The answer to the question, "Is Roger Bacon's scientific practice scientific?" concerns an assessment of whether Bacon's scientific practice exhibits traits of modern science. This paper uses the theoretical framework proposed by Hon and Goldstein (2023) for defining modern science, which identifies three salient, constitutive features: commitment, methodology and technique. These features function together as a skeleton of the argumentative structure which combines presuppositions and rules of inference to reach a conclusion. The fundamental assumption is that scientific knowledge is argumentative. Against this background we examine three scientific results that Bacon included in his Opus majus. Although Bacon's methodology involves the use of geometrical proofs and his technique employs diagrams and geometrical analysis of the relations embedded in them-both features seemingly indicative of modern scientific practice-a characteristic alien to modern practice surfaces in the feature Hon and Goldstein refer to as "commitment." Specifically, Bacon's commitment is rooted in theology and its dependence on sacred scripture. It is this characteristic that sets Bacon's scientific practice apart from modern science. In a nutshell, Bacon's commitment implies that final causes are not directly and fully known from the natural world but are revealed through scripture. Consequently, since understanding the nature of a thing requires knowing all four Aristotelian causes, those ignorant of sacred scripture cannot grasp the final cause and thus miss the true nature of the thing. It thus follows that Bacon's approach is not what we associate with modern science.
This article examines a fundamental transformation in thirteenth-century theory of science by tracing the shifting role of the subiectum scientiae in scholastic theology. While Aristotelian epistemics defined a science through a unitary subject conceived as a logical genus, medieval debates-especially within the Parisian university context-revealed increasing tensions when applying this framework to theology. Focusing on key figures such as Robert Kilwardby, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome, the article reconstructs an epistemological turn whereby the subject of science was progressively reinterpreted in relation to the intellect and its objects. Kilwardby's essentialist redefinition of the subject as a unified nature laid the groundwork for this development. Aquinas advanced it further by integrating the notion of obiectum and emphasizing the role of the intellect, introducing a dual account in which both subject and formal object contribute to the unity of a science. The decisive shift occurs in Giles of Rome, who effectively collapses the distinction by identifying the subject with the principal object of cognition, thereby centering epistemology on the relation between intellect and object. This reorientation foregrounded the limits of human cognition and intensified debates about the scientific status of theology, particularly in contrast to divine and beatific knowledge. The article argues that these developments culminate in an emergent notion of "subjective science," wherein the identity and validity of scientific knowledge become inseparable from the capacities of the knowing subject. This medieval trajectory, far from being anachronistic, offers a historically grounded account of the epistemic conditions that anticipate later conceptions of subjectivity.
We expound the notion of "distinct experience" (experientia distincta) as introduced in the writings of the early modern polymath Joachim Jungius (1587-1657) and operative in his scientific practice. After contextualizing "distinct experience" historically (e.g., vis-à-vis Francis Bacon's [1561-1626] concept of "experience") and embedding the notion conceptually into the broader category of "division" (divisio), we reconstruct the "Problem of Distinct Experience": Jungius' epistemology of science involves a circularity or an infinite regress because scientific methods (inductions and demonstrations) presuppose divisions, which are, in turn, built on distinct experiences, themselves presupposing divisions. However, we argue through a careful historical case study on his investigations of fossilia that his research practice shows why the problem posed only a limited threat for him and his contemporaries. We finish with a brief philosophical appraisal, contrasting his views with those of Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589).
The aim of this paper is to accurately assess the epistemological status of Albertus Magnus' (ca 1200-80) alchemy. In modern bibliography there is a "black or white" approach to the question of whether Albertus regarded alchemy as an art or scientia, and thus the adoption of an absolute thesis on the matter tends to create a series of interpretational problems. In contrast, I argue that Albertus' approach to alchemy does not exclude either art or scientia and, depending on the context, the Dominican master sometimes considers alchemy as an art-when it is connected with manual labor-and sometimes as a scientia-when it is connected to natural-philosophical and metaphysical aspects. At the end of my paper, I offer a way of properly assessing the Albertian alchemy, and determining how and when to accurately connect it with the notions of art and scientia.
