
ABSTRACT Stablecoins are privately issued cryptocurrencies whose value is pegged to official currencies such as the US dollar. Their ease of use on the global level opens up a new front in global currency competition. This article asks how the EU and US—the issuers of the world’s two leading currencies—approach stablecoins through their respective legal frameworks. We contrast a US strategy of cryptomercantilism with an EU strategy of monetary sovereignty. These strategies yield legal frameworks that look similar on the surface but diverge sharply in substance. The US’s GENIUS Act aims to enhance the dollar’s dominance in global payment systems and stimulate new demand for US assets, particularly government bonds. The EU’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) serves to safeguard the state’s ability to govern money. We conclude by discussing how the euro area and other countries can react to US cryptomercantilism, highlighting new challenges related to regulatory equivalence agreements and fungibility of tokens issued in different jurisdictions.
Abstract Supervisory authorities are deploying large language models (LLMs) to assess disclosures, governance quality, and regulatory compliance. Most current applications extract verifiable facts from documents. The frontier, however, is evaluative: scoring qualitative dimensions—governance adequacy, risk culture, recovery plan credibility—for which no objective reference value exists. This article argues that evaluative LLM use is categorically different from any previously regulated form of supervisory modelling, for three structural reasons: the absence of ground truth against which outputs can be validated; the strategic ability of supervised institutions to game the evaluating instrument; and the systemic externalities created when many supervisors rely on the same few models. From these features it derives seven governance principles—three concerning the instrument itself, four concerning the institutional environment around it—and shows that no existing framework, including the EU Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), and the European Banking Authority (EBA) Guidelines on PD and LGD estimation, satisfies them. It concludes with recommendations for supervisory authorities and standard-setting bodies.
ABSTRACT In this article we propose a conceptual framework of liquidity triangulation to understand the creation and management of liquidity in financial systems. We argue that liquidity in credit markets occurs through the interaction of three functions: sovereign debt management, public liquidity provision, and private liquidity provision. These functions have historically been carried out by different actors through different institutional arrangements. These arrangements in turn create endogenous pressure for change through both their effects on financial stability and their distributional implications, which may give rise to political struggle. Further, the international context directly affects the interaction of the agents which exercise these functions. Regulation, on the other hand, shapes the perimeter of the triangulated space. In drawing from disciplines across the social sciences, we aim to create a general framework for understanding the political economy of liquidity which may be used to understand the development and effects of liquidity regimes both historically and comparatively. We then apply this framework to two case studies: the United States during the period that led to the creation of the Federal Reserve System; and Thailand in the context of the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis. The case studies show how different liquidity arrangements can be analysed under a unified framework.
Asset managers, working on behalf of pension funds and insurers, play a central role in the allocation of savings from households to productive investments. US asset managers are emerging as the dominant players in global asset management. Their share in the European market is also rising, surpassing that of European players. This article documents these trends and discusses implications for policy. Differences in operational practice and culture between US and European asset managers can affect decisions on capital allocation. First, on ESG engagement, European asset managers remain active, while their US counterparts increasingly vote against social and environmental resolutions. This is counterproductive for Europe's sustainable finance agenda. Second, the growing US dominance raises questions about Europe's ability to shape how its capital is allocated and governed in line with its economic and societal objectives. The solution for the European Commission lies in strengthening stewardship policies and supporting its own capital markets. Furthermore, institutional investors could avoid excessive reliance on a small number of global asset managers where this may weaken effective stewardship.
The growing importance of European Union (EU) debt in recent years has led to significant institutional changes. Since 2020, the European Commission has taken on the role of managing the Union's debt, while the European Central Bank (ECB) has begun providing 'fiscal agent' services in support of this function. Specifically, the ECB holds the Commission's bank account for borrowing operations and acts as 'paying agent' for the securities issued, according to arrangements that may extend to future EU borrowing instruments. While article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank allows central banks to act as 'fiscal agents' for public entities, this statutory task of the ECB has received little attention in legal scholarship. Traditionally, these functions have been performed by national central banks on behalf of their respective governments. The ECB's assumption of this role marks a departure from established practice within the Union and raises important legal and institutional questions. The article examines the nature and scope of the fiscal agent services, their implications for ECB independence and liability, and the nature of the ECB's relationship with the Commission and other institutions, such as the European Court of Auditors. In this way, the research contributes to the debate on the EU fiscal capacity and EU institutional balance.