
This article uses narrative analysis to examine disillusionment among former ISIS foreign fighters through a dataset of publicly available media interviews. The study draws on these journalistic accounts and conceptualises disillusionment as a process emerging from interconnected factors of deception, unmet expectations, inhumane practices and coercion. A central pattern across the narratives is the dissonance between recruits' initial beliefs and expectations that is often shaped by idealised notions of jihad and moral purpose and the lived realities of life under ISIS rule. Exposure to violence, internal repression and organisational contradictions led many individuals to question the group's legitimacy and reassess their ideological commitments. The analysis further demonstrates how sustained environments of fear and intimidation intensified cognitive dissonance and contributed to disengagement. These findings suggest that disillusionment develops through overlapping moral, emotional and experiential tensions rather than a single causal pathway. The study offers important insights into disengagement processes and has broader implications for understanding other violent extremist movements and informing counter-terrorism interventions.
Identifying violent extremists online before their engagement in physical violence is an ongoing need for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers around the world. Yet the evidence base about their posting footprints or differences in their online behaviors compared to their non-violent counterparts is noticeably scarce. Even less is empirically known about the relationship between their posting behaviors, membership in a violent extremist group, and risk for categorization as violent. This study drew from a unique sample of violent and non-violent right-wing extremists to examine the effect of violent extremist group membership on posting behaviors and risk for violence categorization within a sub-forum of the largest white supremacy web-forum. This study also examined how violence status and violent extremist group membership predicts time to going dormant in the online space. Firth logistic regression modeling was used to examine whether group membership predicted risk for violence categorization. Hazard modeling and survival analysis were then used to examine extremist group membership and violence status as predictors of time to dormancy. Several noteworthy posting patterns were identified in the data that may assist law enforcement and intelligence agencies in identifying credible threats online.
This study investigates cross-cultural differences in the Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM) among Arab and Australian youth (aged 18-20), focusing on four components: Pro-Violence, Vile World, Utopianism, and (Anti-)West. Cognitive styles - specifically, Irrational Beliefs and Dogmatism - were also evaluated as predictors of MEM dimensions. Data were collected from 653 Arab and 156 Australian participants. Both groups reported low levels of Pro-Violence, but Arab participants scored significantly higher on Vile World, Utopianism, and (Anti-)West attitudes. Regression analyses indicated that Irrational Beliefs consistently predicted MEM components among Arabs, whereas Dogmatism predicted two components (Pro-violence and Vile World) among both Australians and Arabs. These findings underscore the importance of cognitive risk factors in shaping extremist attitudes and highlight cultural influences linked to historical and geopolitical contexts. The results suggest directions for targeted prevention strategies to reduce radicalization and call for refining MEM assessment tools to address evolving ideological landscapes.
This study examines the role of trauma in the radicalization journeys of former Salafi-Jihadist militants from Tripoli, Lebanon. Utilizing life-history interviews with ten ex-militants and experts, it explores how different forms of trauma interact across phases of involvement, engagement, and disengagement. Findings indicate that early adversity - including neglect, poverty, and violence - disrupted identity formation, fostered insecurity and desensitization, increasing susceptibility to recruitment. Social traumas, such as the 2013 mosque bombings, further fuelled collective victimhood and a desire for revenge, dignity, and heroism. During the engagement, a combination of empowering and traumatizing experiences led to symptoms of moral injury. Finally, disengagement - often triggered by traumatic imprisonment - rarely led to successful reintegration, leaving respondents with complex PTSD, stigma, and marginalization. Theoretically, this study positions trauma not as a peripheral factor, but as a central mechanism that shapes involvement, sustains engagement, and obstructs disengagement. It demonstrates that radicalization functions both as a coping strategy and an attempted identity reconstruction. Empirically, it provides rare qualitative evidence from a Middle Eastern context. Practically, the findings emphasize the need for trauma-informed counter-extremism strategies that link individual healing with community and structural interventions.
IRA volunteer Bobby Sands died on May 5th, 1981, while on a hunger strike in Long Kesh/Maze Prison. The first of nine to die during the 1981 Hunger Strike, Sands became a martyr and symbol of Irish Republicanism. Prior qualitative research and press reported a perceived increase in sectarian violence following Sands' death. I completed the Unified Dataset of Fatalities in Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-2005 with archival sources, creating the most accurate and complete collection of Troubles murders (N = 3,432 conflict-related murders). An interrupted time series regression discontinuity design estimation revealed that Sands' death caused no statistically significant change in the weekly aggregated rate of murders, cumulatively or by role or religious identity, and no significant change in the number of murders by paramilitaries. The first systematic quantitative analysis of violence caused by Sands' death, this study analyzes the communally mobilizing and (re)traumatizing aspects of political suicide.
