Good governance and respect for democracy are at the forefront of the African Union's (AU) legal and political purpose. International bodies and African conventions emphasize the need for democracy and good governance. Yet, in recent years, a wave of controversial constitutional amendments allowing presidents to concentrate political power by extending their terms in office (e.g. in Egypt, Algeria, Burundi, Chad, and Togo), either by allowing incumbent presidents to serve further consecutive terms or by extending the years they can serve in office, has underlined the need for AU intervention. These constitutional changes have been implemented through controversial referenda, often accompanied by violence, human rights violations, and contentious court rulings, while ruling parties and political elites have been accused of manipulating the results. These developments descend to an abuse of constitutionalism and are hardly compatible with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, or fundamental rights espoused by the AU and African regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The legitimacy of such constitutional changes, and by extension the president, is therefore open to serious questioning.
On April 30th, 2025, US-Ukraine Minerals Agreement is ambiguous in nature. While it may indeed evolve towards a contract or even a treaty, at present it is a political agreement, albeit one whereby the parties rely on the pertinent incentives to ensure compliance. This form of compliance, lacking normativity, is similar to the format of the Sustainable Development Goals and other political agreements. The agreement itself is contingent on a subsequent agreement, that has yet to be finalized and become public, which no doubt will possess a normative character. This latter agreement will serve as the articles of agreement of the investment fund envisaged in the April 30th agreement and which is to be incorporated as a limited liability partnership. The author argues that the agreement violates the internal economic/financial self-determination of the people of Ukraine. Consequently, even if the agreement were to somehow be characterized as a treaty or a contract, it was procured by succinct bursts of coercion on the part of the U.S. and hence may be repudiated on such a ground. In equal measure, the proceeds that are meant to accrue to the USA may be viewed as an obligation giving rise to odious or illegal debt. The U.S.-Ukraine agreement, while stipulating its conformity with Ukraine's obligations under other agreements with the EU, appears to conflict with those obligations.
In 2023, the Seoul High Court made a ruling holding the State of Japan civilly liable for damages to South Korean women who had been subject to sexual slavery during World War II. This article will argue that under modern international law, the 2023 and 2021 court decisions made without the consent of the State of Japan are not enforceable due to a body of domestic and international law establishing the principle that sovereign immunity takes precedence over the persecution of wartime crimes. Furthermore, this article will argue that these unilateral court decisions undermine the principles of good faith and cooperation that are the founding principles underpinning post-World War II institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Even with the overarching goal of achieving justice for wartime crimes, unilateral actions are a rejection of the modern consensus when it comes to international law, and if such actions become the norm, there is risk of a reversion back to the pre-World War II international order--a world dominated by great power politics where peripheral powers like South Korea have lesser influence.
Justice Antonin Scalia once provocatively remarked that the Soviet Union "literally" had a "much better" Bill of Rights than the United States. Clarifying that the Soviet Bill of Rights had no meaning because the Soviet constitution did not prevent the centralization of power, Scalia argued that it was the structure of the United States-not the Bill of Rights-that made\ it exceptional in its freedom. His comments came at a time of increasing public frustration with legislative gridlock and the constitutional structure that caused it, prompting Scalia to come to its defense. As perceived threats to liberal democracy by rival models and internal transformations have received increasing attention, it is worth examining Scalia's defense of the United States structure and the charge he levies at the Soviet constitution. Inversely, the philosophical underpinnings of the Soviet project-Marxism-offers a significant critical perspective of the American tradition that Scalia defends. Indeed, the Marxist theory of law, ideology, and democracy can be wielded to simultaneously critique the constitutions of both the Soviet Union United States. By revealing the failures of Soviet centralization as well as the contradictions in Scalia's view that constitutional barriers protect minorities, a Marxist analysis can equally sustain Scalia's charge and turn it onto itself.
