The coup d'etat in Chile on September 11, 1973, sparked an immense wave of condemnation of the dictatorship and solidarity with its victims on a global scale. The events in Chile quickly acquired different and even contradictory meanings, depending on ideological affiliations, political cultures, and the needs of the moment. Chile was thus a socialist, Third Worldist, democratic, and human rights cause, among other possibilities. This article analyzes this phenomenon through the trajectory and global activism of one of the most prominent Chileans in exile, Hortensia Bussi, who went from being a relatively marginal political role as Salvador Allende's wife to an influential figure with networks that crossed North-South and East-West borders. In this regard, we argue that Bussi skillfully articulated the different meanings of the Chilean cause, while also impacting the new political practices and transnational activism that emerged during the 1970s. In this way, Bussi shaped and fostered solidarity with Chile as a defense of the socialist horizon, democracy, human rights, and women's rights in front of different audiences and in different scenarios.
This article discusses the concepts of the Austrian anthropogeographer Erwin Hanslik. Although this work has inspired many German-speaking geographers, its author has been largely forgotten. Hanslik's holistic philosophy and his distance from (German) nationalism contributed to his marginalisation, despite the modernity of the media he used. His worldview was linked to the scholar's biography and identity, based on his attachment to his home region and the Habsburg monarchy, which was treated as a natural space of a multi-ethnic community. The article analyses his wartime work in the context of the major geopolitical debates of the time. It argues that Hanslik should be seen not only as an eccentric, but as a conscious proponent of an original Austro-Hungarian vision of spatial and political transformation in East Central Europe.
This article examines the brief German occupation of Rostov-on-Don in November 1941 as a case study in the early wartime development of propaganda narratives, concerning civilian participation in combat and legal rhetoric. The episode was interpreted by Nazi, Soviet, British, and American media. The article explores how wartime actors and national press systems justified their actions and framed civilian conduct and violence within broader political and military discourses. Nazi Germany portrayed Soviet tactics as violations of the laws of war by accusing the Red Army of using civilians as combatants. Soviet propaganda celebrated resistance while avoiding detailed discussion of civilian involvement that might raise legal ambiguities. British newspapers, broadly sympathetic to the Soviet cause, largely echoed Soviet narratives while independently amplifyingthemes downplayed in official Soviet propaganda. By contrast, American coverage-shaped by pre-Pearl Harbor neutrality-relied more heavily on German communiqu & eacute;s, often reproducing the Nazi perspective without criticism. The Rostov case reveals early efforts to shape perceptions of legitimacy, legality, and moral authority in total war through competing narratives surrounding civilian participation and violence. It also demonstrates that references to international law formed one element within a broader struggle over military legitimacy, political credibility, and public opinion.
After World War II, the Japanese government attempted to independently prosecute its own war criminals to maintain the 'national system' and reduce punishment by allies, but it was opposed by the United States. Before and after the San Francisco Peace Conference, the pro-American faction led by Shigeru Yoshida formed a government. Taking advantage of the United States's emphasis on Japan's strategic value during the Cold War, the government formulated a policy to release Class B and C war criminals as soon as possible to consolidate the position of the Conservative Party regime and alleviate social dissatisfaction with the Allied trials. After the Sino-Japanese Treaty came into effect, successive Japanese cabinets made preparations and conducted diplomatic negotiations for the implementation of this policy. By the end of 1958, all B-class and C-class war criminals had been released early. This outcome, which was caused by the politics of the Cold War, is an important reason why Japan has not been able to solve its historical problems.
This article examines the evolution of British perceptions of China from the late nineteenth century to the early 1920s, tracing a shift from the 'China Question' - a view of China as a passive arena for European great-power rivalry - to the 'China Problem,' which framed China as a re-emerging world power. It argues that Bertrand Russell's The Problem of China (1922), which popularised the idea, drew upon intellectual currents that had been developing most acutely since 1899. Through analysis of writings by journalists, former diplomats and intellectuals, the study identifies four recurring themes underpinning these visions: China's civilizational strengths and the moral indefensibility of its subjugation; debates over the endogenous versus exogenous nature of reform; prospects for political consolidation; and China's role in international stability. These themes emerged in response to key historical junctures: the Boxer Rebellion, the fall of the Qing dynasty, the birth of the republic and China's participation in the First World War. While these assessments were imperfect, they nonetheless anticipated China's eventual return to great power. By situating Russell within this discourse, the article highlights how British thought began to reconcile China's immediate disorder with its long-term potential, foreshadowing debates about China's global role throughout the twentieth century.