The article argues that, contrary to what is often held in academic literature, traditional fishermen had solid empirical knowledge about underwater topography long before acoustic sounding. To substantiate the argument, a large mid twentieth-century collection of place names and terms collected among coastal fishermen in Norway is explored, with the aim to demonstrate that this vocabulary reflects a detailed knowledge about underwater geography as well as advanced navigational skills. The second aim of the article is to investigate the reformatting of this knowledge when it was first transferred to national fisheries maps and secondly when it entered the International Court of Justice as part of the Norwegian fisheries case against the UK in 1951. Reformatting represents more than a new context: It shapes and changes knowledge. The present article applies this more general principle of knowledge transformation to the study of the human-ocean relationship and explores how reformatting has decisively impacted activities at sea, influenced parameters for ocean use, and been constitutive to shaping the ocean as an object of knowledge.
In this paper I present a case study of the creation of the Event Horizon Telescope (EHT), which provided the first image of a black hole shadow (April 2019) and that of the central black hole of the Milky Way (May 2022), as one in which the collaborative approach was primarily motivated by strong epistemic needs. To this end, I introduce and explore the notion of "epistemic constraint," meaning any component of the world that prevents us from gaining some definite kind of knowledge in a specific manner and allows or promotes some other specific kind of knowledge in defined ways. The collaborative approach that led to the recent images of black hole shadows through the EHT is described in terms of "epistemically constrained collaboration" - i.e., a collaborative mode of research where the epistemic constraints prevail over other factors - and the most important features of this concept are expounded.
Over a four-year period from 1909 to 1913, the German expedition to Tendaguru removed 250 metric tons of dinosaur fossils from what is now Tanzania and was then part of the colony of German East Africa. To this day, these fossils - some of them now world-famous exhibits - are held in Berlin's Museum für Naturkunde. Using hitherto unexamined sources, this paper reveals how the expedition's leaders translated their initial mission of "thorough excavation" into a strategy of total extraction, leading them to amass thousands of additional animals, plant samples, and cultural artifacts that were subsequently distributed among Berlin's national museums. It shows that this multi-institutional and transdisciplinary colonial archive relied heavily on colonial infrastructures and violence and argues that collecting in this context must be understood as an enactment of power. Following Dan Hicks, it asks how this history might be interpreted within a theory of taking.
This article develops a praxeological perspective on the history of partisanship in Central and Eastern Europe. The author proposes to examine partisanship not as an idea or a concept but as a virtue that was supposed to be forcibly cultivated and practiced in science and scholarship under Soviet domination. The article focuses on the cases of two prominent Marxist philosophers, Arnošt Kolman and Adam Schaff, who became devoted teachers of partisanship in the Soviet Union as well as in their "native" Czechoslovakia and Poland. Later, both were publicly accused of "non-partisanship." Based on these examples, the author argues that, with the establishment of the socialist regimes, partisanship became a tool of maintaining stability. This implied more autonomy for the scholars and scientists who learned how to use the quasi-moral authority of partisanship to exclude from the "moral consensus" those who, due to their "excessive diligence," threatened the internal norms and conventions.
Development planning was a form of interventionist social knowledge widely used in the mid-twentieth century. Planning was employed with different aims, and the adoption of concrete techniques and procedures was highly sensitive to each country's institutional context. This article studies the life trajectory of Colombia's Ten-year Plan, an internationally celebrated attempt to design economic development on a large scale in what actors characterized as a politically "democratic" and economically "liberal" setting. Based on the Colombian case, I argue that a central function of planning in developing countries was to build trust, on behalf of local stakeholders and international donors, in the state's capacity to credibly use public resources and foreign aid to achieve its development aims. In turn, planning also allowed outsiders to invigilate the actions taken by states on the economy, and to make them accountable for their commitments. I examine the media of persuasion used in the build-up to, and the publicization and revision of the Ten-year Plan, to account for the shift from the macro scale of comprehensive plans to the smaller-scale development interventions observed in the 1960s. This case shows that the malleability of planning procedures was key for the enduring resilience of the planning system.
