The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the Republic of Serbia and the People’s Republic of China represents one of the most significant changes in Serbia’s trade policy in the last decade. The objective of the paper is to analyse the implications of the Serbia–China FTA for the volume and structure of trade, the competitiveness of the Serbian economy, and Serbia’s strategic positioning in the context of China–European Union (EU) relations. The analysis is based on current data on trade flows and a descriptive-analytical approach, with theoretical grounding in the literature on regional trade agreements, China’s free trade agreements, and small open economies. The results indicate asymmetric initial effects of the Agreement, dominantly concentrated on the import side, while the export effects are conditioned by the structural and institutional capacities of Serbia. The structure of trade remains highly concentrated, with Serbia’s exports dominantly based on primary industrial products, while imports from China consist of products of higher stages of processing and technologically intensive goods. It is concluded that liberalisation by itself is not enough to improve competitiveness, and that active industrial and export policies are necessary in order to achieve long-term development effects.
This paper analyses China’s strategy toward Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 by adopting the theory of predation. It argues that, although China is a rising power and Russia a declining one, Beijing has chosen to tacitly support Moscow’s war effort in order to preserve its relationship with Russia, its only available great-power ally in a hypothetical confrontation with the United States. China has done so by expanding economic and military cooperation with Russia while simultaneously assisting Moscow in mitigating the effects of Western-imposed sanctions. This behaviour reflects a calculated strategy aimed at maximising long-term strategic gains while minimising immediate political and economic costs. However, Beijing’s support for Moscow remained limited due to Russia’s military capacity, which remains potent despite losses in Ukraine, as well as the Chinese reluctance to provoke a broader conflict with the leading Western powers, most notably the United States.
Migration is increasingly recognised as a complex risk environment shaped by physical insecurity, institutional fragility, environmental pressures, and socio-economic vulnerability. Within this context, perceptions of migration-related risks and safety play an important role in shaping migration expectations, preparedness, and adaptive behaviour. Existing research indicates that women are often disproportionately exposed to exploitation, legal insecurity, and unsafe migration conditions, particularly in fragile institutional and crisis-prone environments. This study examines migration-related risk perception and safety among women across multiple national contexts within a disaster risk management and human security framework. Drawing on data collected through an anonymous cross-national online survey conducted among female respondents from six African countries, the study explores how age, regional context, and institutional trust shape perceived vulnerability and safety assessments during migration processes. Using descriptive statistics, comparative analysis, and a composite Risk Perception Index (RPI), the research identifies consistently high levels of perceived migration-related risks across all examined contexts. The findings indicate elevated levels of perceived migration-related risks across the examined contexts. Respondents aged 21–30 reported higher levels of perceived vulnerability and lower safety perception compared to older respondents, while respondents from Sub-Saharan African countries reported comparatively higher levels of institutional insecurity and economic vulnerability. The findings reinforce the importance of integrating gender-sensitive perspectives into disaster risk management, migration governance, and human security policies. By situating women’s migration experiences within broader frameworks of vulnerability and resilience, the study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of migration as a multidimensional risk process and highlights the importance of targeted preventive and protective measures in high-risk migration environments.
The authors explore the driving forces behind the EU’s non-proliferation policies toward existing proliferation cases and crises (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the Middle East) and answer the question of why the EU’s non-proliferation policy diverges in these cases. The main hypothesis is that there are inconsistencies in the EU’s approach to the proliferation crisis, mainly because its policy is three-layered rather than purely normative or regime-type-dependent. The authors claim that it depends first on the preservation of the NPT regime and the UN SC resolution on the issue. But, secondly, in the absence of such a resolution, the regional and internal EU dimensions that matter. The article is based on the document analysis of the EU strategies, resolutions, cooperation agreements, joint declarations and actions. Then the authors use the qualitative comparative analysis of EU policies and measures toward the specific cases of countries that proliferated nuclear weapons or are accused of violating the NPT. The authors conclude that the EU approach prefers the multilateral UN-centred solutions, diplomacy and financial support, where it can act as a preventive actor, but that, in the cases of its absence and military counter-proliferation efforts, the EU stance becomes more divided and pragmatic depending on the regional security dynamics and the impacts the countries involved in crisis have on the EU.