This article examines the Baltic gold dispute as a lens through which to reassess Britain's long-standing policy of non-recognition of the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In 1967-1968, the United Kingdom incorporated Baltic gold reserves into a broader Anglo-Soviet claims settlement while formally maintaining de jure non-recognition of the annexation. For two decades, this apparent contradiction generated little political cost, as Baltic independence was widely regarded as implausible within the stable territorial order of the Cold War. Drawing on archival material from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Treasury, parliamentary debates, and diplomatic correspondence, the article reconstructs how British policymakers reconciled legal doctrine with d & eacute;tente-era pragmatism. It argues that non-recognition functioned less as a rigid constraint than as a flexible diplomatic instrument whose coherence depended on geopolitical context. The restoration of Baltic independence between 1988 and 1992 reactivated the latent tension embedded in the 1968 settlement, transforming a managed compromise into a question of policy consistency and reputational credibility. By situating the Anglo-Soviet Claims Agreement within both the history of recognition policy and the political economy of d & eacute;tente, the article illuminates the conditional character of legal principle and reputation in international politics.
This article places the Holy See at the centre of a non-traditional, performative diplomatic practice linked to the maintenance of state continuity, examining its role in the activities of European governments-in-exile after 1945. In the absence of effective territorial control, their representatives treated the Vatican as a key interlocutor in articulating claims to non-territorial sovereignty and legal continuity under international law. The article argues that the Holy See constituted a distinctive site of interaction in which competing notions of legitimacy, representation, and recognition were negotiated through symbolic diplomatic practices, extending beyond the classical model of interstate relations. Drawing on press sources, diplomatic correspondence, and archival materials, the article analyses both formal and informal modes of interaction, including papal audiences as acts of performative diplomacy. It demonstrates that, despite the Holy See's restraint in issuing formal acts of recognition, its engagement with representatives of governments-in-exile, among them Kazimierz Pap & eacute;e and Stasys Girdvainis, functioned as a form of symbolic recognition, sustaining their claims to state continuity and reinforcing their legitimacy in the international arena.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 forced the Swiss government to make a choice. Abstaining from economic sanctions against Iraq for reasons of neutrality risked isolating Switzerland diplomatically. Participating in economic sanctions risked compromising Swiss neutrality by taking sides in an armed conflict. The Federal Council - the executive body of the Swiss government - responded to this dilemma by imposing economic but not military sanctions on Iraq in response to the Gulf Crisis from 1990 to 1991. Yet this left a number of important questions unresolved. The Swiss authorities understood that economic sanctions tended to yield mixed results. The Gulf Crisis showed that they can have devastating humanitarian implications for the local population, and each permanent member of the Security Council can exercise its veto over UN sanctions in response to armed aggression. The present article shows that the Swiss government's decision-making process in relation to the Gulf Crisis of 1990 to 1991 involved a considerable degree of conceptual flexibility vis-& agrave;-vis the competing imperatives of permanent neutrality and collective security in Swiss foreign policy against the backdrop of massive geopolitical uncertainty at the end of the Cold War.
This study examines the development and activities of the global Betar movement in the Turkish Republic, situating it within the broader context of a Revisionist Zionism movement. Utilising a qualitative methodology that incorporates archival research and document analysis, the paper traces Betar's origins, ideological foundations, and operational strategies from its establishment in Istanbul in the early 1930s through its gradual transition into a semi-clandestine emigration and educational network by the late 1960s. The research highlights how Betar Istanbul maintained ideological continuity with the revisionist Zionist vision despite challenges. Key findings illustrate Istanbul's importance for the Betar and its dual role as a vehicle for Zionist education and Aliyah (migration), its hierarchical and disciplined organisational structure, and its enduring symbolic commitment to principles such as Hadar (dignity) and Mishmaat (discipline). While archival documents reflect that Betar was active in many countries at the same time, this article only concentrates on the Turkish/Istanbul dimension. The study contributes to a deeper understanding of the construction of Jewish political identity beyond borders, revealing how diaspora communities adapted transnational Zionist frameworks to local social, political, and cultural conditions and served their mission.