In 1980, Belgian Plan Commissioner Robert Maldague clandestinely circulated a document called The Impossible Scenario, thereby reshaping planning practices in Belgium amidst a widely perceived moment of crisis. Using archival records and oral histories, this article traces how reformers within the (now federal) Belgian Planning Bureau combined foresight scenarios and macroeconomic modeling in The Impossible Scenario. It explains the use of foresight scenarios through the Planning Bureau's aim of restoring its capacity to intervene in Belgian policymaking. The article then highlights the broader political meaning of this epistemic transformation: the reconfiguration of planning infrastructures in Belgium-and, more broadly, in Europe-from instruments of democratic economic coordination to tools of market governance. Examining this previously underexplored Belgian case thereby reveals the neoliberalized and neoliberalizing character of Western planning infrastructures in the early 1980s.
This article examines how the American psychologist David McClelland advocated a quasi-colonial interventionist view to social science, shaped by his understanding of scientific progress, economic development, and social change. In the 1960s, he saw real-world experiments as a means both to test his theories and to generate knowledge efficiently and quickly-all with the ultimate aim of improving the human condition. While his primary focus was knowledge production rather than social transformation, his dual roles as professor and consultant carried an interventionist dimension, grounded in the belief that psychological measuring instruments could serve as tools for psychological training. By reconstructing this stance and the interstitial space McClelland created between academia and consultancy, I aim to show that his drive to intervene-exemplified by his company's work in Curaçao-stemmed less from a pre-scientific conviction than from a distinctive mode of scientific practice.
This article examines the intellectual and interventionist trajectory of American popular writer and commentator Robert Reich from his early 1980s advocacy of "industrial policy" to his time as US Secretary of Labor in the 1990s. It argues that Reich is an interesting figure to consider through the lens of "interventionist knowledges" because, although he draws selectively on social scientific data and knowledge, his syntheses of these things are more rooted in mythic thinking than in disciplined analysis. This article recounts the history of a failed bill, the Reemployment Act of 1994, to examine how Reich and those around him drew on and interpreted existing social scientific data to construct an idea of "the New Economy" and what, they claimed, it meant for national human capital policy. This article suggests that mythic visions of society and economy possibly play a large role in policy-making and issues advocacy.
This article investigates how anthropological knowledge about regions with economic difficulties became part of regional development in France during the pivotal decade of the 1970s. It argues that ethnological fieldwork in French peripheries in the 1960s provided knowledge about regional culture and practices for its maintenance that became the core of a new development tool, the Ecomusée. It was via this tool that French anthropologists sought to intervene in regional development. By analyzing one of the first French ecomuseums, we gain an understanding of how anthropological practices and knowledge nurtured the shift to cultural development politics associated with the "enrichment economy." Fieldwork in the 1960s, aimed at a professionalized Ethnologie de France, problematized interaction with the local population and produced knowledge about regional culture that identified a region with its economic past. The practices of documentation and participation established during these fieldwork projects shaped the enrichment economy.
This paper reevaluates Friedrich Max Müller's interactions with his British detractors from the early 1860s to the early 1890s. By offering a re-examination of their disputes concerning language and mind, it first and foremost illuminates a transformation in the research methods, standards of evidence, and forms of explanation that were seen as scientifically legitimate in the human sciences in late Victorian Britain. To use Müller's language, this entailed a shift in the balance of power between "historical" and "theoretical" schools of thought, which came to privilege the latter over the former. No less importantly, this paper also demonstrates how the history of philology can contribute to the history of science by revealing the extent to which Müller and his opponents were ultimately searching for the same thing - knowledge about human origins and development. Additionally, by taking seriously Müller's arguments as a philologist, this paper refutes the pernicious view that his objections to Darwin's account of languages were motivated by his religious beliefs.