Former German Chancellor Scholz marked the Russian war against Ukraine in 2022 as a turning point (“Zeitenwende”), after which the international system would no longer be the same, as power gained primacy over law and war over peace. Without delving into whether the Russia–Ukraine war objectively represents a turning point in the international system or is merely a subjective perception formed within Germany, this paper aims to determine how Germany has adapted to these “new” circumstances. Since power and war have become central in this “new” international order, Germany’s response to these circumstances must be sought in the field of defence policy. This raises the question of whether the “Zeitenwende” can be considered a turning point in German defence policy? The assumption is that it does represent a turning point, as Germany, for the first time since the end of World War II, independently decided to rearm. The analysis of German defence policy prior to the “Zeitenwende” is based on an interactionist approach that combines structural and actor-centred perspectives. This framework makes it possible to explain both the marginalisation of the armed forces in the period preceding the “Zeitenwende” and the subsequent shift in which rearmament came to occupy a central position in defence policy by examining the dynamic interplay between structural constraints and the agency of key political actors.
This article examines the nature of India’s energy relationship with the UAE. It analyses how both countries are navigating collaboration in the energy transition areas concerning global climate action to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, it analyses to what extent cooperation on renewable energy serves the geopolitical interests of both countries. Integrating renewable energy into the energy portfolio is crucial to mitigating the climate crisis, necessitating international cooperation in finance, technology, and infrastructure development. India and the UAE pursue energy security for distinct motivations. India relies on imports to meet energy demands, while shifts in US energy policy impact the UAE’s economic stability. The UAE’s economy, heavily reliant on crude oil reserves, faces pivotal challenges due to increasing calls for energy transition and regional geopolitical changes. These factors have driven both countries to invest in renewable energy sectors. This article argues that both countries seek pathways to integrate renewable energy into their energy portfolios. Consequently, the UAE can maintain its status as a major energy supplier and reap the geopolitical advantage associated with the label. India can reduce its dependency on energy imports while meeting the increasing energy demands. Simultaneously, both countries are meeting the climate action objectives set by the Paris Agreement.
In this paper, the author examines Mosaic Warfare (MW) as a doctrinal concept that emerged in response to the complex and asymmetrical environment shaped by disruptive technology and complexity in the post-Cold War period. With its integration of individual combat platforms and decentralised decision-making through artificial intelligence, MW forms a cohesive force package akin to a mosaic. This approach, which emphasises complexity, flexibility, and speed as tools of advantage, introduces significant doctrinal innovations. However, the author argues that MW cannot be viewed in isolation. Instead, it must be analysed and understood as an evolutionary post–Cold War framework— advancing and integrating critical elements from Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), and Decision- Centric Warfare (DCW). The paper raises the question: Are these new concepts products of the postmodern era, or do they represent a continuation of the centuries-old tradition of the art of war? The author’s use of a comparative and theoretical approach is highlighted, as it situates MW within the broader continuum of classical military thought, drawing from the strategic legacies of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Boyd. Particular emphasis is placed on how MW reinterprets enduring concepts such as deception, friction, and decision-making speed under conditions of complexity and asymmetry. The author concluded that MW is not a complete departure from these classical principles but rather a reinterpretation and evolution in postmodern warfare.
