This lecture, delivered in memory of Peter Mair, discusses how political scientists can account for the far right's evolving relationship with democracy as far-right actors become increasingly integrated into mainstream politics. Building on Mair's diagnosis of the hollowing out of representative democracy, I argue that this integration challenges the conceptual and empirical frameworks long structuring the study of the far right. Three key pathways are identified: (a) defining what far right is, as distinctions between extreme, radical, and mainstream actors have blurred; (b) understanding what the far right does in power, where focus on policy outcomes - especially immigration - has obscured how far-right actors embed coercion and targeted violence within state institutions; and (c) locating where the far right operates, as movements increasingly operate across both civil society and electoral politics. The lecture proposes expanding party-centred perspectives to view the far right as a nativist-authoritarian social movement integrating multiple actors across a spectrum from street violence to institutional governance. By situating the far right within the 'void' Mair described, I highlights how democratic withdrawal has created structural opportunities for movements challenging liberal democracy, offering new directions for research on the far right, democracy, political parties, and social movements.
The 2025 Irish Presidential Election, held on 24 October, resulted in the election of Independent TD Catherine Connolly as the 10th President of Ireland. Her candidacy, endorsed by all parties on the political left, and her triumph came as a surprise to many. The outcome represented a positive result for the opposition, particularly after their disappointing performance (specifically, Sinn F & eacute;in) in the previous general election. In contrast, both coalition parties suffered major setbacks, with Fianna F & aacute;il experiencing the collapse of Jim Gavin's candidacy. Voter turnout was low, and there was a dramatic increase in spoiled votes, possibly indicating dissatisfaction with the conduct of politics and growing public disillusionment with the political establishment.
In 1983, the Dublin government established the New Ireland Forum. Its objective was to reach an agreed approach to address the conflict in Northern Ireland. It owed its existence primarily to the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader, John Hume, but what is largely neglected in any commentary is the part played in the background to its formation by the Irish Independence Party (IIP). The IIP was a nationalist party that operated in Northern Ireland in the 1970s/1980s. Its objective was to seek a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland by political means. It was not a long-term electoral success and it folded in 1989. Effectively, it was squeezed out in the rivalry between Sinn F & eacute;in and the SDLP. During its brief existence, the IIP was not an insignificant party, and it had an impact on these two larger parties. It briefly challenged the electoral dominance of the SDLP, and its electoral support was a factor that convinced Sinn F & eacute;in to contest elections in Northern Ireland in 1982. This article will include a brief history of the IIP, its effect on Sinn F & eacute;in and the SDLP, and its neglected and forgotten role in the creation of the New Ireland Forum.
This article analyses and evaluates Fianna F & aacute;il's 'progressive republican' cross-class ideological strategy between 2011 and 2024 after the economic crisis and electoral collapse in 2011. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci's hegemony, it demonstrates how the party reconstructed strategically 'national-popular' identity (i.e. republicanism) and 'common sense' values (i.e. 'fairness') to attempt to rebuild ideologically a cross-class alliance - the historic foundation of its hegemony. Party leader speeches, party literature and policy documents are analysed to show how its 'progressive republican' collective identity and core values framed a new programme. It argues that the strategy yielded a partial recovery but ultimately failed at the implementation stage as it was unable and unwilling to transform substantially the structural effects of Fianna F & aacute;il's previous neoliberal policies. The latter created deep class contradictions and inequalities in housing and health provision for low- and median-income workers. This meant the limited concessions actually implemented post-2020 were ineffective in winning their consent. I thus conclude that the era of Fianna F & aacute;il one-party hegemony is finally over. The article also defends class and ideological analysis in the light of this application maintaining against existing scholarship that it can provide insights into Fianna F & aacute;il and wider Irish party politics.
Opposition to immigration in Ireland has visibly increased in recent years. Considerable evidence indicates opponents of immigration are more likely to vote for populist parties and more likely to be disenchanted with the establishment of political parties and democratic institutions. In many Western European countries, opposition to immigration has been the driving force in the rise and electoral success of populist political parties. Using the European Social Survey, this paper explores whether opposition to immigration is associated with lower levels of trust in democratic institutions and weaker attachment to a democratic regime in Ireland. The results indicate that opponents of immigration display significantly lower levels of trust in partisan institutions, such as politicians and political parties, and to a lesser extent in non-partisan institutions, such as the police and legal system. More notably, opponents scored significantly lower on the importance of free and fair elections, a critical media, protection of minorities and living in a democracy. These respondents also displayed significantly stronger authoritarian tendencies, being more likely to accept a strong leader above the law compared to those with more liberal attitudes towards immigrants. Extreme anti-immigrant attitudes thus tend to be associated with an erosion of the democratic public sphere.
