In this paper, we look for the relevance of chaos in the well-known Hicks-Samuelson's oscillator model investigating the endogenous fluctuations of the national income between two limits: full employment income and under-employment income. We compute the Lyapunov exponent, via Monte- Carlo simulations, to detect chaos in the evolution of the income between both limits. In the case of positive Lyapunov exponent and large values of the parameter (i.e. marginal propensity to consume and technical coefficient for capital), the evolution of income is seen to be chaotic. The model also may contain a quasi-periodic attractor that can be chaotic or not.
Friedrich Hayek was a fervent advocate of the methodological specificity of the social sciences. However, given his contact with Karl Popper, several historians and philosophers have characterized his final position as Popperian, that is, a position that would have accepted the unity of the scientific method. A closer look to Hayek's philosophy and Popper's own intellectual course shows that such a thesis is based on some misconceptions that can be overcome by taking the Hayekian concept of "spontaneous order" as the foundation of a methodology immune to any kind of methodological monism and Popper's late works that reveal a loosening of his defense of methodological unity.
The study of how ideology impacts economic theory helps to shed light on the nature of economic theory itself. I have tackled these issues in my own PhD Dissertation (Almeida, 2019a), and I appreciate this opportunity to comment on Professor Gillies’ article which provides an interesting perspective from an author with training in philosophy. Economists important to the development of the discipline have dedicated themselves to issues of ideology. Robbins (1932) and Friedman (1953), two of the most important trend-setters in economics, provided dialogue between economics and philosophy. Robbins, when he defined economics as ‘the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses’ (Robbins, 1932, p. 15), has allowed the expansion of the range of economic analysis through its method; Friedman argued for pragmatism in the models, in which results are more important than premises. I believe that no discipline has ever persisted so strongly in its claims to be value-free as economics (cf. Aldred, 2009). This is true even of physics, often viewed as the ultimate science to be emulated by other branches of science, leading to accusations of ‘physics envy’ (Nelson, 2015). The attempt to make economics value-free has been a concern of economists, as early as the 18 th century (Colander and Su, 2015; Waterman, 2020). This has influenced how economists build their models. Jean-Jacques Laffont, one of the most important names in applying general equilibrium models to public economics, wrote that most economists have chosen to ignore the interaction between economic policy and politics because of ideology, and that ‘some even believe that it is not “politically correct” to develop policy recommendations altered by political considerations’ (Laffont, 2000, p. 5; Almeida, 2019a, p. 109). Robbins established (neoclassical) economics as non-ideological and value-free (assuming we can consider ‘value judgements’ and ‘ideology’ to be synonyms). In essence, he helped economic theory to become what it is today, and this is the subject of Professor Gillies’ critique. Robbins wrote:
This paper is part of the general debate about the need to rethink economics as a human discipline using a heuristic to describe its object, about the need to explicitly reject the positivistic approach in neoclassical economics, and about the urgency to adopt a different methodology, grounded on a realistic set of initial assumptions able to cope with the complexity of the decision making process. The aim of this paper is to show the use of Occam's razor in the economic debate around realism in economic modelling. Occam's razor can be intended as a principle of logic that emphasises simplicity, or as a heuristic tool that emphasises parsimony. Neoclassical economists, such as Samuelson, have explicitly used Occam's razor as a logical principle to highlight the strict logic and simplicity of neoclassical economics; neoclassical models, however, are based on unrealistic assumptions. Some approaches of heterodox economics, au contraire, have used Occam's razor as a powerful heuristic tool to emphasise parsimony, building up models grounded on realistic initial assumptions and capable of embedding complexity into the general explanation of economic behaviour, as in Simon's bounded rationality (1955; 1957) and Hayek's notion of human rationality (1948; 1952; 1974) and cultural and social evolution (1967; 1978).