Contemporary international relations, characterised by different challenges, risks, and threats, raise questions about the socalled traditional patterns of cooperation between states. On the other hand, the “traditional” theoretical framework related to the collaboration between states excludes concrete guidelines about the cooperation possibilities of small states. Based on the aforementioned, the double goal of this paper is the presentation of contemporary principles and conditions in the context of cooperation between states, while, on the other hand, the paper’s crucial scientific step is to examine the challenges, possibilities, and obstacles of international or regional cooperation of small and micro states, using the Western Balkans as a case study. The key research question is whether small states can lead cross-border regional cooperation and what the key determinants in that process are. From the theoretical perspective, the paper is based on neoclassical realism, a perspective which, in the contemporary context of international relations, explains the manoeuvring space of small states in their foreign policy actions.
The interplay between Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy and economic results is the primary research subject of this article. It is explored by observing the connection between Serbia’s political cooperation with its four main strategic partners (the European Union, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China) and the economic outcomes achieved in cooperation with these countries. The authors employ descriptive statistical and case study analysis to investigate whether four macroeconomic parameters—trade, foreign direct investment, loans, and grants—have been influenced by foreign policy. The analysis indicates that Serbia’s foreign policy orientation is significantly correlated with economic performance. The primary economic parameters linked to political influence are loans and grants. Other aspects of economic performance, such as trade and foreign direct investments, are less affected by political cooperation.
The application of artificial intelligence in the development of new technologies has significantly contributed to the technological revolution in both the military and civilian sectors. In just two decades, there has been a multi-fold increase in the number of countries involved in innovation programmes based on the use of artificial intelligence, particularly reflected in the military sector. We are witnessing a race in artificial intelligence development. A striking example is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for military purposes, whether in peacetime or wartime. Using a descriptive and explanatory method of analysis, this paper aims to present the potential of unmanned aerial vehicles in the military sector, the situations and ways in which they are used, and the reasons why their use is widespread today. Therefore, in the first part of the paper, we will define artificial intelligence and clarify the meaning of terms related to unmanned aerial vehicles. Additionally, we will pay attention to the differences between the use of artificial intelligence and drones for military and civilian purposes. Based on this, the second part of the paper is dedicated to the use of drones for military purposes. In this context, we will provide examples of the use of various types of drones in current conflicts around the world. The rationale for theoretically addressing this topic is reflected in the authors’ strive to synthesise the latest knowledge on the use of drones for military purposes and, thereby, conclude on their development and potential, as well as predict potential future trends in the military sector. The authors will collect data through a qualitative analysis of relevant literature and available documents related to the research subject.
This study interrogates the profound metamorphosis of America’s international posture, tracing its trajectory from the architect of post-war liberal hegemony to its contemporary manifestation as what we term a “rogue superpower”. This paradoxical condition is defined by the retention of preeminent material capabilities alongside a growing disregard for the very institutional and normative frameworks it once established. To unravel this complex shift, the research constructs an innovative Integrated Multi-Paradigm Framework, synthesising the analytical strengths of neorealist power transition theory, neoclassical realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. This multifaceted lens is applied to a rigorous analysis of primary documents, policy declarations, and empirical data, revealing that America’s unilateral turn is not an ephemeral political phenomenon but a structural realignment. It is propelled by the confluence of systemic forces – relative power diffusion, demographic asymmetries, and technological disruption, and potent domestic currents, economic fragmentation, political polarisation, and evolving national identity narratives. By moving beyond monocausal explanations, this study offers a comprehensive toolkit for scholars and policymakers alike to navigate the contours of global realignment in an emerging post-hegemonic era.
This paper examines the potential role of the Catholic Church in mediating Mexico’s drug war, particularly in light of the 2024 proposal from the leader of the Mexican Episcopal Conference. While the concept of faith-based mediation has been extensively explored in political science, this specific case is noteworthy due to the involvement of drug cartels in an internal armed conflict. Utilising the theoretical framework established by Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, the author investigates the Church’s identity, resources, challenges, strategies, and motivations as a mediator. The study sheds light on the complex dynamics between the Church and drug cartels, which encompass everything from parallel social activities to instances of victimisation. Despite these challenges, the context in Mexico offers the Church a unique opportunity to confront issues related to drug cartels, including the rise of “narco-religion”. As a result, three potential approaches emerge – religious, social, and political – that could mitigate the influence of drug cartels and enhance the mediating power of the Catholic Church.
