Amid global resonance for and against the unilateral measures to tax cross-border digital transactions, Pakistan has adopted an eccentric statutory regime. This regime has tax consequences for digital profits of businesses located in the UK, the USA, and beyond. The article reviews these statutory measures and examines their interplay with the international tax rules. In particular, the article discusses the questionable co-existence of Pakistan's multiple legislative instruments with Pakistan's double tax agreements (DTAs) with other States. In doing so, the article analyses the (in)consistencies between the newly adopted legislation and Pakistan's DTA regime. The article also identifies duplication in Pakistan's multi-layered digital tax regime and discusses its inadequacies in terms of enforcement by domestic authorities. In the end, the article provides brief suggestions to optimize such statutory measures for their better alignment with both the international and domestic tax regimes.
When the Australian Government's automated debt recovery system issued hundreds of thousands of unlawful payment demands to welfare recipients, the error was not computational but interpretive: the algorithm embodied a reading of social security legislation that no court would have endorsed. This controversy-the Robodebt scandal-illustrates the stakes of Rules as Code, an emerging movement to translate legislation into machine-executable form. This article argues that such translation is not a neutral technical operation but a substantive interpretive undertaking, embedding contestable judgments about statutory meaning in systems applied automatically to an indefinite number of cases. Drawing on Hart's account of open texture and Fuller's principles of legality, the analysis demonstrates that the computational demand for determinacy conflicts with the deliberate flexibility of legal language. Evaluative standards such as 'reasonable' or 'proportionate' resist encoding without either defeating automation's purpose or substituting quantitative thresholds for contextual judgment-though this article proposes that hybrid norms, bifurcating provisions into computationally tractable and human-assessed components, offer a promising middle path. On the contested question of legal status, this article argues that encoded rules should be recognized as a sui generis category of administrative instrument requiring its own regulatory framework, including mandatory interpretive documentation, formal certification of equivalence, and preserved citizen challenge rights. Comparative examination of emerging safeguards in Estonia, Kazakhstan, and France reveals that no jurisdiction has achieved a fully satisfactory accountability architecture. For courts, this article argues that judicial review should extend to the encoding itself-examining whether code faithfully implements statutory requirements, not merely whether code was correctly applied to particular facts.
This article critically examines the approach towards judicial control over executive powers under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, as it has been established by the Supreme Court's majority judgment in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs. It argues that the decision establishes a sweeping doctrine of judicial restraint for review proceedings under that act, termed here as 'Shvidler-deference'. By accepting the government's contentions without truly testing the rational connection between the specific sanction and how it could achieve its aim, and by balancing the impact on the individual against the abstract importance of the objective rather than the measure's actual efficacy, the Court might risk that judicial control of executive measures under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 becomes illusory, thereby eroding essential constitutional protections of civil liberties and the rule of law.
The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment responds to a persistent structural problem in cross-border finance of high-value movable assets, most prominently aircraft. When collateral routinely traverses multiple jurisdictions, lenders' security interests are exposed to fragmented domestic property and priority rules, increasing enforcement risk and raising the cost of credit. The Convention seeks to mitigate this market failure by establishing a uniform international regime for the creation, registration, priority, and enforcement of 'international interests', anchored in an electronic International Registry and standardized priority rules across Contracting States. This article develops an economic framework for evaluating the Convention's legal design and its distributive consequences. Drawing on Kaldor-Hicks optimality and the potential compensation principle, it argues that the Convention can be justified as welfare-enhancing even where it imposes short-term costs on identifiable groups. In particular, the elevation of registered international interests may disadvantage certain local creditors, unsecured claimants, and smaller enterprises that rely on domestic priority rules or local enforcement dynamics. However, by reducing legal uncertainty, transaction costs, and information asymmetries, the Convention lowers risk premia and expands access to cheaper finance, thereby enabling greater investment and more efficient capital allocation. The article's contribution is to show that the Convention's harmonization of secured transactions law can be understood not merely as privileging international finance, but as an institutional mechanism that reallocates priority to facilitate productive credit markets. On a Kaldor-Hicks account, the long-run gains from increased financing capacity, particularly for emerging and developing economies, can outweigh the transitional redistribution inherent in accession and implementation.