How does gender impact the amount of media coverage individual extremists receive? In criminology and terrorism studies, a large body of research has shown that women are viewed differently when it comes to crime and terrorism. Yet, these insights have not led to an examination of the question of gender and the amount of media coverage as it applies to extremism. This article remedies this by presenting and testing an argument regarding the impact of gender on media coverage of extremists using newly collected data of media attention given to individual extremists in the United States from 2001 to 2021. The results show that women extremists are given less media coverage than men, even when controlling for other factors. Media organizations need to ensure that they are providing consistent coverage to all aspects of the issue of extremism and terrorism to ensure the public is well informed about the overall threat.
Existing criminological theories predate algorithmically amplified digital platforms and have not been extended to the persistent, non-reciprocal relationships that those platforms now enable at scale. This paper introduces Parasocial Learning Theory (PLT), a novel social-cognitive framework that addresses this gap by extending Akers' Social Learning Theory (SLT) and Glaser's Differential Identification into the domain of non-reciprocal, algorithmically mediated relationships, a context neither framework was designed to address. PLT posits that individuals acquire pro-criminal attitudes and justifications through parasocial relationships (PSRs) with media figures. Within a PSR, the illusion of reciprocity weakens cognitive defenses, facilitating parasocial identification; the mechanism by which the individual's self-concept and the emblem's grievances and behavioral scripts collapse into one another. The framework incorporates mediators such as moral disengagement and moderators such as social isolation, and introduces the concept of 'parasocial emblems,' media figures who serve as symbolic representations of crime, to explain disproportionate influence and contagion. We demonstrate PLT's utility by applying it to three emerging digital threat vectors: Nihilistic Violent Extremism, the decentralized 764 network, and True Crime dark fandoms. This paper details the theoretical model, addresses limitations, and concludes with directions for future empirical research on mediated radicalization.
This study examined the characteristics differentiating violent from non-violent extremist offenders, focusing on established risk factors. The sample comprised 163 male offenders convicted of terrorism-related offences or extremist-motivated crimes within His Majesty's Prison Service in England and Wales. Participants were categorised as violent or non-violent based on their index offence, with risk factors coded from ERG22+ reports and related file information. Results indicate that violent extremist offenders were more likely to have histories of previous violence, interpersonal difficulties and pro-violent attitudes, whereas non-violent offenders exhibited a higher prevalence of major mental disorders. Analyses by ideological subtype revealed distinct patterns: violent Islamist offenders were more likely to endorse violent attitudes, while non-violent counterparts showed increased mental health vulnerabilities; among right-wing extremists, violent offenders displayed elevated antisocial behaviour and prior violence. These findings underscore the complex interplay of behavioural histories, attitudes and psychological factors influencing violent extremist behaviour. The study highlights the importance of targeted, nuanced risk assessments and contributes to the limited literature directly comparing violent and non-violent extremist offenders. Understanding these distinctions within the legal context, where preparatory actions can also constitute offences, has important implications for risk management and intervention strategies.
Most of the limited research on nihilistic violent extremism (NVE) has focused on the Com Network and its affiliated group, 764, which have gained attention for their explicit recruitment and victimization of children. In contrast, this study analyzes the long-form manifestos produced by four nihilistic violent extremists belonging to the Soyjak Video Attacker Fandom (SAVF). Using reflexive thematic analysis, this study seeks to improve our understanding of NVE by answering two research questions: (1) what are the key themes in manifestos produced by the nihilistic violent extremists of the SAVF, and (2) how do these compare to themes of right-wing extremism (RWE)? This analysis constructed four core themes of NVE, degeneracy, no lives matter (but some matter less), self-hatred, and the veneration of violence. These themes help frame nihilistic violence as its own type of violent extremism, distinct from RWE. They can also be used to refine and develop the definitions of NVE used by governments, lawyers, law enforcement/security services and practitioners.
The growing presence of anti-establishment extremist movements online, and the offline actions that they inspire, pose a significant threat to U.S. democracy. This study evaluates the relationship between support for anti-establishment sentiment and trust in news sources; and tests whether a fictional counter-narrative story regarding an anti-government extremist group and group-related misinformation can change an individual's support for anti-establishment beliefs, and for whom they are more effective. A total of 512 participants were surveyed before and after viewing an animated film portraying a fictional character who becomes radicalized through online misinformation. The 11-minute film follows the protagonist's involvement in and disengagement from the Boogaloo, an extremist movement that engaged in anti-government armed protests throughout 2020. Our survey was administered between the 2020 U.S. Presidential election in November and the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol attack, allowing us a unique opportunity to measure anti-government extremist belief and trust in information sources during a point in time when misinformation was particularly prevalent and potent. We find that video counter-narratives using fictional stories can be effective in specific populations, and present important implications for reducing support of anti-establishment narratives. The results provide implications for P/CVE practitioners and the efficacy of fictional storytelling counter-narrative strategies generally.
