula, requires the decisive contribution of philosophy and can exert a pre-eminent influence on the quality of human living conditions. Thus, people should be involved in philosophical thinking and argumentation, and for practical reasons, they would benefit by starting even in primary school.
This article explores the role of Bildung in vocational education, questioning whether it can effectively create the values it aims to instil. While Bildung has traditionally been seen as separate from vocational training, recent discussions in the Netherlands have sought to integrate it into post secondary vocational education (middelbaar beroepsonderwijs or mbo). However, Bildung relies on implicit assumptions about how students attribute meaning to their education, which risks undermining its own ideals. To address this issue, the article argues that Bildung must become part of the students' process of self-formation rather than a predefined educational goal. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, the historical and political roots of Bildung in vocational education are examined, revealing its dual function: fostering individual freedom while also shaping good citizenship and vocational identity. This duality exposes Bildung to the critique of elitism. Second, Wolfgang Klafki's concept of Allgemeinbildung is analysed for its potential to address this critique, but it is found to tacitly impose predetermined values on students. Finally, using critical phenomenology, the article highlights the reciprocal relationship between lived experience and social norms, suggesting that Bildung must be open to contestation by students themselves. Ultimately, Bildung in vocational education can only remain relevant if it engages with students' own interpretations of their educational experiences. Instead of imposing an external vision of human development, Bildung should enable students critically to shape their own understanding of self-determination, co-determination, and solidarity. This requires a philosophical enquiry into how vocational students create meaning in the process of their formation.
I propose a notion of teaching for epistemic authenticity which involves providing students with knowledge about a range of choices on how to live a flourishing life and encouraging students to reflect critically on their own belief commitments and external influences on their beliefs. I suggest that this notion of teaching about diverse ways of living broadens moral education acquired at home and is justified under both perfectionist and anti-perfectionist strands of liberalism even in cases when parents disagree with such teaching. I then turn to the notion of indoctrination, and argue that when instruction conducive to epistemic authenticity in schools with liberal tradition is taught through critical discourse, such instruction is not indoctrinating, but rather a means of fostering informed and independent thinking, thereby empowering students to make autonomous decisions about their beliefs.
In this article, we analyse how coherence should be addressed in critical thinking courses. Our starting point is the fact that, while coherence seems important for rationality and critical thinking, several studies now suggest that thinkers with conspiracy world-views give more importance to coherence than other criteria. However, conspiracy world-views do not (fully) embrace the ideals of rationality and critical thinking. This suggests that some desiderata of rationality or critical thinking can, in isolation, be counterproductive. In response to this puzzle, we first argue that coherence cannot be separated from other desiderata of critical thinking. Becoming more coherent does not necessarily matter if one is unresponsive to the evidence, fails to reason on the basis of justified attitudes, and so forth. Then, we turn to consider the concrete actions that can be implemented in critical thinking courses which would reflect this. Articulating the relationships between the various desiderata of rationality can be difficult in introductory critical thinking courses, since they usually carry different objectives. Still, simple measures can be put in place to give students some guidance. We illustrate our point with marking grids.
This article is an effort to explore an incident of conflict that occurred between me-as a teacher in a private tutoring agency-and a fourth-grade boy, Jie, who was under my supervision. During this incident, Jie uttered a physical threat which he directed towards me after I nagged him about his disruptive behaviours. In response, I gave Jie permission to carry out his threat of physical violence against me, but he refrained from doing so. After the incident, we developed a somewhat positive relationship, with Jie showing significant improvement in his conduct. I do not refer to this incident as an example of 'what to do in a situation like this', but rather to explore various possible interpretations of the event from a philosophical and educational point of view. In this article, I first discuss two key themes relevant to this incident-namely, freedom and 'being bad'-and their relationship to one another, before providing a description of the incident itself. I then present the interpretation of the incident that constituted my initial understanding of 'why my method worked'. I then problematize this interpretation and offer three alternatives, discussing their viability and limitations. The third alternative interpretation, which is largely based on Gert Biesta's notion of education as subjectification and his interpretation of a similar incident relayed by Homer Lane, is what I settle on in this article. Finally, I draw some implications about education in general from the preceding discussion.