This study conducts a comparative legal analysis on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (PCV) in the USA and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and addresses the way in which two drastically dissimilar legal systems, common law and Sharia-based jurisprudence, respectively, handle the balance between shareholder protection and corporate accountability. Courts in the USA use existing doctrines, like alter ego, instrumentality, and reverse piercing, to prevent abuse of the corporate form. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia's approach is based on Islamic commercial ethics, and the Saudi Companies Law (2022) focuses on fairness, moral conduct, and adjudication discretion. This article takes the form of a doctrinal review of case law, statutory provisions, and Islamic legal principles and finds broad divergences in the methods by which courts arrive at their conclusions: US courts tend to begin with decisions and apply rule-driven tests, whereas Saudi courts look for concepts like 'adl (justice), gharar (deception), and maslahah (public interest) to justify corporate disregard. While both jurisdictions provide PCV as a remedy for fraud and misuse, the lack of codified criteria in Saudi Arabia leads to legal uncertainty compared with the structured (albeit sometimes prismatic) framework used by American courts. But the findings are also more widely relevant to corporate governance in hybrid legal systems. The application of PCV standards could be codified by Saudi Arabia without any loss of its ethical foundations and would lead to increases in legal certainty. On the other hand, there are limitations in the formal doctrines of the US framework, which could be fortified by accessing Sharia's focus on moral responsibility and equitable intent. This research advances ongoing debates in comparative corporate law and thus holds significance for business, regulatory, and policy actors in the area of cross-border activities.
The legal system must provide certainty for the addressees of criminal law that their acts will not be assessed more severely than they could have been at the time when the act was committed (the lex mitior principle). At first sight, it is surprising that this guarantee is limited to statutory amendments and does not extend to the interpretation of the law. Yet, a sudden and unfavourable change in interpretation, previously widely and consistently accepted by the courts, is, from the perspective of the addressee of criminal law, not materially different from a change in the law itself. In the authors' view, an established interpretation gives rise to legitimate expectations regarding the meaning of criminal law. Such expectations, however, are not protected in abstracto through the lex mitior principle, but only in concreto. In practice, a court may hold in an individual case that the potential offender acted under an institution of mistake of law, having been convinced that a different interpretation would apply. This study seeks to identify the rationale behind this difference in the treatment of changes in the law and changes in the interpretation. The existing approach to the protection of legitimate expectations is contrasted with alternative models, allowing for a cost-benefit analysis of their possible adoption. The analysis is grounded in Polish criminal law, which provides a useful illustration of trends widely present, at least within European criminal law.
The potential failure of water companies, which are normally regional monopolies, involves extraordinary public interest. Under the Water Industry Act 1991 (WIA), the English regulator has general duties to protect the interests of consumers, ensure the continuity of vital public services, and promote the long-term resilience of water supply and wastewater systems. A critical enforcement tool is the Special Administration regime (SAR), a dedicated statutory framework under the WIA that empowers the English regulator to deal with a failing service provider. Despite the substantial reforms in 2024 aimed at strengthening it, the regime has never been meaningfully considered as an option, reflecting persistent regulatory reluctance. This reluctance is illustrated by the recent restructuring of Thames Water, the biggest water provider in this country, which, amid acute financial risks, adopted a market-led solution partially implemented through a court-sanctioned restructuring plan in 2025. The sanction judgment drew widespread criticism for permitting high-cost bridge financing, yet left the company in prolonged uncertainty. The purpose of this article is to provide a legal analysis of the court's limited role in safeguarding the public interest outside a SAR and critically consider whether the option of placing Thames Water into a SAR should have been more seriously considered. It further evaluates the applicability and effectiveness of the SAR, particularly in light of recent legislative reforms, arguing misconceptions of its nature and purpose have simply rendered it, to some extent, redundant.
Statelessness disproportionately affects children and undermines their access to basic rights, including education, health care, and dignity. Despite South Africa's ratification of core international treaties and its constitutional guarantee of every child's right to a name and nationality at birth, the operationalization of these norms reveals a paradox. This article conceptualizes and evidences what it terms the operationalization gap: the phenomenon whereby states appear normatively compliant through treaty ratification and constitutionalization yet reproduce exclusion through legislative and administrative practice. In South Africa, this manifests in four interlocking barriers: gaps in nationality legislation, onerous evidentiary burdens, restrictive interpretations, and broad discretion vested in officials-mechanisms that perpetuate childhood statelessness despite South Africa's constitutional and international commitments. Drawing on the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child's General Comment 2, the article advances original, context-sensitive recommendations that translate constitutional supremacy and treaty obligations into actionable reforms. These include legislative amendments, administrative presumptions, and policy firewalls designed to dismantle systemic barriers. While grounded in South Africa's socio-legal context, the analysis offers transferable insights for other jurisdictions grappling with migration pressures and the conflation of nationality law with immigration control. By bridging the gap between normative frameworks and administrative realities, this article contributes a novel lens and a practical blueprint for eradicating childhood statelessness in South Africa and beyond.