This article argues that British handling of the Trump administrations has evidenced the under-recognised value of Britain's monarchy in promoting the Anglo-American special relationship. Traditional British approaches of seeking close leadership relations and public American endorsement of special relations have delivered mixed results and carried abnormally high political risks. The House of Windsor has consequently been enlisted to the cause with unusual intensity. This owes to three key reasons. First, Trump's ego and admiration for the monarchy enhance the latter's ability to provide an additional means of building diplomatic bridges and promoting a public narrative of special Anglo-American relations with the President and his administrations. Second, British royalty help reinforce Anglo-American cultural connection, popular American fascination with the House of Windsor enabling it to emphasise traditionally shared values to, and raise Britain's profile with, domestic US audiences. Finally, British royalty complements assiduous government cultivating of Trump and his administrations but also lessens political risk in close government association with a President deeply unpopular in large swathes of Britain.
The article examines the policy of the Spanish Empire toward northern Borneo during the nineteenth century and argues that there existed a structural contradiction between Spain's diplomatic claims and its actual administrative practice. Although Spain occasionally invoked historical ties with the Sultanate of Sulu to justify claims of sovereignty, it never effectively incorporated Borneo into the administrative or legal framework of the Philippine colony. Drawing on the analysis of treaties, diplomatic correspondence, maps, and administrative records, the study demonstrates that the power of the Sultanate of Sulu and the pressure exerted by other powers-particularly the United Kingdom-prevented Spain from establishing effective control over Borneo.
This article reconstructs the British blockade of Greece in 1850 as an experiment in intervention short of war. Commonly remembered through the prism of the Pacifico Affair and Palmerstonian gunboat diplomacy, the blockade has been treated as an episodic display of British power rather than as a practice of international governance. Drawing on British, Greek, and French sources the article shifts attention from justification to implementation, tracing how naval coercion was organised, contested, and experienced across ports, ministries, and public arenas. It shows that the blockade operated as a disciplinary instrument directed at a formally sovereign European state, testing the limits of protection regimes, treaty obligations, and the law of nations. Far from suspending Greek agency, the crisis provoked intense domestic debate over sovereignty, dignity, and European belonging, while also exposing fractures among the Great Powers charged with guaranteeing Greek independence. The Greek case reveals how nineteenth-century international order was produced through everyday practices of coercion that blurred the boundaries between war and peace.
In November 1959, an international team of peace activists issued a statement to the 14th session of the United Nations General Assembly demanding they oppose the French government's plan to test nuclear weapons in the Sahara. As the foremost forum for international peace and co-operation, the group recognised the symbolic value of appealing to the UN but were sceptical about its capacity to realise its humanitarian commitments. Accordingly, they worked with Kwame Nkrumah and other African leaders to devise an assembly of their own. From here, the group launched plans for a direct action academy that would recruit and train a civilian army in non-violent resistance. Using the case study of the Sahara protest and the United Nations, this article engages with the question of how social movements stimulate change in global governance institutions. It highlights the co-dependent, performative nature of this relationship, drawing on the concept of theatre to show this in action. It is argued that the Sahara activists structured their strategy through their engagement with the UN moving from attempts to leverage its self-image as a humanitarian organisation, to parodying its shortcomings and ultimately imagining an oppositional 'counter-theatre' intended to force it to honour its commitments.
The concept of civilisation was central to nineteenth century international legal thought. The concept was an ambiguous one, however. Its ambiguities were particularly marked in the case of consular jurisdiction, or extraterritoriality, in Japan. Beginning in the late 1880s the treaties by which extraterritoriality had been established in Japan were revised, culminating in the abolition of extraterritoriality in 1899. The first power to revise its treaty with Japan was Great Britain, with negotiations concluding successfully in 1894. British residents in Japan strongly opposed treaty revision, an opposition which they justified by recourse to the concept of civilisation. As well as making legal arguments in favour of the maintenance of extraterritoriality, the residents challenged the assumption inherent to the project of treaty revision that Japan was sufficiently civilised to become an equal subject of international law. The residents' pleas were largely ignored by the Foreign Office, which had determined that consenting to treaty revision was advantageous to Britain's relations with Japan. In this way, the British government agreed to abolish extraterritoriality in Japan against the wishes of those who enjoyed its privileges, and Japan came to be formally accepted as a civilised state.
