
Building bridges is among the most attractive images in contemporary leadership and management discourse. It evokes connection, mediation and the overcoming of distance. This article does not argue that the field as such is governed by a single imperative of connection. Rather, it examines a recurrent epistemic-normative pattern across influential strands of that discourse, in which connection, mediation and integration become intelligible as signs of responsible leadership, while separation, refusal or delay risk appearing as deficits. Using a conceptual-philosophical method, the article treats bridging as an analytical figure for a broader connective logic that shapes what can appear as mature, professional and responsible action. It situates this logic within literatures on boundary spanning, collaborative and integrative leadership, network governance, systems thinking, culture, sensemaking and change leadership, while distinguishing functional coordination and mediation from the moralization of bridging as a default evaluative good. To make the epistemic costs of this connective logic visible, the article develops counter-figures drawn from Kafka, Simmel, Greek mythology, cartography and infrastructure theory. These figures articulate logics of transition in which separation, asymmetry, delay or non-crossing are not treated as failures, but as meaningful conditions of judgement. The article contributes to philosophy of management by developing threshold awareness as reflexive attention to the epistemic-normative framing through which a situation becomes intelligible. It already involves evaluation at the level of that framing while leaving open the substantive practical judgement of what should be done.
This study examines how common good–oriented values are interpreted and enacted within sustainable food practices from both consumer and organizational perspectives. Drawing on virtue ethics and personalist business ethics, the study adopts the Personalist Principle and the Common Good Principle as its normative core and conceptualizes food systems as moral contexts in which human dignity, responsibility, and sustainability are mediated in everyday economic life. Adopting a qualitative and interpretive research design, the study combines focus group discussions with a semi-structured expert interview to integrate consumer and organizational perspectives. The data are analyzed to explore how ethical expectations, value orientations, and practical constraints shape the interpretation and enactment of common good–oriented practices across different actor perspectives. The Economy for the Common Good is employed as an interpretive framework through which these principles are examined in organizational practice. The findings show that common good–oriented practices are realized through solidarity-based relationships with suppliers, sufficiency-oriented assortment strategies, and value-aligned interactions with customers, while remaining embedded in competitive market conditions. They reveal both convergence and tension between ethical ideals and their realization in practice, as shared values such as human dignity, solidarity, and ecological responsibility are mediated by institutional constraints and differentiated understandings of responsibility. By integrating multiple actor perspectives, the study contributes to philosophy of management and business ethics by empirically grounding common good theory in concrete economic practice and highlighting the role of organizational mediation in the realization of ethical principles in practice.
This study is a conceptual-theoretical investigation that employs a transdisciplinary philosophical lens to examine the relationship between Digital Sustainability (DS) and Eco-Environmental Sustainability (EES). Using epistemic, metaphysical, ontological, and normative reasoning, we argue that DS must be normatively and ontologically subordinated to EES due to the inherent reliance of digital infrastructures on natural ecosystems. The paper advances an original normative–ontological framework that clarifies why DS can only be normatively legitimate when positioned within the ecological boundaries defined by EES. Our analysis establishes that DS must be embedded within EES because digital infrastructures depend fundamentally on ecosystemic energy, material resources, and biophysical stability. For managers and policymakers, this subordination implies that governance frameworks, incentives, and technology standards are only legitimate when they reinforce eco-environmental resilience. We propose a balanced governance strategy that balances precautionary and proactionary approaches, sets eco-performance thresholds for digital rollouts, and incentivizes interoperability, modularity, and energy efficiency. Further investigation is warranted to examine the responsible management implications of DS as artificial intelligence (AI) advances and as artificial general intelligence (AGI) and artificial superintelligence (ASI) potentially emerge, developments that could substantially intensify environmental and ethical challenges amid accelerating climate and environmental crises.
Paradox has long occupied a central place in management scholarship, yet it remains conceptually elusive. Ambiguously articulated foundations have created confusion around paradoxical constructs and their interrelationships, generating persistent theoretical and practical challenges. This study addresses these issues by returning to the philosophical roots of paradox, emphasizing its subjective existential grounding and intersubjective expression. Drawing on Heidegger’s existential ontology and Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, it introduces the concepts of existential paradox and paradoxical semantic clusters to show how shifting constellations of managerial paradoxes expand and contract through semantic relations while remaining rooted in their existential origins as dynamic wholes. The analysis develops two interwoven existential paradoxes—(1) structural versus destructive thinking and (2) calculative versus meditative thinking—and proposes a relational approach to conceptualizing and analyzing paradoxical phenomena through semantic interconnections and existential foundations. Their interplay illustrates how patterns of thought and behavior emerge, evolve, and become embedded in individual and collective life, simultaneously enabling and constraining practice while shaping conflicting yet complementary understandings of management. By revealing common existential foundations across paradoxical constructs, the study offers a more integrated understanding of paradoxes and reduces complexity in paradox research. The findings further demonstrate how subjective existential experiences become socially shared and institutionalized through semantic clusters, while also showing how these collective meanings shape human experience in return. Moreover, the dominance of calculative thinking frames managerial perceptions, whereas meditative thinking discloses a latent capacity to cultivate ethically attuned, meaning-generating practice. Collectively, the findings contribute an alternative ontological and epistemological framework for understanding the origins, interrelationships, and evolution of paradoxical phenomena in management and organizational research.