In the United States, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the reforming institutions of the horse-drawn-carriage trade prescribed descriptive geometry to their workshops in order to modernize the drawing process for modern carriages. This injunction, institutionally supported by the builder's national association, professional newspapers, and education, was part of a wider movement to organize production at a time when the carriage trade was booming. In order to facilitate the circulation of theoretical knowledge within workshops that were reluctant to mathematize their environment, two trade journals translated, in the space of a few years, and on three occasions (once by one journal and twice by the other), the same French treatise on descriptive geometry written by a Parisian carriage woodworker. This paper highlights the process of creation of a mathematical translation in a professional environment. It emphasizes the significant role of the industrial and technical context that influenced the choice of translators, the writing style, and the speed with which a translation was produced and published. In the case of mathematical content that did not belong to the common culture of the trade, international circulation allowed for the direct transfer of knowledge from one national industry to another, without relying on academic sources as intermediaries.
In 1679, the astronomer Giovanni Domenico Cassini published a large print detailing the entire visible surface of the moon with unprecedented meticulousness. This Grand Selenography is undoubtedly one of the most spectacular pictures ever produced within the Académie royale des sciences. However, it has remained widely neglected by historians up to now. This study offers the first account of the making and early reception of the print. It argues that the Grand Selenography remains uncompleted because it failed to satisfy Cassini and his contemporaries. Furthermore, its history allows us to shed new light on the range of issues that scientific pictures might have raised during Louis XIV's reign.
This article explores the dispute between the philosopher Immanuel Kant and the physician Johann Daniel Metzger over the moral autonomy of individuals with mental illness. Situating the debate within the broader context of the evolving philosophical and medical professions in eighteenth-century Germany, the article examines how a professional conflict emerged over who - the physician or the philosopher - should serve as the legal authority in cases where moral responsibility was in question. The analysis shows that this was not merely a theoretical issue for Kant, but a practical one, brought to the fore by the infanticide trial of Margarethe Kaveczynska, in which Kant's friend, Theodor Gottlieb Hippel, presided as judge. The article argues that while Kant's vision for the practical application of his anthropology influenced his conception of moral autonomy, he ultimately lost ground to the rising authority of the medical profession.
This article uses archival material to trace rising rhetoric about prenatal prevention of birth defects. I argue that the new philanthropic framing of "birth defects," aimed to create a coherent category and scientifically prevent a complex array of intractable anatomical and functional disorders seen in infants and young children, with repercussions for women. Emphasis on scientific prevention of birth defects was built on networks of volunteers, fundraising activities, and philanthropic marketing models that had been developed for a crippling epidemic disease, polio. The National Foundation's (NF) expansion to congenital malformations fit uneasily within the prior infectious disease eradication model, assuming that elimination of birth defects was a worthy and achievable goal. Scientific research fundraising, advice, and advocacy aims became entangled. Marketing of birth defects as a vast problem and looming undesirable outcome for all potentially pregnant women was shaped by philanthropic and professional domain expansion. The NF initially promised that funding scientific research innovation would yield a return on investment, with scientific research on pregnancy leading inevitably to elimination or repair of congenital malformations or medical rehabilitation. However, definitions of prenatal prevention were unstable, and prioritizing research and medical aid funds for the vast array of chronic conditions defined as their new target became a challenge. Framing birth defects as a public health crisis, such advocacy leveraged parents' hopes and aspirations for their children's future well-being towards fundraising for medical research and technologically mediated gatekeeping of bodily and functional differences.
The Jesuit Joachim Bouvet established an analogy between the binary arithmetic developed by Leibniz and the diagram Fuxi liushisi gua fangwei (or FX64), attributed to Shao Yong, which organizes the sixty-four hexagrams according to the Fuxi/Xiantian order. Consequently, this diagram could be considered as binary. Some scholars argue that the diagram is not binary because of the different construction of the two systems and the "wrong" reading direction used by Bouvet and Leibniz-opposite to the one used in China. Nevertheless, by a superimposition of Leibniz's binary table and of the derivation table used to construct the diagram, this article shows that the diagram is binary, since it is constituted of two elements and the binary system can use other symbols than 0 and 1. The reverse methodology used in constructing the two systems because of their different purpose-division for the FX64 diagram and multiplication for Leibniz's dyad-allows their reading from either one direction or the reverse. This does not affect the fact that they are both binary, since it leads to the same form and structure.
