This article evaluates whether Kant's argument in & sect;IX of the second Critique's Dialectic-that theoretical knowledge of God and immortality would make the highest good practically impossible-would be convincing to a pre-Kantian "dogmatic" metaphysician who affirms this knowledge. Taking Aquinas as an exemplar of pre-Kantian metaphysics, I argue that Kant's argument would not be convincing, since it turns out that Kant begs the question against the dogmatist. Kant therefore lacks this practical reason to reject knowledge of the unconditioned in favour of faith.
By analysing Marin Cureau de La Chambre's works from 1634 to 1666, I map out his theory of universal extension. I focus in particular on what he borrowed from his contemporaries, especially his synthesis of Scaliger's doctrine of the extension of spiritual substances and Suarez's notion of extensio entitativa, a pre-categorial extension attributed to bodily parts prior to categorial continuous quantity. I reconstruct both his overall metaphysical account of extension and his specific positions on the extension of God, angels, and human souls, before outlining the main implications of this theory for his natural philosophy. I conclude with brief remarks on the possible relationship between La Chambre's view and Henry More's similar theory, set against Cureau's anti-Cartesian polemic following the publication of Descartes's letters in 1657.
Kant’s grounding of friendship in morality and his downplaying of feeling have been criticized as emotionally detached. In this paper, I aim to develop a Kantian concept of friendship that incorporates situational sensitivity, emotional warmth, and a consideration of happiness. First, by comparing the duty of friendship with the general duty of love, I argue that Kant’s theory of friendship constitutes a casuistic problem in the implementation of the duty of love, necessitating a nonmoral value evaluation of a prospective friend as an indispensable presupposition of its fulfillment. Second, I contend that the problem of rational selection of a friend is rooted in a deeper theoretical gap in Kant’s moral theory: the lack of a developed rational self-love and intellectualized happiness. By contrasting Kant with Aristotle, I identify the need for a harmonious intrapersonal state as the foundation for interpersonal bonds. Finally, I propose that the reflective power of aesthetic judgment provides a systematic solution not only to the problem of rational self-love but also to that of rational friend selection, thereby bridging the gap between formal moral principles and the vibrant, affective reality of human life.
It is commonly accepted that the "self" in Confucian thought is a relational one. What this means, however, is not always clear. In addition, the relationality of the "self" entails certain philosophical problems-such as how one delineates self from other, and how others contribute to the constitution of the self. This article's investigation of the rela-tional self in Confucian thought focuses on the concept of ren (sic), arguing that it represents a bidimensional social ontology that connects horizontal and vertical dimensions between self and particular and general others. It focuses on the transmitted version of the character for ren, composed of "person and two," to discuss the horizontal dimension, and on the Guodian excavated version, composed of "body above mind below," to discuss the vertical dimension. Furthermore, it introduces George H. Mead's theory of the "generalized other" to elaborate on the vertical dimensionality of the self-other relationship. This will show that self and other are mutually produced and incorporated into a progressive sociocultural complex of selfhood.
An important part of the Humean legacy in metaethics would be unacceptable to Hume himself, viz., the argument for moral non-cognitivism based on Humean moral psychology: This argument would be unacceptable to Hume because it requires the premise of motivational internalism: “Necessarily, if one judges an act right, then one is motivated to act in accordance with that judgment.” This asserts a universal, necessary connection between an agent’s moral judging and that agent’s being motivated to act accordingly, but this violates Hume’s claim that the only true propositions asserting universal, necessary connections are about “relations of ideas.” But motivational internalism cannot be about relations of ideas, because it fails the contradiction test in “Hume’s Fork.”
Gadamer’s hermeneutics has faced persistent objections regarding its alleged relativism. I explain why the problem of relativism arises in hermeneutics, while arguing that it is ultimately not entangled with relativism. I begin by proposing that the process of understanding, as construed in hermeneutics, involves critique, showing that hermeneutics is far from irrationalist relativism. However, the relativist objection is not dismissed by this alone. I argue that the difficulty stems from the fact that hermeneutics, like relativism, acknowledges the historical diversity of truth. To address this challenge, I examine three considerations: the character of understanding as a learning experience, the realist nature of hermeneutics, and the possibility of communication across heterogeneous perspectives. I then argue, in turn, that each of them, despite its significant contribution, remains insufficient on its own. I therefore introduce a further decisive element of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, namely truth, and finally show that, since truth, for Gadamer, is not a property of propositions or sentences but a finite event of unconcealment, the historical diversity of truth moves beyond the debate over relativism.
In our times, Phenomenology brings challenge and opportunity to think about God. In this article, I examine the dependence of God on Being in Heidegger’s thought, focusing on three dimensions: the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics, the pre-turn dependence of theology on philosophy, and the post-turn dependence of God on the truth of Beyng. Contrasting with this, I analyse how Marion critiques the subordination of God to Being as a form of idolatry, proposing instead that love, as self-giving, constitutes the proper horizon for thinking God. Then I explore how, within this horizon of love, “praise” emerges as a non-objectifying discourse that responds to God. Finally, I shall show that while Marion’s proposal is predicated on a strategic reading of Heidegger’s “Being,” this theoretical choice transcends Heidegger’s methodological agnosticism and opens a new phenomenological path for thinking the personal God.