The meaning of citizenship in Malaysia is a tale as old as the country itself-a thorny triangular relationship between the state; the Bumiputera majority of Malay and indigenous natives; and the non-Bumiputeras minority of Chinese and Indians who primarily migrated when the region was under British colonial rule and influence. In the present, Bumiputeras enjoy a constitutionally stipulated special status-a distinction that bestows many privileges and preferential treatment in all facets of life, from commerce to education, homeownership to government employment, that is off-limits to non-Bumiputeras. Supporters of the system argue it remains necessary-a form of affirmative action to correct the economic disparity between the two groups that has largely persisted since Malaya gained its independence. Detractors contend it effectively creates two classes of citizenship while also breeding corruption. Malay nationalistic rhetoric claims it is an inviolable Social Contract, concocted in a grand bargain between Malay and non-Malay independence leaders in exchange for non-Malays gaining citizenship rights. What is less clear is the historical context that gave rise to these privileges and the views of Malaysia's independence leadership on citizenship -in particular Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's first prime minister and founding father. This Article intends to shed light on the confluence of history, law, economics, society, and politics in the formation of Malaysia and analyze how these circumstances affected Tunku's leadership and his approach toward reconciling the competing goals of delivering independence and uplifting Malays while simultaneously enfranchising non-Malays and making them feel included in the new state. Introspection here would show that Tunku struggled deeply on this account-his brand of communal politics pandered to Malay nationalists while convincing non-Malay leaders to recognize that Malays needed a special status to uplift themselves in return for citizenship rights and verbal promises to act on their interests. As time progressed, both sides felt Tunku was not doing enough for them, culminating in the election and riots of May 1969 that would force him out of power. However, without Tunku's "moderate" guiding hand, his successors would use the foundation he laid to implement more aggressive affirmative action for Malays while also diminishing any legal and political space to question the special status of Malays-defining modern Malaysia's relationship with Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera citizens.
China has been enacting data protection laws with distinctive features at an unprecedented pace, which makes it necessary to update existing studies on the Chinese approach to data protection. Unlike its predecessors, this Article focuses on developing astructured approach to dissecting the Chinese regime, especially the Personal Information Protection Law and latest case law. It analyzes how the laws allocate responsibilities among the three major parties involved in data protection-individual data subjects, data controllers, and regulators-and draws comparisons with European Union (EU) laws that inspired the Chinese laws. It argues that the way Chinese laws allocate data protection duties differs significantly from the EU laws. While individual consent, organizational obligations and state power are the three pillars of Chinese laws, state power takes precedence over the other two, especially when details of enforcement and the scope of state power remain unspecified. The Article proposes that future legislative efforts focus on two priorities: one is to provide more alternatives and exemptions to consent to make it less rigid, and the other is to clarify details of implementation so that the processors' obligations become enforceable and state power will be constrained.
The development of China's anti-sexual harassment laws and policies over the past few decades has raised the hopes of many. However, the sheer volume of regulations can easily create the false impression that the Chinese legal system is effectively dealing with workplace sexual harassment. Statistics show that the number of lawsuits filed in Chinese courts remains trivial, even though workplace sexual harassment continues to be widespread. This article argues that courts in China misunderstand how to apply important concepts in litigation such as how to define sexual harassment and employer liability. The difficulty of carrying the burden of proof in workplace sexual harassment litigation also hinders legal remedies. This article offers concrete proposals for advancing China's ongoing legal reform on workplace sexual harassment law by reconceptualizing workplace sexual harassment, adopting fairer evidence rules, and firmly establishing an employer liability framework.
Despite Taiwan's significant contributions to the global artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystem, its role remains underexamined in international AI governance discourse. This Article addresses this gap by analyzing Taiwan's emerging AI regulatory framework, with particular emphasis on the Draft Basic Law on Artificial Intelligence (the "Draft AI Law"). Situating Taiwan's approach within the broader global regulatory landscape, the Article compares the Draft AI Law with key international models, including the European Union's AI Act and the United States' NIST AI Risk Management Framework, while also drawing on regulatory developments in Japan and South Korea. Rather than providing a clause-by-clause analysis, the Article examines the structural and contextual factors shaping Taiwan's AI regulation and identifies key uncertainties within the Draft AI Law, particularly regarding the governance of general-purpose AI (GPAI). Given the rapid evolution and uncertain risks of GPAI, the Article argues that adopting a centralized and rigid regulatory model, such as that of the European Union, may be premature for Taiwan. The Article proposes a hybrid regulatory framework that combines hard and soft law mechanisms, anchoring core principles such as risk management and transparency in legislation while allowing more technical and dynamic issues to be addressed through flexible, expert-driven processes. It further recommends a comprehensive assessment of GPAI prior to the implementation of binding regulations and suggests targeted revisions to the Draft AI Law to promote innovation while advancing trustworthy, ethical, and responsible AI governance.