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly permeate society, the challenge for policymakers is evolving from whether to regulate how to govern effectively in a complex global landscape. With the formal adoption of landmark frameworks like the EU's AI Act and diverse national strategies taking shape worldwide, the need for balanced and adaptable governance is more pressing than ever. This study addresses this challenge by proposing a framework for creating effective AI regulation that fosters innovation while mitigating significant risks. The research synthesizes insights from foundational ethical theories and game-theoretic principles to critically analyse contemporary policy developments and regulatory case studies. It proposes a risk-based, tiered regulatory model that calibrates oversight in proportion to an application's potential societal impact. This article puts forward evaluation criteria that consider not only technical performance but also scalability, the reversibility of effects, and the embedded values within technological systems, moving beyond a simplistic view of technology as morally neutral. The study concludes with actionable recommendations for implementing adaptive governance mechanisms, such as co-regulation and regulatory sandboxes, and underscores the necessity of international cooperation to address the global nature of AI development and prevent regulatory fragmentation. By integrating deep theoretical analysis with practical, up-to-date policy insights, this research provides a guide for navigating the intricate trade-offs between innovation, safety, and equity in the age of AI.
This case note critically examines the jurisprudential significance of HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2025] HKCFI 6291, arguing that the Verdict represents a distinct phenomenon as a common law illusion. While ostensibly adhering to orthodox interpretive canons, the Court deploys a result-oriented instrumentalism that utilizes common law methodology to expand state power rather than constrain it. Specifically, the Verdict reveals a stark 'interpretive asymmetry', characterized by an oscillation between literalism and contextualism, contingent upon which method better serves national security objectives. This note dissects three key judicial manoeuvres: first, the selective deployment of contextualism to elevate national security above constitutional rights; second, the distortion of interpretive canons to reconstruct the material elements of the offence of collusion with foreign elements; and third, the misapplication of comparative jurisprudence to legitimize the Hong Kong National Security Law's expansive reach. By severing the nexus between collusion and surreptitious conduct, the Court effectively transmutes public political expression into criminal offence. Ultimately, the decision establishes a precedent that fundamentally alters the landscape of Hong Kong's legal order, challenging the protective presumptions foundational to the common law tradition.
The aim of the study was to analyse the mechanisms of constitutional and legal responsibility of high-ranking officials in the Kyrgyz Republic, based on legislation and law enforcement practice. To achieve this aim, regulatory legal acts defining the status of an official were studied, and specific cases of accountability were analysed. According to the results of the study, the current legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic defines the term official in general, but does not provide steps or justifications for holding senior public bodies accountable in accordance with the Constitution or the law. Such individuals were brought to court irregularly and often for political reasons, which undermined trust in state institutions, as confirmed by the review of practice over the past 10 years. The decisions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court on these matters were fragmented and did not constitute long-term judicial practice. Furthermore, it was found that these procedures lacked sufficient legal transparency, while parliamentary and public oversight mechanisms were weak.
There is an emerging academic and judicial interest in the role and significance of travaux pr & eacute;paratoires or drafting history in judicial argumentation. This article considers this subject in the context of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Its central thesis is that the interpretive bodies of the African human rights system may consult these historical materials in their interpretive work to engineer social change in Africa. Although initially relegated to the outer margins, there is increasing acknowledgement that travaux pr & eacute;paratoires may assist human rights treaty bodies in norm entrepreneurship. By this, it is meant that these materials may assist these bodies to be innovative in their elaboration of human rights treaty norms. This article cautions against conflation between travaux and originalism or intentionalism. It does not call for reliance on originalism or intentionalism as a theoretical basis for reliance on travaux but argues that travaux pr & eacute;paratoires can be a separate and distinct basis for evolutive interpretation of the African Charter. This article laments that the travaux of the African Charter is inaccessible, and where it is found, it is cursory and incomprehensible. This is attributable to poor record-keeping by the relevant department(s) of the African Union. This therefore means that African human rights interpretive bodies are presently unable to effectively and meaningfully invoke these materials in judicial decision-making calculus. This article concludes by recommending that the drafting history of the African Charter must be reconstructed and published, if possible.
In the perpetual debate about the legitimate role of courts in a democratic state, constitutional rights have become increasingly relevant. In Germany, the doctrine of 'horizontal effect' of those rights has reinforced judicial creativity. The civil courts are called to interpret vague clauses of the B & uuml;rgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) in a way that fully implements constitutional rights. In consequence, they often balance conflicting rights rather than applying specific statutory rules. But legislation does not only co-exist as a way to resolve rights conflicts. It is also possible to articulate a second, democratic side of constitutionalism that vindicates the primary role of legislation. In German constitutionalism, this has always been an important aspect of rights protection in public and criminal law. In its more recent jurisprudence, the constitutional court has started to strengthen the democratic side of constitutionalism even in private law by establishing constitutional limits to judicial developments of the law. The courts must obey legislative decisions, and they may not develop obligations that put heavy burdens on constitutional rights of one party without a sufficiently detailed statutory basis. At the same time, the constitutional court insists that reserving decision-making powers to parliament should not go to the detriment of substantive rights protection. In consequence, the necessary role of legislation will depend on the strength of the constitutional rights in question.