We report general and consensus results of a survey administered to a defined population of economic science academics in Mexico. Our results include insights on economic opinions, scientific aspects of economics, scientific activities, countries' economic performances and methodological orientation. Our outcomes show areas of consensus which, at least partially, are consistent with findings in previous studies. Comparisons between our results and those of other studies suggest that consensus could be constant over time and that economics academics in Mexico seems to show similar levels of skepticism about the importance of rationality assumption as those in other latitudes.
As is well understood, the values inherent in the dominant neoclassical economic paradigm are self-interest and optimization. These are the values that guide individuals and policymakers in advanced capitalist economies in their economic decision making. As a consequence, the economics discipline, arguably, is insufficiently oriented to helping people and organizations make wise choices, choices about what is really and truly in people’s best interests. In other words, there is strong reason to believe that economics has a wisdom deficit.
In past decades, significant work in behavioural economics has decisively revealed the limitations of the human agency model known as Homo Economicus, whereby humans are purely driven by material self-interest. These behavioural findings are, however, far from integrated in mainstream economic theory, which builds heavily on the neoclassical tradition. Unbeknown to modern economics, Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith already proposed a richer model of human agency in which choices also depend on the desire for social approbation. The social approbation mechanism complements material self-interest and provides a more diverse toolset, which is able to explain social preferences. Mainstream economic agency confines the study of human action to an artificially-limited spectrum because it reduces society to atomistic individuals who maximise one all-purpose measure of value: utility, which is often instrumented by consumption. Collective action is therefore only sustainable where material incentives are in place, as the economic agent rides for free unless financially penalised. To explain pro-social behaviour from the standpoint of self-interest, Mandeville and Smith proposed that agents also maximise social approbation, which conveys incentives to act pro-socially because the desire for others' approval encourages compliance with social norms. The upshot for collective action is that, assuming social norms represent common interests, approval from others provides an extrinsic motive for pro-social behaviour. I formalise the mechanism by proposing a simple utility function in which agents maximise social approbation as well as material self-interest.
The main thesis of this paper is that the empirical success of Keynesianism shows it to be scientific. Keynesianism here refers not to a specific theory, but to a paradigm. It is argued that Kuhn’s notion of paradigm can be applied to economics, but, in contrast to the natural sciences, in economics there are always competing paradigms. The principal ones in contemporary economics are the Neoclassical, Keynesian and Marxist. To investigate whether the Keynesian paradigm is scientific we need a criterion for the scientificity of a paradigm. The paper first considers one approach to this problem due to Kant, but this is rejected as incorrect and called ‘the Kantian fallacy’. Another approach is then put forward: ‘the empirical confirmation principle’, and reasons are given for accepting this as correct. Using this principle, it is then argued that that Keynesianism is indeed scientific.
The aim of this work is to illustrate the psychological contributions of Pragmatism and of the Original Institutional Economics (also referred to as OIE or institutionalism), and their relevance for improving the process of social valuing and, as a consequence, the effectiveness of policy action. As a matter of fact, both institutionalist and pragmatist theories were well acquainted with various strands of psychology, and some of them also provided relevant contributions in this respect. Moreover, these theories reveal, along with various differences, significant complementarities, both between themselves and with important concepts of social psychology and psychoanalysis. The work will address the following aspects: (I) The main characteristics of pragmatist psychology with particular attention to their social implications. For space reasons, we will focus attention on the contributions of authors – John Dewey, William James and George Herbert Mead – more oriented to social sciences. (II) The psychological contributions of institutionalism. We will pay particular attention to Thorstein Veblen's theory of instincts and John Rogers Commons' theory of negotiational psychology. We highlight that these theories present, despite a number of differences, relevant complementarities.