Dignity as an empirical variable poses a challenge to the epistemic grounds of the social sciences. The study of dignity entails an ontological and epistemological adherence to moral realism, but the vast majority of work in social science and management field, study it in managerial and positivist forms which tend to favour measurement over meaning, and prediction over understanding. Through observations from phenomenology and critical realism, this study uses the current examples of workplace indignity among young professionals in the Indian corporate world to question the social scientific approaches to knowledge which conceptualize and measure human value in the organization. It is understood that organizations through dominant management practices such as 1) Psychological Abuse and Identity Devaluation 2) Feudal Autocracy and Forced work compliances 3) Institutional Failures and Complicity, eliminate personhood and create epistemological problems. This study suggests that a moral phenomenology of work is needed, which reinstates dignity as a state of, rather than a result of, social scientific knowledge.
Is a leader the master of their fate, or merely a surfer on the waves of circumstance? This inquiry reflects the perennial dichotomy between free will and determinism. While one side champions autonomous agency, the other posits a world bound by strict causal chains. Compatibilism, however, offers a dialectical middle ground: the possibility that autonomous choice and structural constraints are not mutually exclusive but are, in fact, co-constitutive of the human experience. Drawing upon twenty-three years of executive coaching practice, this paper introduces the “Achievement Six Forces Model” (ASFM) as a theoretical bridge between these abstract philosophical concepts and the praxis of leadership. The model divides leadership dynamics into two domains: the Internal Triad (Vision, Mind Method, and Competency), which is the locus of agency, and the External Triad (Timing, Strategic Position, and Harmony), which represents structural, deterministic constraints (see Fig. 1). This framework operationalizes the compatibility of free will and determinism, suggesting that human agency does not operate in a vacuum but unfolds within a coordinate system defined by external limits. Through an interdisciplinary approach that combines philosophy, psychology, and management theory, this paper explores how leaders exercise “constrained agency” to navigate complex environments. It argues that external boundaries do not negate freedom but rather define the scope within which effective will can be exerted, offering a grounded, cross-cultural framework for leadership development.
The values associated with work have long been debated, especially within capitalist systems where labour is typically understood through the categories of exchange and use value. This paper argues for a broader perspective by foregrounding social relationships and the values they embody, such as solidarity and mutual aid, which are often overlooked because they are ‘free’, ‘unpaid’, or ‘unproductive’ and excluded from formal accounting systems. Drawing on gift-giving theory, we conceptualize these aspects of work as intrinsically valuable, proposing the notion of ‘bonding value’ to capture how social relationships generate value beyond strict instrumentality. This theoretical contribution challenges economistic and productivist views of labour by highlighting the need to recognize and value these neglected dimensions of work. By revealing the ‘hidden’ values embedded in organizational life, the present study argues for a reconsideration of how organizations can design, support, and manage social relationships at work in ways that go beyond purely economic measures.
Novelty is widely invoked as a defining criterion of scholarly contribution, yet its meaning in management research methodology remains philosophically underexamined and institutionally overstretched. This paper investigates what should count as genuinely new in management research and how claims of originality may be evaluated more rigorously under contemporary academic conditions. Drawing on a philosophical analysis of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Paul Feyerabend, the paper develops an integrative diagnostic framework for interpreting novelty across quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods research approaches. The analysis shows, first, that novelty should not be treated as a single or self-evident standard, but as a plural construct whose meaning depends on the kind of change being claimed and the justificatory standards governing that claim. Second, the paper argues that the four philosophers are better understood as contrasting diagnostic lenses rather than fixed philosophical foundations for particular methodological traditions. Third, it shows that many contributions institutionally presented as novel in management research are more plausibly understood as forms of incremental, paradigm-bound, or normal-scientific development than as deeper epistemic transformation. Fourth, it argues that contemporary academic pressures, especially contribution signaling and publish-or-perish cultures, can distort originality into performative novelty or pseudo-innovation. The paper contributes to debates in the philosophy of management and management research methodology by offering a more discriminating account of originality, one that distinguishes epistemic novelty, legitimate incremental contribution, and rhetorically overstated claims of innovation. In doing so, it provides a philosophically grounded basis for evaluating what is truly new in management research more rigorously and more responsibly.