This article explores the ethical distribution of labour in addressing 'hard history' within cultural communities, focusing on histories that are difficult to confront due to their complex and emotionally charged nature. These include events like the genocide of Indigenous populations in the USA and the impacts of colonialism in the UK. Hard histories challenge national narratives and cultural identities; they evoke strong emotional responses, necessitating a deeper understanding of the past and its present implications. The central argument of the article is that, within a community, the responsibility for engaging with hard histories should not (as it often does) disproportionately fall on those who have been most directly harmed. The article provides an analysis of different types of labour involved in processing hard histories, proposing that an ethical distribution of labour requires prioritizing the voices of some community members (i.e. those most burdened) as they provide evaluative perspectives on ongoing projects. Others (i.e. those who have most benefited from these histories) should take on most of the other forms of labour, adopting a studious approach as they remain open to mutual learning about and engagement with these histories. This approach promotes empathy, critical thinking, and informed discussion, contributing to a more accurate understanding of cultural histories and their impact on contemporary society.
This article argues that philosophy, when approached as a lived, dialogical, and inclusive practice, can and should be a way of life for children. Drawing on the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement, the article challenges assumptions that philosophical enquiry is too abstract or advanced for young learners. It explores how diverse philosophical traditions, including Dewey's pragmatism, Buber's dialogical ethics, Kant's constructivist epistemology, Wittgenstein's language games, and Heidegger's existential questioning, affirm children's capacity for philosophical engagement. The article further draws on developmental psychology and pragmatist ethics to show how children think critically, reason ethically, and contribute meaningfully to philosophical dialogue. By foregrounding children as capable thinkers, the article reimagines education as a transformative ethos rooted in enquiry, reflection, and shared meaning-making. P4C is presented not simply as a pedagogy, but as a democratic, humanistic practice that affirms children's full participation in intellectual and moral life.
Computational thinking (CT) is currently being introduced into non-computer science disciplines at all educational levels. Many who have written on or implemented CT in educational contexts claim that CT is a universally applicable set of general problem-solving skills. I challenge this claim by discussing how CT is used in practice within everyday contexts and in learning within different disciplines. I propose an alternative conceptualization of CT as being socially and disciplinarily situated and transforming across these contexts. I discuss the significance of a situated conceptualization of CT for educational and research practices, highlighting through example cases the risks that choosing an inadequate conceptualization of CT has for disciplinary learning. These risks include concentrating student learning time on neither meeting discipline-specific learning objectives nor on developing computer science skills, but on an artificial intermediary. Key questions for future research are identified, centring around the realization of CT in different disciplinary settings, its transformation across contexts, and how to develop and test assessment formats that take CT's situated nature into account.
This article outlines some problems inherent in the World Religions Paradigm and focuses on the problem of teaching propositional belief. By comparing belief to faith, this article suggests that teaching World Religions in higher education can be done without propositional belief and through a practice-oriented alternative. Using one line of thought in the philosophy of education, this article argues that teachers can adjust the World Religions Paradigm, rather than getting rid of it all together. This adjustment is based on Wrathall's neo-Heideggerian argument that praxis-oriented faith and lived religious experience should be fundamental to World Religions in higher education.
This article develops the concept of 'covert no-saying' as a pragmatic framework for democratic education in illiberal democracies. Drawing on pragmatist philosophy, it argues that traditional approaches-'yes-saying' (compliance) and 'drastic no-saying' (overt dissent)-are increasingly untenable in contexts marked by repression, polarization, and diminishing civil liberties. Instead, educators should foster 'covert no-saying': indirect, strategic forms of dissent that preserve democratic values while minimizing personal and professional risk. Through analysis of classroom strategies such as coded language, allegory, comparative case studies, and critical media literacy, the article illustrates how teachers can nurture critical reflection and resilience in students without openly confronting illiberal authorities. The discussion highlights the importance of adaptive teacher education and collaborative support networks for sustaining democratic practice under adverse conditions. Ultimately, the article contends that covert no-saying offers a vital, context-sensitive response to democratic backsliding, enabling educators and students alike to maintain hope and agency in the ongoing struggle for democracy.
The crisis of the digitization of human culture may be the most acute since the agricultural revolution that founded our civilization about ten thousand years ago. Given the tectonic nature of the current civilizational upheaval, it is not surprising that revolutionary transformations are taking place in education and pedagogy as well. Educational institutions increasingly rely on the technological possibilities of digitization in order to enrich or even replace traditional teaching methods. Such remarkable and seemingly effective innovations raise a critical question: which elements of the old world do we want to preserve and sustain in the new one? This article brings insights from Socratic pedagogy to bear on digital education, exploring the ways in which Socrates' views on education and the limits of written language can assist in our attempts to strike a balance between the innovative technologies that will be integrated into education, and the traditional methods it would be wise to preserve, and perhaps even refine, in light of the Socratic pedagogical legacy. With a focus on the notion of 'content', the article argues that the digital sphere in which it is ubiquitous is characterized by passive consumption, undermining active and meaningful learning. The article then defends three principles of Socratic pedagogy-namely, its emphasis on moral improvement, dialogical encounters, and fostering active enquiry-as foundational for recalibrating educational priorities in this transformative era.