This paper contends that Marx develops in Volume III of Capital an incisive conceptual framework in which excessive credit creation, indebtedness and speculation play a critical and growing role in the reproduction of social capital on an extended basis; however, given the decentralised and anarchic nature of capitalist production, the credit system does so in a highly erratic and contradictory manner which only postpones the inevitable day of reckoning. The paper also highlights Marx's relatively neglected but highly important analysis of the separation of ownership from management in the advanced capitalism of his day, England, and its modern-day implications for excessive risk-taking and debt-fuelled speculation up until the eve of the crash. More importantly, the paper argues that in Volumes II and III, Marx implicitly connected the expanding role of credit (which he associated with the development of capitalism) to a significant reduction in the turnover period of capital, thereby boosting the rate of surplus-value, and countering in a highly erratic and contradictory manner, the fall in the rate of profit. The growing role of credit has been relatively ignored in the Marxian literature as an important counteracting factor to the law of the declining rate of profit. It is not mentioned at all by Marx in his famous Chapter XIV, Vol. III of Capital where he discusses other important counteracting forces to the falling rate of profit, nor by Engels (in this particular context) who edited both Volumes II and III.
I have been writing and publishing in economics for 50 years and much of my work has been debated and criticised. But I think that this is the first time that someone has honoured me by a full-scale article criticising an unpublished working paper. I am very grateful to Lynne Chester for bringing the questions I raise to a wider audience. The working paper that she criticizes went through several versions, of which the 12 July 2017 draft that Lynne downloaded from the World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research (WINIR) website is not the final version. In addition, the working paper has now expanded into a book entitled Is There a Future for Heterodox Economics? (Hodgson, 2019). Lynne's criticisms help me to attempt to make the text clearer and deal with some misunderstandings that have arisen...
The renowned institutionalist Geoffrey Hodgson has claimed inter alia that heterodox economics has failed to define its nature and scope, does not take pluralism seriously, and lacks expertise concentration to ensure quality which means it has made limited progress and is held in variable esteem. To address these alleged problems, Hodgson proposes four alternative strategies: the creation of heterodox economics academic departments; for heterodox economists to enter non-economics academic departments; for heterodox economists to 'organise' around a successful approach with future potential; or, to encourage the study of economic institutions by other social science disciplines or by using prominent mainstream techniques and approaches. A response to these criticisms and proposed strategies is warranted for several reasons. These criticisms are not trivial and, as an assemblage the import is much greater than a singular criticism. Hodgson is very influential within the economics discipline and he reiterates, in part, past criticisms from the mainstream as well as presenting his criticisms to a wide range of audiences. These criticisms intersect with longstanding debates within heterodox economics about the role of pluralism, the definition and project of heterodox economics, its relationship to the changing form of mainstream, and the merit of synthesis or convergence of different heterodox schools of economic thought. The suitability of mainstream measures to judge heterodox economics, and the relationship of ideology and economic theory, are also raised by these criticisms as well as the feasibility of proposed strategies to support heterodox economics within the academy. It is argued that several fallacious claims lead Hodgson to misconstrue the nature and evolution of heterodox economics, and inherent flaws in each of his proposed alternative strategies will further marginalise – not advance – the project of heterodox economics.
This paper seeks to examine the relationship and the interaction between institutions, policy and the labour market in the light of the ideas of the first generation of institutional economists, who, in contrast to neoclassicals, conceived of the economy as a nexus of institutions, underlining, therefore, the significant role of institutional and non-market factors in the functioning of an economic system. They also criticised those who define (economic) welfare only in terms of efficiency and satisfaction of consumer interests; institutionalists instead focus on issues related to justice, human self-development and labourers' welfare. In addition, early institutionalists paid considerable attention to the institutional framework of the labour market. In particular, the first generation of institutional economists highlighted the importance of institutions and other non-market parameters in determining the level of wages and employment (e.g. the role of the bargaining power of workers and employers). Furthermore, they made substantial contributions towards the field of labour policy and they were pioneers in the formulation of economic and social policy. Specifically, various modern institutions and labour market policies, such as unemployment benefits, industrial training and active employment policies, were implemented in the US, during the first decades of the 20th century, after the recommendation of the institutional labour economists. Therefore, their ideas, besides being interesting from a historical point of view, may also be useful in today's analysis of workers' problems and the functioning of modern labour markets.