One of the central questions raised for management in light of the rise of modern artificial intelligence (AI) is whether to pursue substitution automation strategies or to seek ways to enable/augment human knowledge using AI systems. This question has significant ethical and socio-political consequences that will require intensive theoretical investigation. The management science field will have to address questions about the role of human intelligence and knowledge in organizations. This paper argues that knowledge management (KM) provides a theoretical and practical foundation to address these questions because (a) KM has a human-centric, enabling view of knowledge and technology and (b) KM has incorporated epistemology and epistemic constructs into its theoretical base. The paper supports this thesis by showing that the central epistemic models of KM shed theoretical and practical light on replacement versus automation strategies. Further, it argues that KM’s epistemic models generally support a human enabling/augmenting strategy, while demarcating a place for replacement automation. The paper is organized around two research questions: Research Question 1: How do KM models incorporate epistemic theory and concepts? Research Question 2: How do KM models and their associated epistemic theories conceptualize knowledge in relation to AI-based automation, and in particular, to what extent do they support enablement versus substitution AI and knowledge work?
A key problem in philosophy of management is the role of the manager and of the researcher in relation to practices and processes of organizations. Mainstream philosophy of management is striving to conceive practices of ethics and responsibility in organizations. Moreover, it is a problem of how to do ideographic analysis and capture the uniqueness of situations. However, such efforts to capture actions and events in practical life have not been sufficiently successful. With post-humanist practice philosophy, we find an innovative attempt to study organizations that help us to address these challenges. This approach is inspired by the new materialism, feminist analysis and sustainability theory in relation to organization studies. In particular, the Italian organizational theorist Silvia Gherardi develops a relevant perspective on ethics and an ideographic approach in organizational analysis, and this is further developed into a post humanist perspective on management responsibility. In this article we propose a hermeneutic analysis of Gherardi’s work with focus on clarification of the possibilities of the post-humanist contribution to approach analysis of ethics and responsible management. The article presents an analysis of the contribution of post-humanist practice theory to do research in ethics and responsible management with focus on methodology to capture unique real-life situations of doing ethics and responsible management in practice. The aim is to demonstrate how practice theory with the development of analytical strategies based on ethico-onto-epistemology and agential realism implies an important contribution to the study of ethics and responsible management, and idiographic methodology in philosophy of management. With this scrutiny of posthuman practice theory the innovative contribution of this article lies in the hermeneutic evaluation of Silvia Gherardi’s work as a key position in philosophy of management with focus on ethics and responsible management in practical organizational processes.
This paper examines when it is impermissible to outsource bureaucratic decisions to machine learning systems. It distinguishes between institutional legitimacy and decision permissibility. The former refers to the authority of an institution whose decisions have impact on matters of public interest. The latter refers to the internal features of automated decision-making procedures that make it permissible to substitute organizational decision-making with automated processes. The paper argues that the violation of certain criteria makes it impermissible to outsource a decision to a machine learning system. These criteria include five necessary, but not sufficient, conditions: due appreciation, consistency, justifiability, accuracy, and contestability. Failing any of these conditions renders a machine learning decision impermissible. Lastly, it explores the possibility that meeting all conditions might still not suffice in more complex scenarios.
Large Language Models (LLM) are being used, among other ends, to epistemically enquire and gain knowledge about different areas of investigation. In this paper, we will reflect on the nature of LLMs outputs and the epistemic status of the beliefs we can form from relying on them, paying special attention to their role in organizational contexts. The main thesis is that LLMs statements are and could increasingly be regarded by their users as a kind of objective expert testimony, with the epistemic authority that this entails. Although LLMs do not satisfy the criteria to be qualified as epistemic experts, due to, for example, their lack of intentionality, they still can be perceived as experts because of several reasons: our tendency to anthropomorphize, their appearance as objective, value-neutral and accurate entities, and the increasing distrust in human testimony. The search for information through LLMs instead of human epistemic experts, which could become more common with time within organizations and firms, raises several ethical issues, precisely because they are not experts in the strong sense. In this paper, we will investigate some ethical issues that arise from overreliance in LLMs, especially through the case of hallucinations.
This paper delves into the issue of corruption and business ethics with the intention of exploring if there are cases in which paying a bribe by a business leader might be potentially justifiable and ethically acceptable. It does so by, first, defining corruption and bribery and then providing some ethical theoretical background. It then adopts Philp’s (2006) model of corruption to analyse four case studies where the unit of analysis is an incident of attempted bribery. It concludes by broadening the definition of corruption and arguing that, from a not implausible ethical perspective, the business leader might be doing the right thing by paying a bribe.
