Crowdfunding, particularly investment-based crowdfunding (IBCF), has become a vital funding avenue for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), enabling them to raise capital directly from the public. While IBCF offers advantages such as democratizing investment opportunities and lowering financing barriers, it also presents significant risks, including information asymmetry, fraud, and investor exposure. This article examines the evolution of the regulatory framework for IBCF in the UK from 2011 to 2024, focusing on the balance between encouraging sector growth and ensuring investor protection. Initially, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) adopted a principles-based regulatory (PBR) approach, promoting flexibility and growth. However, this model also led to gaps in platform accountability, with inadequate due diligence leading to misleading investments. In response, the FCA has introduced stronger liability requirements for platforms and tightened due diligence standards. Despite these efforts, challenges persist in ensuring consistent platform compliance and protecting investors from emerging risks. The article concludes that while the UK’s regulatory framework has adapted to mitigate IBCF risks, further refinements are needed to clarify platform responsibilities, enhance investor disclosures, and improve due diligence practices. Ongoing regulatory adjustments will be critical to maintaining investor confidence, supporting innovation, and ensuring crowdfunding remains a secure funding option for SMEs.
Organizational approaches to corporate criminal liability have been gaining much traction for some time now. Accordingly, they have been advanced as theories that more adequately allow the law makers to get to the heart of the reasons for corporate malfeasance and also as a means of effectively punishing the corporation, whilst curbing crime. This paper considers whether this holds true and whether organizational approaches, represent viable means of addressing corporate crimes.
This article advances a legal framework for addressing the intersection between sovereign debt, infrastructure finance, and climate-related environmental harm, through the deployment of equitable set-off and debt-for-nature swaps (‘DNS’). It proposes the establishment of a permanent adjudicatory mechanism, operating under United Nations auspices, capable of determining claims arising from historically accumulated ecological damage where such harm intersects with contemporary financial obligations. (Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Annex 2 (15 April 1994) 1869 UNTS 401.)
Organizational approaches to corporate criminal liability have been gaining much traction for some time now. Accordingly, they have been advanced as theories that more adequately allow the law makers to get to the heart of the reasons for corporate malfeasance and also as a means of effectively punishing the corporation, whilst curbing crime. This paper considers whether this holds true and whether organizational approaches, represent viable means of addressing corporate crimes.
