Political philosophers have grown interested in the egalitarian project of making postsecondary education affordable for everyone interested, citing civic and economic benefits. But how and why the state should intervene in this project is still a matter of great debate. Despite wider coverage in colloquial debates, broad state funding approaches like free public college have been justifiably met with skepticism among British and American philosophers. Most accounts worry that such models may be inegalitarian, serving as a middle-class benefit at the expense of low-income families. In this article, I both articulate and complicate this worry—or what I call “the fairness objection.” I argue that this objection has two common versions: (1) the weak fairness objection, or that tuition-free models are unjust because they disproportionately distribute funds to middle-income over low-income families; and (2) the strong fairness objection, or that tuition-free models are unjust if they leave any individual—especially though not exclusively if they are from a low-income family—without aid. I then examine each version of the fairness objection more closely and argue that the model at least requires further justificatory work for political philosophers and politicians before such broad funding models can be dismissed on the grounds of justice.
To better understand how and why educational policies and practices designed to increase the quality of learning for all may not succeed in doing so, we take up a conceptual question that is underexplored in global education: what does it mean to increase the quality of learning for all? To do so, we examine the case of Botswana through Levinson et al.’s conceptions of educational equity and trade-offs. We combine historical process tracing with a 2017 empirical study of student-level literacy assessments and classroom observations. Our analysis reveals ways in which conceptions of equity influence students’ literacy outcomes and teachers’ pedagogical practices. Botswana has, since Independence, acted on conceptions of equity related to equal allocation of resources and equal experiences for all students. We find that, while foundational, these conceptions of equity also acted as barriers to equal learning outcomes and educational adequacy, which require consideration of differential resources and/or experiences. We argue that conceptions of equity can provide a useful framework in future work aimed toward expanded educational goals and learning for all globally.
Teachers’ professional judgment depends on attentional conditions that formal discretion alone cannot secure. Institutional requirements, classroom relationships, and cultivated habits shape which educational considerations become salient and remain available for judgment. This article develops a normative account of attentional autonomy : the prudential capacity to let educational reasons appropriately govern how teachers direct, distribute, sustain, and suspend attention. Four perspectives on attention (process, skill, resource, and ecology) inform a model of four interacting avenues for cultivating and exercising this autonomy: attentional skills, pedagogical knowledge, action on classroom conditions, and collective influence over institutional arrangements. The model distinguishes directive, distractive, and deformative threats, emphasizing how deformation alters salience and meaning, including where teachers retain formal discretion. It also identifies institutional supports, including protected domains of pedagogical judgment, confidential formative inquiry, and collective authority to revise working conditions. Such support should enable situated judgment while sustaining opportunities for challenge and reconsideration. Distinguishing teachers’ own attention from their direction of students’ attention, the account explains how autonomy can enable both warranted guidance and appropriate relinquishment of control. Attentional autonomy thus specifies an important dimension of teacher professionalism: the capacity and conditions for responsiveness to educational reasons.
In this conceptual article, I examine several educational aims and propose a new conception of education based on stewardship. The conception of stewardship as an educational aim recognizes the limited authority of educators and parents while fostering student autonomy. I address educational stewardship across various lenses, such as democratic, cultural and epistemic, environmental, and ethical stewardship as a means of informing a well-rounded approach to educational stewardship. I address the boundaries of stewardship as an educational aim and conclude with implications for further work.