This article addresses the absence of youth voices in Estonian P/CVE (preventing and countering violent extremism) research by examining how Estonian young adults perceive the risks of political violence and its prevention. It first explores structural causes of political violence in Estonia, such as tensions between Estonian, Russian, and Estonian Russophone nationalisms, along with the Soviet colonial legacy marked by orientalisation and subalternisation of various groups. Recognising the crucial role of youth in both the causes and prevention of violent extremism, the study used semi-structured interviews with twenty Estonian and Estonian Russophone young adults to explore the extremist ideas they encounter online and in everyday life. Reflexive thematic analysis identified five key themes: hate between Estonian and Russophone communities (affecting Russophone's hate towards Ukrainian war refugees), racism, anti-LGBTIQ+ hate, misogyny, and prevention. Subthemes include normalised subalternising jokes, teacher bias, classroom incidents resembling radicalisation, violence scenarios, and prevention strategies. A key finding is young people's willingness to counter radicalisation and their desire for more education on the topic.
This article examines the engagement of far-right militants with dystopian literature, focusing on Jean Raspail's Le Camp des Saints and William Luther Pierce's The Turner Diaries in the Italian context. Based on qualitative correspondence with 16 militants, it analyses how these texts are interpreted, valorised and deployed as instruments of ideological formation, political imagination and affective investment. Findings reveal a marked ideological split: a radical Westernist majority treats Raspail's novel as quasi-prophetic, reinforcing narratives of Western decline and migratory threat, while an anti-Western minority reads Pierce's work as a revolutionary blueprint anticipating systemic collapse in the United States. The article shows that dystopian narratives function less as literary artefacts than as active tools shaping political worldviews, legitimising ideological commitments, and negotiating geopolitical orientations. By centring militants' own readings, the study offers empirically grounded insight into far-right reception practices and underscores the methodological value of ethically sensitive research with politically radicalised actors.
South Asia has witnessed a surge in jihadist activity, with Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) making significant inroads into the region. Their presence has reshaped terrorism dynamics, notably by involving women in jihadism. AQ and IS have leveraged social media to attract both male and female recruits, with a particular focus on the latter. Through a thematic network analysis of online magazines like Azan, Resurgence, Dabiq, Rumiyah, Inspire, and Al Balagh, this article explores the evolving roles that AQ and IS offer to women. It argues that the emphasis on individual obligation of jihad through online propaganda has not only increased women's participation in jihad, but has also redefined their roles in South Asian jihadism. The changing roles of women in jihadism in South Asia encompass a range of activities, including suicide bombers, propagandists, planners, plotters, recruiters, matchmakers, facilitators, and fundraisers. Notably, IS offers a wider array of dynamic roles for women compared to its competitor, AQ. This article highlights the shift in the roles of women in South Asian jihadism due to the online propaganda efforts of AQ and IS, which have expanded the opportunities for women to participate in various capacities within these extremist groups.
While the 'rigidity-of-the-extreme' research line focuses on deficits in cognitive flexibility (CF), the Significance Quest Theory highlights the motivational quest for significance (QFS) as a central driver of radicalization. Despite calls for integration, these research lines have not been combined, nor have their effects been disentangled across different dimensions of extremism. This preregistered study examines whether an interaction between CF and QFS is associated with ideological (Nationalism), attitudinal (Willingness to Fight for the National Group), and behavioral (Political Violence) extremism. Data were analyzed from 957 Polish adolescents, an age group vulnerable to radicalization. Latent moderated structural equation modeling was employed to test the interaction of CF and QFS. Results showed that the interaction was associated with ideological and behavioral extremism and approached significance for attitudinal extremism. QFS was positively associated with ideological and attitudinal extremism at low CF but with behavioral extremism only at high CF, indicating distinct effects across extremism dimensions. This study expands the empirical body on Significance Quest Theory by demonstrating that CF moderates the relationship between QFS and extremist outcomes and illustrates how their interplay shapes different dimensions of extremism.
Although terrorist attacks sometimes target minorities, there are few studies of the impact of terrorism on affected minority groups, as most studies investigate the effects of terrorism on out-group hostility, right-wing political shifts, and government support. Drawing on the previous studies on the effects of terrorism and perspectives from hate crime research, this article examines the consequences of the 2022 Pride terrorist attack in Oslo, Norway. Based on an online survey of Norwegian LGBTIQ+/queer people (total N = 906), including people who reported being present in the targeted area when the terrorist attack occurred (N = 127) and others who were not present (N = 777), this study focuses on emotional reactions, behavioral changes, and perceptions of Norwegian society after the attack. The findings show how the terrorist attack had major negative consequences on all three dimensions measured, not only for those who experienced the attack first hand but also for those indirectly affected through their LGBTIQ+ identity. We argue that this illustrates a profound negative 'community impact' of terrorism on the minority group, which poses a threat to diversity and to the protection and inclusion of minorities as core liberal democratic values, and should be taken seriously by society and investigated in future terrorism research.