The Supreme Court in For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 held that 'sex' in the Equality Act 2010 means biological sex only, resolving through statutory interpretation a conflict between sex-based rights and trans recognition interests. This article critiques the Court's refusal to engage in proportionality analysis when adjudicating conflicts between protected characteristics. Drawing on comparative jurisprudence, rights-balancing theory, and equality law scholarship, it argues that such conflicts require transparent proportionate balancing rather than categorical resolution through interpretative technique. The article proposes a structured, context-sensitive framework grounded in established proportionality doctrine that would enable principled adjudication whilst maintaining legal certainty for duty-bearers. It contends that binary interpretative choices, while providing surface clarity, present as textually determined what are in fact normative judgments about the relative weight of competing equality interests, thereby obscuring the evaluative reasoning inherent in rights adjudication and foreclosing more sophisticated responses to the graduated nature of equality conflicts.
This article describes how legislative drafters in three countries have tried to write clearer laws. It identifies three key influences on this development: public and political interest, government support, and drafting office cultures. This article also describes three phases in this trend: from simplifying wording to clarifying text and structure and now edifying readers by providing context and guidance. These emerging goals reflect growing awareness and understanding of statute users' needs.
This article examines the credentials of the three dominant modalities of statutory interpretation: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. This article argues that these modalities share an unfulfillable epistemic ambition: the quest to uncover the empirically true meaning of a statute-a communicative act of the individuals authorized to legislate-under conditions of uncertainty. Through critical analysis and examination of the English law classics, this article demonstrates that this ambition collapses under the weight of factual indeterminacy. Textualism fails when the ordinary meaning of statutory language is unclear; intentionalism falters when the legislator's intent is uncertain; and purposivism turns ineffectual when the scope of statutory purpose is unverifiable. This article contends that, in practice, textualism and intentionalism inevitably devolve into probabilism-a procedure that identifies the statute's most probable meaning based on available evidence-whereas purposivism gives way to pragmatism, which prioritizes cost-benefit analysis and social welfare-maximization. This article then juxtaposes probabilism and pragmatism against each other and concludes that the choice between these two viable modalities depends on whether one prefers to enhance democracy over welfare-maximization, or vice versa.
Electronic signatures are now routine in cross-border contracting. Saudi Arabia's Electronic Transactions Law and Law of Evidence provide a structured domestic regime, yet unaccredited foreign e-signatures remain exposed to unpredictability because Article 52 leaves their admissibility, legal effect, and probative weight insufficiently guided by statute. This article addresses that cross-border gap as a problem of statutory design and evidentiary treatment. It benchmarks five leading models (UNCITRAL, the EU, the post-Brexit UK-EU position, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the USA) through three evaluative dimensions: the recognition pathway by which foreign signatures acquire legal effect, the evidentiary consequences in contested cases, and the allocation of verification burdens. On that basis, the article proposes a Saudi-tailored, two-pillar revision embedded in the Law of Evidence. Pillar 1 clarifies, in Article 57, the evidentiary consequence of signatures generated through accredited foreign providers. Pillar 2 embeds, in Article 52, a non-discrimination rule and reliability criteria for unaccredited signatures that structure judicial reasoning while preserving a guided role for probative assessment. The proposal aims to reduce cross-border unpredictability, improve commercial confidence, and maintain sovereign control and technological adaptability.
This article is a reappraisal of the doctrine of implied powers in South African law in the specific context of constitutional law as it relates to the jurisdiction and remedial powers of specialist courts and tribunals. It argues that the jurisprudence on implied powers has become such that there are no discernible limits on when powers can be said to be implied and no guidance on whether there are instances where such powers can never be implied. It argues that recent developments uncoupling implied powers from express statutory text on which such powers are grounded, have led to courts adopting a free-for-all approach to implied powers with very little attention paid to the effect of this approach on the operation of the Constitution in light of its text, structure, and history, and urges a return to a minimalist understanding of implied powers.
Section 116 of Botswana's Electoral Act grants any person aggrieved by the outcome of elections a democratic right to seek judicial redress. For this right to be meaningful, the procedural requirements for access to the courts must be clear and simple. This requires a conducive legislative and regulatory framework. Since the promulgation of the Electoral Act in 1968, Botswana has not had election regulations. The article poses the question whether election petitions can be fairly adjudicated in the absence of clear procedural regulations. Furthermore, it interrogates the position adopted by the courts in holding that they do not have discretion to condone non-compliance in election petitions and that any non-compliance, no matter how minor, renders the petition incurably flawed. The article examines the propriety of the courts' insistence on strict procedural compliance and the dismissal of petitions on technical grounds, even where serious electoral irregularities are alleged. It argues that the approach of the courts in Botswana to election petitions, coupled with the absence of electoral regulations, undermines electoral justice. The article recommends reform of the legislative and regulatory framework with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the exercise of the right to petition in respect of elections.