This paper proposes a two-level account of individuation, focusing on reconciling existential Thomism (especially Etienne Gilson’s version) and Duns Scotus’s teachings on haecceitas. I will argue, first, that the metaphysical root of individuation is the incommunicable act of existence (esse), that makes beings to actually exist and thus act in the world. Second, the formal specification of thisness within a finite individual is given by an intrinsic, non-qualitative principle. Following Scotus, I will call this haecceitas, “thisness.” The idea is to preserve the Thomistic priority of act over potency and the centrality of esse while addressing the concern that esse lacks the positive determination to secure thisness. The first section of the paper will discuss the views of Aquinas, Gilson, and Scotus in their historical context. The second section will attempt to synthesize Aquinas’s esse and Scotus haecceitas which, though having different roles, are essential to individuality. The third section will answer potential objections, followed by a concluding section.
This paper explores the relationship between classical theism, natural law, and moral realism, focusing on the critical role of divine exemplarism in securing moral constraints. Drawing on the work of Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau, the paper examines three central theses for a robust moral realism: (1) the existence of moral facts, (2) their stance-independence, and (3) the necessity of moral constraints. While Aristotelian essentialism addresses the first two theses by grounding moral truths in human nature, it falls short on the third—constraint. The paper argues that classical theism, through divine exemplarism, provides the necessary resources to secure moral constraints that other metaethical proposals lack. By asserting that all essences reflect divine goodness, theism constrains the moral landscape, ensuring moral facts are not arbitrary and preventing any world from permitting violations of essential moral platitudes—such as the idea that it could ever be good to torture, act cruelly, or slander for fun. The paper concludes that classical theism strengthens moral realism while offering a simpler, more robust explanation than alternative theories.
It is well-known that Kant at some point thought the faculty of imagination was a necessary and autonomous faculty of the mind working in conjunction with sensibility and understanding to perform cognition. However, many scholars in the last 50 years have argued that Kant abandoned this view of the imagination and relegated its activities to the faculty of the understanding. In this paper, I join some recent scholars in pushing back against this view. I argue that the role of imagination in the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason requires it to perform the necessary task of mediating between the non-conceptual intuitions of the sensibility and the concepts of the understanding. I argue that imagination cannot do this if it is the performance of the faculty of the understanding. Hence, it must be a faculty distinct from the understanding. I also explore how the schemata are initially generated by the imagination and later refined by the concepts of the understanding.
This article investigates the metaphysical foundation for integral human flourishing through an updated account of the transcendentals based on the Thomistic tradition. Arguing that contemporary culture’s emphasis on autonomy neglects the intrinsically relational nature of being and fosters fragmentation, the text proposes that freedom attains its true purpose in loving relationships which reflect the structure of reality itself. Introducing relationality as a “pre-transcendental” provides an organizing principle for the transcendentals. “Integral thinking” is both based on and allows to give an account of the mutual interdependence of the transcendentals—each presupposing, enriching, and integrating with the others. This framework becomes fruitful in conjunction with the concept of “dynamic transcendentals” (Alice Ramos), the view that human beings are called to realize these principles actively in themselves and in the world through love, and thus offers a coherent basis for integral formation.
Interaction in the intersubjective sense, or the conceptual triangle including relationships and mutual communication, can also be named “concrete intersubjectivity.” A core of sociality, interactions can be personal, political, friendly, indifferent, intimate, casual, hostile, among humans, and among or with other animals, and are highly diverse, indeterminate, ambivalently multiple, and changeable. Yet they share a detailed structure, which implies their openness. Condensely: I. For Mia and Liu to interact is tantamount to Mia having some interactional engagement as in II. [I.i . . .] II. that Mia is interactionally engaged with Liu means that Mia is interactionally engaged-engaging as a whole person with Liu as a whole person interactionally engaged-engaging with herself as a whole person engaged-engaging with . . . [ad infinitum] [II.i. . .]. This second-personal analysis is both individualistic and relational, and identifies a logically ambivalent structure whose tension lies within interaction, and within subjectivity, rather than between them. This paper introduces my analysis of interaction or concrete intersubjectivity, or, again, of the relations between interaction and subjectivity.
According to Aquinas, the moral quality of the human person depends on the actions carried out through the will, understood as efficient cause. In Aquinas’ thought, the will is a rational appetite, but it cannot be reduced to a mere executor of reason’s commands; otherwise, it would lack freedom, and its actions would not be meritorious. This raises a central question: how can the will be free in choosing its actions if it always chooses and acts under the guidance of reason? I argue that Aquinas provides sufficient theoretical resources to answer this question, resources that this article brings into focus.
In modern society, science holds an influential status in a range of disciplines including politics, healthcare, and environmental policy. However, because the ideology of the scientific perspective is often uncritically accepted, deeper ontological and ethical concerns may be obscured. A phenomenological critique, informed by Martin Heidegger, offers us to move beyond scientific interpellation and objectification to uncover other modes of revealing. This essay explores Heidegger’s phenomenological critique of scientific investigation and focuses on the concept of enframing (Gestell). From this perspective, we challenge the hegemony of a non-inclusive scientific worldview. Our aim is to uncover the ontological and ethical assumptions within science that instrumentally reduce beings (both human and non-human) to objects for prediction and control. We then outline Heidegger’s meditative thinking as an alternate to such calculative thinking in science. The essay is split into two parts, Part One: Ethical and Ideological Reflections on Scientific Investigation and Part Two: Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Scientific Investigation.
There has been much discussion over God’s existence as a metaphysically necessary being. I respond specifically to brute theism, a view that is against the metaphysical necessity of the statement ‘there is a God’ and of God proper. Although Richard Swinburne, the most prominent brute theist, claims to circumvent skeptical worries about reason’s insight into nonempirical truths, he slips into the Kantian understanding of necessity as a modal category limited to judgments, not a metaphysical one. After laying out Swinburne’s argument and what I take to be its implicit Kantianism, I make a case for understanding necessity as constitutive principle by drawing on Descartes’s Creation Doctrine as a reductio for Swinburne’s view.