For nearly three years, the Eastern European nation of Ukraine has been entangled in a war it did not instigate, did not desire, but was forced into by its more powerful neighbor, Russia. Since the onset of the war, Russia has faced accusations of widespread atrocities, including severe violations of human rights, international humanitarian law, and breaches of other international norms. Following the inauguration of United States (US) President Donald Trump, there has been a renewed effort to bring both parties to the negotiating table and end the conflict. With the ongoing negotiations, there is no better time to investigate and place Russia's actions in the correct legal context regarding this war than now. Thus, this article examines Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent conflict. The article's analysis is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on a contextual analysis of the concept of "Novorossiya" and how this centuries-old idea was revived by Russia to rally ethnic Russians in Ukraine in support of its invasion. The second part conducts an extensive legal analysis of the invasion, concentrating on the legal framework governing the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2 (4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter and the scope of the right to self-defence under Article 51. In the context of these two doctrines, it reviews Russia's justifications for invading Ukraine, specifically the claim of collective self-defence in support of the alleged Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. A key question the article addresses is whether Russia's claim of collective self-defence and its assertion of protecting the Russian-speaking people of eastern Ukraine is legally sustainable in international law. It concludes that Russia's actions constitute a clear violation of Ukraine's sovereignty as well as territorial integrity and that its justification for using force lacks legal merit. Based on its analysis, the article concludes that there are sufficient grounds to pursue justice to uphold international law, maintain its credibility, and deter similar acts of aggression in the future.
In 2017, the Japanese penal code was amended to broaden protections for victims of sexual assault. However, pressure mounted for further protections after several decisions on cases involving rape shocked the nation in 2019. In 2023, the penal code was amended again including to raise the age of consent to 16 and broaden the definition of rape to include nonconsensual sexual acts. This comment examines the history of rape law in Japan, introduces challenges that victims of sexual assault face when trying to seek justice, and analyzes the first cases determined under the amended code. Finally, it looks to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany on how to improve access to justice for victims of sexual assault in Japan. Ultimately, Japanese courts appear to be recognizing previously unrecognized psychological factors that victims of sexual assault face. However, it is too early to tell whether the code changes alone will greatly improve how the rate of rapes that are reported and prosecuted.
Through a comparative analysis of the criminal laws of Sri Lanka and the United States, this paper examines how Sri Lanka's legal framework on sexual offenses often hinders women's access to justice and reinforces systemic gender discrimination. Recognizing the structural constraints inherited from older common law traditions, it underscores the potential for reform through targeted, gradual changes, drawing on developments in modern common law in the United States and relevant international legal standards. The discussion unfolds in three parts: first, a feminist critique of exiting criminal laws in postcolonial; common law systems such as Sri Lanka's; second, a comparative analysis of laws on sexual offenses and related legal frameworks in Sri Lanka and the United States; and third, a set of reform-oriented recommendations for Sri Lanka, informed by United States legal practice and international laws.
Mainland China traditionally upheld the one-share-one-vote (OSOV) principle. Since 2019, however, Chinese authorities have introduced the dual-class equity structure (DCES) for innovative enterprises. Due to investor-protection concerns, China's DCES operates on a "stringent approval system," with only eight corporations listed under DCES as of December 31, 2024. This Article provides a comprehensive policy analysis of the Chinese DCES system, including empirical analyses of the eight existing cases. It explores legal and economic aspects of investor protection within China's DCES, examining "three sets of investor safeguard measures": (1) "three numerically specified rules" (e.g., 10% equity rule, 10-time voting-right rule, and 2/3 voting-right rule); (2) sunset provisions (event-driven and time-based); and (3) rules converting special-voting shares into shares with one vote (e.g., conversions in an amendment to the articles of association, the appointment and removal of independent directors, and mergers and control contests). Addressing tunneling concerns, this Article argues for "DCES with enhanced investor protection." To foster entrepreneurship, the Chinese authorities should gradually relax the stringent approval system for DCES. This relaxation is crucial for China, as escalating tensions with the United States have significantly impacted its DCES-IPO markets. Additionally, the DCES-IPO market in Hong Kong remains inactive, underscoring the need for viable DCES-IPO markets in Mainland China.