This paper extends the debate over the application of Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtues-goods-practices-institutions framework. In particular, it draws a distinction between the ‘conventional’ approach which has largely dominated the literature to date, and a more recent ‘alternative’ approach which takes a much more positive position in relation to external goods and institutions. It seeks to resolve these differences through a case study of elite rowing, which also fills an empirical lacuna in the literature associated with MacIntyre’s framework. Its key contribution is to propose significant modifications to the framework including our understanding and the ordering of goods.
We show that in ancient times, in both West and East, philosophers thought deeply and systematically about leadership—as exemplified in both the ruling of states and in the management of households. Scholarly interest then lessened (with some notable exceptions), only to revive in the late 19th century. That interest, however, has largely been on the part of applied social scientists and management theorists. There is a need for trained philosophers to bring their specialized skills to the field. Indeed, there is a need for a revived philosophical subfield in the philosophy of leadership. We offer a list of particularly pressing questions pertaining to leadership that would benefit from philosophical attention. We then highlight the way that the contributions to this Special Issue contribute to answering some of these questions.
Purpose: This paper explores how principles of dharma from ancient Hindu Vedic texts can inform ethical practices in AI development. Drawing on traditional Vedic texts, the study aims to develop a holistic ethical framework that will guide developers, organisations, and policymakers in the development of AI tools.Originality: This research pioneers the integration of traditional wisdom from Hindu philosophy into AI ethics. While existing frameworks focus on humanistic and legal principles, this study introduces spiritual and moral dimensions derived from Vedic teachings. By incorporating concepts such as Ṛta, Yajus, Satyam, Jnana, Para Vidya, Vikrama, and Dharmaraja, the paper presents a novel approach that enhances and extends current AI ethical guidelines.Methodology: A qualitative research design employing grounded theory and hermeneutic analysis was used to explore ethical principles in foundational Hindu texts, including the Vedas and 10 principal Upanishads. Inductive coding identified recurring themes related to dharma and ethical conduct. The findings were validated through consultations with scholars of Hindu ethics and AI ethicists to ensure robustness and relevance. Practical Implications: The proposed ethical framework provides actionable guidelines for AI developers, organizations, and policymakers. By integrating ancient wisdom with modern ethical principles, it offers a comprehensive approach to AI ethics that emphasizes transparency, accountability, social responsibility, and the protection of vulnerable communities. This framework can guide the development and regulation of AI technologies toward more responsible and human-centered practices.
While the dominant justification for intellectual property rights seems to remain consequentialist, various deontological theories are also proposed. They often appeal, directly or indirectly, to intellectual labor as a source of rights or as a circumstance that is relevant to justifying intellectual property on moral grounds. Recently, another such theory has been proposed by Bryan Cwik, gaining substantial recognition. It holds that, in the absence of intellectual property regulation, innovators and artists are at a disadvantage as compared to manual laborers. This is because they cannot control how the fruits of their intellectual labor are used. Patents, copyrights and other similar regimes are portrayed as necessary to secure their control over the exercise of their productive capacities. In the present paper Cwik’s theory is evaluated and exposed as indeterminate. Its metaphysical presuppositions are also criticized. When they are replaced by a more coherent ontology, a reinterpretation of control relations follows. Cwik’s objective of maximizing individuals’ control over their own productive capacities is achieved by intellectual property abolition, rather than enforcement. His theory fails to support intellectual monopoly.
Critical rationalism emphasizes scrutiny and learning from errors as essential for advancing knowledge and human problem-solving. Learning from errors is also a major concern in error management with the aim of maximizing the positive effects of errors. Against this background, this paper explores the potential adoption of a critical rationalist perspective in error management. To this end, the paper examines whether error management is suitable for reflecting the major tenets of a critical rationalist perspective in problem-solving. The analysis reveals significant correspondences between error management and critical rationalism, including conceptualization and recognition of errors, and learning through trial and error. Moreover, the paper discusses contributions and challenges that adopting the “philosophical lens” of critical rationalism for error management may entail. The findings are relevant from various respects – in a more practical sense, for example, to take precautions that encourage organizational members’ critical attitude, to impede blaming, or to follow the concept of small losses, aligning with Popper’s piecemeal engineering. In a more conceptual sense, the discussion reveals that the innate dynamics of learning and unlearning that the critical rational perspective imposes may be a major issue not only for organizational members but also, by raising questions about the appropriate and acceptable levels of dynamics in organizations.