This article critically examines the growing tension between climate activism and state repression in the European Union, focusing on the legal and political implications of criminalising civil disobedience in environmental movements. It starts from the hypothesis that the legal frameworks of the EU member states and the EU itself insufficiently protect the rights of climate activists, leading to democratic backsliding and the erosion of fundamental freedoms. Grounded in John Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience as a public, non-violent, and conscientious act aimed at changing unjust laws or policies, the article explores whether climate resistance should be considered a legitimate form of political expression rather than a threat to public order. Using a multidisciplinary and comparative legal method, the analysis draws on European and international human rights instruments—including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Aarhus Convention—EU climate policy frameworks such as the European Green Deal, and recent jurisprudence from national and European courts. It finds that while legal systems nominally protect freedom of expression and assembly, in practice, they often allow for disproportionate sanctions, police violence, and the misuse of antiterror laws against environmental activists. The article concludes that EU climate governance lacks a consistent human rights-based approach (HRBA), particularly in policy implementation and allocating EU funds. It calls for integrating fundamental rights into all aspects of climate governance, including litigation, policy design, and public participation, to ensure a just, democratic, and socially equitable green transition.
Normative entrepreneurs, i.e., those political actors who attempt to promulgate a norm into wide acceptance, can influence the formation of international regimes once the norm they promote becomes widely accepted by most of the world’s countries. However, normative entrepreneurship has limits since not all states accept the proposed norms. This paper will try to answer the question of why that is the case. According to the article, some nations refuse to adopt standards that they believe could jeopardise their national security. Other states can accept the norm even with their national security interests affected due to humanitarian and diplomatic reasons. As a result, a regime could exist and be formed by normative entrepreneurs. However, some powers, potentially the major ones, might not accept it, limiting the regime’s efficacy. The article will present how this security-centric framework functions using the case of the anti-landmine norm and the Ottawa Convention. This approach can explain the membership limits that the regimes produced by normative entrepreneurs such as the Ottawa Convention face. Furthermore, the article will outline how this framework can be used to adjust the anti-personnel landmine norm to a less demanding form, i.e., in such a manner as not to compromise national security and make the spread of the regime-forming norm possible again.
This paper explores the role of Citizens’ Assemblies (CAs) in fostering deliberative democracy and resisting authoritarian tendencies in the Western Balkans, a region facing significant democratic backsliding. Analysing three assemblies held in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro between October 2023 and February 2024, with 133 participants, the study investigates citizens’ willingness to participate and their satisfaction with deliberations on critical societal issues. While CAs remain primarily organised by civil society organisations and face limited institutional support, they have demonstrated significant potential to enhance citizen participation and bridge societal divides. The findings reveal high levels of citizen engagement, with participants articulating perspectives that often challenge dominant political narratives. Notable examples include fostering inter-ethnic dialogue in Bosnia and Herzegovina and producing actionable recommendations on disinformation in Serbia. However, CAs’ influence on formal policymaking is constrained by entrenched political structures, resistance from elites, and funding uncertainties. Despite these challenges, CAs serve as vital platforms for deliberation, offering a corrective to the deficits of traditional governance in hybrid regimes. This study highlights the transformative potential of CAs in building democratic resilience, emphasising their role in advancing deliberative practices and challenging authoritarian norms in fragile political contexts.
