Abstract A movement that calls itself “child free by choice” has gained popular traction yet has received little philosophical response. In this paper, I suggest that given facts about the human body and action, it would be surprising that the CFBC lifestyle would be a choice in the way its adherents conceive of it. I first attempt to offer a strong case for why one might choose to be child-free. Then I examine the concept of choice itself and question whether child-bearing squarely fits within the bounds of human freedom. I conclude that we should take seriously the ways in which human beings fit into a cosmic picture of fertility, wherein life in all its forms seeks to diffuse and propagate itself, one in which the reverence for the givenness of human life ought to remain paramount in order to preserve a proper relation of man to himself and to his Creator.
Abstract One of the challenges of modern bioethics concerns its very method: how to discuss the application of technology to the human body. More specifically, how to perform an ethical assessment when everything—including negative consequences of biotechnical actions—is manipulable? An interesting proposal can be found in Leon Kass, who diagnoses that the fundamental problem of bioethics is the technological mindset, which prevents ethical assessment by treating a person as if he were lifeless. Kass’ response, expressed through the title phrase “primacy of form over the material,” is that human action should be assessed within the phenomenon of human life: one cannot assess the value of an action without assessing its human meaning. This anthropological style of his bioethics is evident in the range of issues he addresses. This article broaches the above problem through the analysis of Kass’ assessment of the use of psychochemical agents.
Abstract There is an active debate about whether religious, and specifically Christian, clinical ethics consultants should allow their beliefs to influence their assessments and recommendations. Speaking as a Christian consultant, my problem with this debate is that it often treats “Christian belief” narrowly, as a set of rules derived from Christian authorities. I argue that this framing focuses exclusively on the theme of “law” in Christian theology and neglects the central Christian theme of “gospel”: the good news of God’s mercy and compassion extended to “lawbreakers.” Christian conduct is to be shaped not only by “the law” but also by the transformative power of God’s grace. While identifying the rules and principles in a case is important, how ethicists conduct themselves matters just as much. Ethics consultation requires active listening, interpreting others charitably, and building trust. What is missing in current debates is how the virtue of compassion and the work of mercy can guide the consultation process and help manage the burdens of moral responsibility. A Christian approach to ethics consultation not only influences these practices but also supplies a spiritual engine that inspires action.
Abstract What makes Christian clinical ethics consultation distinctly Christian? Clinical ethics expertise is predominantly couched in terms of a cognitivist approach, which gives primacy to reasoned, normative arguments, whether secular or Christian. The cognitivist approach is not necessarily anti-Christian, but it is not distinctly Christian either. In this essay, I offer a Christian incarnational approach to clinical ethics consultation that is grounded in a Christo-logic of persons, rooted in embodiment as a transcendental condition for medicine, motivated by love, and practiced with a hierarchy of moral attention, which holds a proper place for moral argumentation. If bracketing out religious considerations for the clinical ethicist is metaphysically harmful, then it is equally metaphysically irresponsible not to consider how incarnation is essential for a Christian clinical ethics consultation method. I conclude that for a Christian clinical ethics consultation to be distinctly Christian, its metaphysics and method must be incarnational.
Abstract The American Psychiatric Association (APA), in tacit agreement both with forensic psychiatrist and sexologist, Fred S. Berlin, MD, and with prominent Canadian clinical and forensic psychologist, researcher, and sexologist Michael C. Seto, PhD, had proposed that pedophilia—like homosexuality, bisexuality, and heterosexuality—be classified as a sexual orientation. I argue that the APA, Berlin, and Seto are correct in this regard. My reasons for affirming this view, however, differ in critical respects from Seto’s reasons for endorsing this classification. In contrast, I join wholeheartedly with Berlin. In addition, I critically explore some reasons that Seto gives for discriminating against certain sexual minorities, including pedophiles, and find his reasons wanting. Along the way, I provide a perspective on the possibility of both spontaneous and therapeutically mediated sexual orientation change, the complexities involved in how to understand the notion of “consent” between “consenting adults,” the distinction between “sexual sadism interest” and “sexual sadism disorder,” and a brief history regarding the APA’s more recent understanding of pedophilic sexuality. Finally, I investigate how some arguments that are recruited to defend nondiscrimination against “dominant” sexual minorities, such as homosexuals, mutatis mutandis, also apply to defending nondiscrimination against pedophiles and other “subdominant” sexualities.
