
This paper develops a new argument against the existence of the Abrahamic God, understood as Supreme Lawgiver and Judge. Just law requires due promulgation: no one can be justly held accountable for laws they could not reasonably know. Yet not all rational agents can, with minimal conscientious reflection, discover the divine commands binding on them. The failure of conscience, natural law, and the sensus divinitatis to resolve this problem shows that due promulgation has not occurred. Because the Abrahamic God represents Himself in Abrahamic scriptures as a just lawgiver who holds rational agents accountable for commands he has adequately promulgated to them, this failure entails that He does not exist. Unlike the problems of evil or hiddenness, which turn on contested expectations, the promulgation argument shows that the Abrahamic God fails by his own standards, which also correspond to our core intuitions concerning justice.
Hedonic adaptation, the tendency for affective experience to return toward a baseline after improvements or setbacks, has been widely studied in psychology and economics. Building on earlier interdisciplinary work on hedonic adaptation and the persistence of suffering, this paper examines its philosophical implications for debates on the problem of evil. I argue that adaptation introduces a distinctive constraint on theodicy by foregrounding a neglected temporal dimension of suffering: its recurrence. Even when external circumstances improve, the experiential significance of those improvements diminishes as affective baselines recalibrate, and remaining adversities can become increasingly salient, allowing perceived suffering to re-emerge over time. I develop a minimal conceptual framework centered on perceived suffering and examine how the persistence and potential asymmetry of adaptation shape these temporal dynamics. The recurrence constraint has its most direct implications for theories of divine intervention and providence, while also bearing on the soul-making theodicy and the free-will defense. The paper argues that the temporal structure of affect places a distinct constraint on the enduring experiential effects of benevolent improvements within finite human experience.
I consider the plausibility of arguing for the doctrine of the trinity from the premise that the best possible type of redemption for creatures such as ourselves requires the cooperation of three distinct divine persons and thus God must in Himself be trinitarian in structure to be able both to create a world like ours and to be perfectly good in the eventuality of a fall. God must ontologically ‘stand ready’, as it were, across all of modal space, to be economically trinitarian presuming that the need for Him to be economically trinitarian does arise somewhere in modal space; and thus He must essentially be trinitarian, i.e. be immanently so.
This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of demonic despair offers a distinctive contribution to the philosophy of evil. Demonic despair is neither a merely privative failure of selfhood nor a completed negative sovereignty, but an attempted closure of inwardness: the self tries to close itself against the good, the other, and the power that establishes it while remaining dependent upon what it refuses. The article situates this claim within the post-Kantian problem of freedom and evil. Kant understands evil as an inversion of incentives; Schelling makes evil a real possibility within freedom; Kierkegaard relocates the problem within the theological structure of the self as a relation established before God. Demonic despair is then interpreted as a disordering of inwardness, not a pathology of privacy: the finite creature refuses to receive itself before the Creator. Faith does not perfect autonomy, but restores the order of relation through which the self receives itself from God and can love the neighbor. Lacanian psychoanalysis explains only the persistence of this misrelation through jouissance; it does not replace Kierkegaard’s theological account.
Parfit's non-identity problem shows that on the counterfactual theory of harm, a child born severely disabled cannot be said to have been harmed by a decision to conceive earlier rather than later, since the alternative, healthier child would have been a numerically different individual. Most solutions to this problem work by challenging origin essentialism—the assumption that individuals are essentially tied to their biological origins. This paper explores a different resource for rejecting origin essentialism: substance dualism. I argue that any substance dualist worldview capable of even attempting to solve the non-identity problem must satisfy four conditions: substance dualism itself, incarnation (embodiment of a pre-existing mental substance), possibility (that the same substance could have incarnated into a different body), and morality (that incarnation is governed by some principle of cosmic justice). From these conditions I construct four candidate worldviews—three reincarnation-based (karmic, flexible, and semi-flexible) and one non-reincarnation-based (the "storage" view, adapted from Crummett, 2021)—and evaluate each. I argue that the karmic view satisfies morality but not possibility, the flexible view satisfies possibility but not morality, the semi-flexible view satisfies both only in a formal sense that fails to track our moral intuitions about harm, and the storage view, while the most promising candidate, ultimately faces unresolved difficulties in justifying how mental substances are assigned to bodies. I conclude that no substance dualist worldview governed by incarnation and morality adequately solves the non-identity problem.