In a wide range of situations, the law in different jurisdictions requires that a person who has been unjustly enriched at another's expense make restitution to the other. However, what justifies the liability for unjust enrichment? This fundamental question has perplexed unjust enrichment scholars, especially in the common law world, for decades, with various justificatory ideas being proposed while no consensus has been reached. This article explores the justification of the law of unjust enrichment within the context of China's historical, legal, and social frameworks for the first time. A historical review reveals that the notion of unjust enrichment has been persistently reserved in China after its transplantation through different historical periods due to its conformity with China's most influential philosophical tradition: Confucianism. Therefore, this article proposes a rational explanation for unjust enrichment liabilities through a Confucian lens. This innovative Confucian account complements existing Western theories of unjust enrichment.
This article, theoretically and empirically, articulates the rising role of criminal law as a regulatory tool of China's digital platform economy. This unique Chinese model of digital platform governance is described as "regulation through sanctions." Through a comprehensive survey of a wide range of digital platforms- e.g., financial fundraising platforms, e-commerce, taxi-hailing, and video-sharing platforms-and criminal cases involving such platforms, I reveal the logic of regulation through sanctions: It shifts state regulatory burden and accountability, redistributes risks and responsibility, and enhances political legitimacy. Compared to the direct regulatory model adopted by European countries and indirect, self-regulatory model employed in the U.S., China's hybridity of platform governance saw the merge between direct intervention and indirect control through threats and sanctions. The centrality of criminal law as a regulatory device in the governance of platform-derived risks has been achieved through the imposition of three types of positive duties: the duty to review, the duty to manage, and the duty to protect. This legal and regulatory ecology exerts pressure on digital platforms but also allows its power to extend upward to serve public management functions as well as downward to modify individual behavior.
The University of Washington International Law Journal's timely symposium explores the strains in the U.S.-China political and economic relationship. As China and the United States become estranged, or "decoupled," this essay explores the United States' relationship with India in light of this trend. The U.S.-India foreign relations are stronger today than they have been in India's 75-year history as an independent nation.2 To understand why this is the case, we have to examine both the U.S. and Indian foreign policy perspectives. The United States' interest in India has grown in part due to the United States' own changes in domestic policy and motivations to counter China. It is only in the more recently that India has been open to a stronger partnership with the United States due largely to political and economic changes in the country.
Decoupling refers to the strategy of separating and disconnecting economies and markets between different nations. However, in the contest of the ongoing trade conflict between the United States and China, decoupling primarily refers to determining economic dependence on a specific nation as a national security risk, thereby reinforcing vulnerabilities in one's supply chain. Japan views the United States as its primary partner in national security policy and China as a significant market because of its geographic proximity. As a result, ensuring economic security became a pressing concern for Japan. Japan refers t o the United States' idea of economic statecraft to shape its economic security policy. Since 2007, Japan strengthened foreign direct investment regulations by making amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. Some interpret these changes as an endorsement of the United States' efforts to prevent technology leakage. One example of this technological policy is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which was enacted to ensure the stability of economic activity by establishing essential procedures and regulations. As no nation can independently complete the supply chain, it is necessary for Japan to foster collaboration among allies and to have the engagement of the United States. Whether or not the United States approves the acquisition of United States Steel Corporation by Nippon Steel may influence the future relationship between the two nations.
As debates on potential societal harm from artificial intelligence (AI) culminate in legislation and international norms, a global divide is emerging in both Al regulatory frameworks and international governance structures. In terms of local regulatory frameworks, the European Union (E.U.), Canada, and Brazil follow a "horizontal" or "lateral" approach that postulates the homogeneity of AI, seeks to identify common causes of harm, and demands uniform human interventions. In contrast, the United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.), Israel, and Switzerland (and potentially China) have pursued a "context-specific" or "modular" approach, tailoring regulations to the specific use cases of Al systems. In terms of international governance structures, the United Nations is exploring a centralized AI governance framework to be overseen by a superlative body comparable to the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, the U.K. is spearheading, and the U.S. and several other countries have endorsed, a decentralized governance model, where Al safety institutes in each jurisdiction conduct evaluations of the safety of high-performance general-purpose models pursuant to interoperable standards. This paper argues for a context-specific approach alongside decentralized governance, to effectively address evolving risks in diverse mission-critical domains, while avoiding social costs associated with one- size-fits-all approaches. However, to enhance the systematicity and interoperability of international norms and accelerate global harmonization, this paper proposes an alternative contextual, coherent, and commensurable (3C) framework. To ensure contextuality, the framework (1) bifurcates the Al life cycle into two phases: learning and deployment for specific tasks, instead of defining foundation or general-purpose models; and (ii) categorizes these tasks based on their application and interaction with humans as follows: autonomous, discriminative (allocative, punitive, and cognitive), and generative AI. To ensure coherency, each category is assigned specific regulatory objectives replacing 2010s vintage "AI ethics." To ensure commensurability, the framework promotes the adoption of international standards for measuring and mitigating risks.