One of the stated advantages of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) voting system in deeply divided societies is that voters are given the opportunity to express support for a range of parties. Proponents argue that this will result in voters casting their second or lower preferences across community lines in ways that encourage support for moderate parties and reduce conflict. This study examines patterns of vote transfers in Northern Ireland in the thirteen local elections since 1973, to determine whether voters are transferring support across the ethno-national divide, and whether such transferring has increased over time. This analysis will provide evidence regarding the effectiveness of STV in encouraging support for moderate parties and cross-community transfers in deeply divided societies. It concludes that there has been a modest but significant increase in transfers from moderate parties in one community to the other, and from moderates in both communities to non-aligned parties. This has played an important role in facilitating moderation in Northern Ireland politics.
Since its publication in 1992, Politics in the Republic of Ireland (originally edited by John Coakley and Michael Gallagher) has become the standard textbook for the study of Irish politics. As such, it plays a critical role in shaping how students understand this subfield of political science. The picture of Irish politics painted by the book has, however, not remained static, as new editions of the book (seven to date) have been released. New chapters have been added (e.g. a chapter on politics and the media), while others have disappeared (e.g. a chapter on constituency work). Other chapters have been split into two or merged together. More importantly, the content of the book has shifted - sometimes subtly, sometimes dramatically. These shifts can be attributed to changes in the Irish political landscape, improved data regarding Irish politics, and changing priorities within the Irish political science profession - changes reflecting, in part, the use of such data.
Parliamentary committees have been found to advance women's rights. It is not known if this claim can be made in relation to the Irish parliament. This study asks to what extent has the women's rights committee of the Irish parliament effectively addressed a gender equality agenda over time. It attends to the question by systematically examining the work of the Joint Committee on Women's Rights (JCWR) and its successors to substantively represent women along three dimensions - rules (mandate and function), scope (range of issues adopted and their impact on legislative change), and advocacy by critical actors (individual leadership on gender equality). It contends that these three aspects interacted in different ways over the course of four decades to create an institutional context in which the committee had varying opportunities for women's substantive representation. It concludes that the JCWR and its successors have been an important site of women's substantive representation in the Irish parliament. However, it also reveals a weak commitment to women's rights in the parliamentary system which makes the hold of women's equality on the parliamentary agenda a contingent one.
Historically, PMBs in the Irish parliament were few in number, both in terms of those published and those enacted. It was believed they were having little impact on the political system. Something has been changing in recent years, and in this paper, we examine the rise of PMBs as a tool of legislators since 2011. Their impact beyond parliament is the main focus of the paper. Two types of effect are considered, what we call policy and publicity, and both relate to two of the primary goals of political actors, namely policy and votes. The policy effects considered are how PMBs can be used both to promote a policy area and to highlight policy priorities. Two forms of publicity effects are considered, namely the impact of PMBs on the media coverage of their sponsors and also their electoral impact. We find that media coverage of an issue more than doubles once it is the subject of a PMB, but that it does little to promote the policy preferences of an individual parliamentarian. We also show that PMB activity is associated with greater media coverage for their sponsors and that it has a significant impact on their vote.
Irish political finance exists in two parallel universes, one for elections and one for day-to-day activities. Ireland's election finance rules focus on candidate spending. Candidates are treated equally and regarded as belonging to civil society. Ireland's parties are treated as public utilities. They are overwhelmingly publicly funded for their non-electoral activities. Funding is allocated proportionally, not equally, and is provided on the basis that parties submit to a plethora of bans, limits, and disclosures. They are parallel universes because parties are not allowed to use their generous public funding in election and referendum campaigns: this is important because in a scenario where public funding could be spent on campaigns, incumbents would have a much greater financial advantage. In the UK state subsidies are so miserly that public funding is a footnote, not a parallel universe. In other countries, like Finland, public funding can be spent on campaigns: there is only one political finance universe. The parallel-universe argument is a more useful description of Ireland's political finance regime than any of the existing classifications from the small political finance literature.
Some years before the Good Friday Agreement, Michael Gallagher addressed a key dilemma in Northern Ireland politics. In two seminal articles, he raised central normative and empirical questions embodied in the titles of two articles: 'Do Ulster unionists have a right to self-determination?' (1990) and 'How many nations are there in Ireland?' (1995). On the first question, Gallagher comprehensively explored theories of national self-determination and decolonisation before concluding that 'the very idea of an absolute right to self-determination for either nationalists or unionists is a chimera'. On the second question, following an assessment of the case for a one-nation or a two-nation island, and assessing the notion of 'partial' or not fully formed nations, he concluded that a type of 'three nations theory', distinguishing between 'Irish', 'British' and 'Ulster' identities, performed better than the alternatives. This article revisits these debates a generation later, in the light of major changes in demography, identity and geopolitics. It uses contemporary survey, census and other data to assess the extent of ethnopolitical change since the late twentieth century, and explores the implications of change for collective choice on the island of Ireland in matters pertaining to national identity.