This article raises the question as to whether philosophy of education has both categorial and normative commitments, and argues that it has both. First, it discusses categorial philosophy of education (CPED) in terms of two possible forms: one which involves uncontroversial anthropological considerations, and one which makes substantial claims about human nature. Each is framed with examples. Normative philosophy of education (NPED) is then introduced and contrasted with the categorial version. An illustrative example from Rousseau demonstrates the close relationship between normative political philosophy and NPED. The article then presents an extended example of NPED, relating this to contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering. The work of R. S. Peters is considered as a sustained and partly successful attempt to disentangle categorial and normative elements in his own evolving philosophy of education. Finally, the relationship between CPED and NPED is outlined.
The article starts with the popular diagnosis that generative artificial intelligence (genAI) will 'change everything' in education and asks what such a fundamental change would entail-and if we would even notice it under our current theoretical frameworks. It then analyses two such frameworks-namely, Martha Nussbaum's neohumanist theory and posthumanist theory-to see if they can provide guidance in this potential new situation. Nussbaum's theory is found to fall short in terms of appreciating the potential positive developments the introduction of genAI could bring, such as the emergence of new capabilities that are not covered by her framework. Posthumanist theory faces the opposite problem-not being good enough at identifying the potentially dangerous outcomes of using genAI in the classroom. The article ends with suggestions concerning a possible path forward, incorporating the most valuable insights of each theory.
This article focuses on the four-step schema introduced by Harry Brighouse, Helen F. Ladd, Susanna Loeb, and Adam Swift for operationalizing the Educational Goods Framework and making 'value-led and data-informed' decisions in education. The four steps are (1) identify the main values at play; (2) identify the key decisions relevant to those values; (3) assess the options in light of the values and evidence; and (4) establish what is the best policy overall in the circumstances. In this article, we point out the ambiguities in this four-step approach and argue that its lack of clarity carries the danger of causing ethical problems in certain real-world educational contexts. We demonstrate our points through two cases in El Salvador, a country with non-ideal features that render it challenging to implement Brighouse and Swift's idealized vision of rational, impartial, and informed decision-making processes. We conclude with a call for adding normative guidance on collective decision-making as an addendum to the Educational Goods Framework and note its potential utility in contexts beyond El Salvador.
In the wake of recent developments in Large Language Model (LLM) Artificial Intelligence technologies, there has been a resurgence of scholarly conversation regarding the roles and value of human teachers in the educative process. In this article, we situate these scholarly discussions against the backdrop of an ancient tale of artificial intelligence from the Mahabharata. We begin by providing a basic explanation of how LLMs function and then highlight major trends in the literature that advocate for, or caution against, their implementation in education. Next, we explore the dangers of anthropomorphizing LLMs more generally before situating those dangers in an educational context. Finally, we outline the specific ways in which LLMs cannot fulfil the human teacher's role. This is in large part because LLMs lack the capacity that human teachers have for empathetic understanding in relation to their students. Because LLMs function within the bounds of numerical algorithmic predictions that are based on patterns of textual data devoid of semantic meaning, we argue that LLMs as currently constituted cannot embody some of the most salient attributes of a human teacher.
This article questions the meaning of Eros in sexual desire and education by comparing the Greek mythological figure Butes-who, enchanted by the Sirens' song, throws himself into the sea despite the risk of death-with today's narcissistic 'digital players', who, through dating apps, AI, or virtual reality, exchange only pleasure while avoiding negativity. First, it examines Pascal Quignard's Bout & egrave;s (2008), contrasting Butes with both Orpheus, who neutralizes the Sirens' song with his own music, and Odysseus, who is bound to the mast to resist the Sirens' seduction. Through Anne Carson's Eros the Bittersweet (1986), the article also emphasizes the paradoxical nature of Eros, which inherently involves madness and suffering: it critiques today's tendency towards convenient love that seeks only controlled, safe thrills with risk-free desire. Furthermore, drawing on Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus, this article develops Carson's idea of Eros as the 'desire to know the unknown', highlighting the similarities between Eros and knowing, the lover and the thinker. It argues that when the narcissistic self opens itself to the longing for love and wisdom, it paradoxically gains a deeper understanding of itself, in an ongoing process of learning. In this sense, the article advocates philosophy that encourages individuals to grow by moving beyond the comfort of pleasure-satisfaction, embracing negativity, and casting themselves into desire for the unknown.