This article purportsto discussthe impact of international investment law ondomestic governance and the rule of law of a nation state.Using China as a case study, this article argues that the role of international investment law in advancing domestic rule of law has long been overstated.The prevailing narrative is premised on some deeply flawed assumptions of the nature and function of international investment law as well as how international investment law may affect domestic legal change.These assumptions include, inter alia: (1)international investment norms possess the rule of law ideals; (2)improving good governance and the rule of law is part of the mandate of international investment law; (3)powerful investor-state dispute settlement is effective in guarding therule of law; and (4) the state is readily receptive to all direct and indirect influences of economic globalization. A close examination of the limits of international investment law in this article explains why its role in promoting the rule of law in China is rather limited, contrary to what was widely expected in the Western world.
This article discusses the role of black-letter law in labor protection in China in cases where employers dismiss employees on the grounds of serious breaches of internal regulations. This article presents an empirical analysis of the judicial practice of two of China's economically developed cities, Suzhou and Wuxi. Suzhou employers have to give employees the opportunity to be heard prior to dismissal, while Wuxi does not provide that opportunity. First, this article introduces the Chinese labor legislation system, the dismissal system, and the two cities' local labor regulations. Second, the article will analyze and discuss 140 cases from Suzhou and 234 employment cases from Wuxi. Third, this article concludes that giving employees the opportunity to be heard is essential for protecting their rights, as evidenced by the higher success rates (i.e. the combination of full win and partial win rates) for employees in Suzhou compared to those in Wuxi. The analysis highlights the significance of black-letter law in ensuring labour protection in China. Finally, this article calls for national legislation to provide more explicit and detailed guidance on dismissals, or in the alternative, to mandate local authorities to enact clear labor protection rules appropriate to local circumstances.
A lack of information about potential borrowers is a major obstacle to access to financing from the traditional financial sector. To prevent fraud, increase access to finance, and support balanced sustainable development, countries aroun6d the world have moved over the past several decades to develop credit information reporting requirements and systems to improve the coverage and quality of credit information. Until recently, such requirements mainly covered banks. However, with the process of digital transformation in China and around the world, a range of new credit providers have emerged, in the context of financial technology (FinTech, TechFin,and BigTech). Application of advanced data and analytics technologies provides major opportunities for market participants-both traditional and otherwise-as well as for credit information agencies. By utilizing advanced technologies, these participants and credit reporting agencies can collect massive amounts of information from various online and other activities ('Big Data'), which contributes to the analysis of borrowing behavior and improves the accuracy of creditworthiness assessments. Thereby,enhancing availability of finance and supporting growth and development while also moderating prudential, behavioral and conduct related concerns are at the heart of financial regulation.Aligning withtheinternational trend, China hasdeveloped a regulatory regime for credit information reporting and businessover the past decades.However, this development has not come without its problems, even in the context of traditional banking and credit. With the rapid growth and development of FinTech, TechFin,and BigTech lenders, opportunities to leverage credit information and data, and challenges around its regulationhave emerged. For example, due to fragmented sources of borrower information and the involvement of several actors, difficulties arise in clarifying the business scope of credit reporting andcustomer protection.Moreover, inadequate incentives for credit information and data sharing pose a challenge for regulators inpromoting competition and innovation in the credit market.Drawing upon the experiences of other jurisdictions, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Singapore,and Hong Kong, this paper argues that China should establish a sophisticated licensing regime and set out differentiated requirements for credit reporting agencies in line with the scope and nature of their business, thus addressing potential for regulatory arbitrage. Further,this paper argues that China should formulate specific rules governing the provision of customer informationto credit reporting agencies and resolving disputes arising fromaccuracy and completenessof credit data. An effective information and data sharing scheme should be enactedto help lenders make appropriate credit decisions and facilitate access to financing. The lessons from China's experience hold key insights for other jurisdictions as they move from credit information to credit data regulation in theirfinancial systems.