This paper assesses the impact of Chinese and South Korean historical TV dramas on youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, considering this format as one of the instruments of cultural diplomacy. The primary goal of the research is to determine how these media contents shape the cultural values and attitudes of the target population. Additionally, the paper analyses the development, characteristics, and mutual relationships between Chinese and South Korean TV productions. The research was conducted in two phases, employing a comparative-historical method and thematic analysis of data collected through focus group interviews with sinology students at the Faculty of Philology, University of Banja Luka. The results indicate that Chinese and South Korean historical TV dramas have no significant impact on young people in BiH, with the absence of their influence representing an epiphenomenon of Western cultural hegemony. In this context, the findings contribute to the understanding of the soft power dynamics and cultural interactions in BiH, as well as the challenges faced by alternative cultural contents in a globalised society.
This study employs a network analysis framework to evaluate economic vulnerabilities within the Western Balkans (WB) value chains, focusing on Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. The aim is to identify industries critical to the network’s structural integrity and assess potential impacts from disruptions. This approach provides new insights into the connections between the WB countries and regional industries based on input/output data for each sector. Evidence from raw bilateral trade data often misses those insights and does not provide the level of interconnectivity between industries. Our findings highlight the dominant importance of Serbia’s Electricity, Gas, and Water (ELE) industry and Transport (TRA). Also, several industries from North Macedonia are important within the region. The obtained results can be used to revise and adjust industrial and trade policies in the WB countries. Identified interconnectedness is significant for improving the countries’ position in international frameworks and their possibilities for more active participation in value chains.
The Mediterranean migrant crisis, fueled by conflict, poverty and political instability in countries of origin, positions the Mediterranean as the deadliest sea in the world. Thousands risk perilous sea crossings, while transit and destination countries struggle with humanitarian relief and asylum challenges. The European Union initially responded to the crisis by applying the principles of unity and liberalism. This paper deploys political realism as a theoretical lens to analyze the crisis, demonstrating how state sovereignty, national interests, and security concerns dominate policy responses – often at the expense of humanitarian principles. The main concepts employed in the analysis include the state as the primary and most significant actor in international relations, sovereignty as the state’s right to control its borders, national interest as the central motive driving state policy, and security as the paramount priority of states within an anarchic international system. The concepts of anarchy and self-help describe the absence of a superior international authority and the necessity for states to independently ensure their own security. Within the context of the migrant crisis, migration is often perceived as a threat to national security and social stability, while humanitarian concerns are frequently relegated to a secondary position. Research concludes that although the European Union still has mechanisms for the demonstration of cohesion and comprehensive actions, we might expect further strengthening of a realistic approach.
The victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election of November 5, 2024, has reignited academic debate concerning the future grand strategy of the United States. This paper seeks to contribute to that debate by analysing the current global context and evaluating the strategic options at Washington’s disposal. Specifically, we address two central research questions: first, what strategic options are available to Donald Trump, and second, which grand strategy will likely be chosen by the 47th president of the United States? We argue that, despite the unconventional nature of Trump’s first presidential term, his strategic priorities have remained broadly consistent with those of previous administrations, particularly regarding the preservation of US primacy and the maintenance of a favourable balance of power in key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. The paper further explores the dominant strategic options available to Trump, including isolationism, offshore balancing, selective engagement, and deep engagement. We predict that Trump is unlikely to significantly alter the grand strategy from his first term, opting instead for selective engagement. Methodologically, the paper employs content analysis, comparative methods, and genealogical analysis to examine Trump’s strategic options within a dynamic global context.
The article analyses the US policies in the post-Soviet space as an example of how a great power can stimulate specific political order in a region. The author states that the US strategic framework in this space does not contradict the deterrence imperatives towards the USSR. Depending on its short-term goals in relations with Russia, US foreign policy follows a seven- or eight-year cycle of stimulation of the decentralisation processes in the region. After the dissolution of the USSR, the first clear manifestation of differences between Moscow and Washington, which occurred in 1999, was followed by three waves of tensions in 2007, 2014, and 2022. In all four cases, the US raised its strategic attention towards other former Soviet republics. In each sub-region of this space, the US applies different sets of practices that would be most efficient and suitable for each country in fulfilling current American political imperatives. Throughout the last three decades, the United States demonstrated an effective usage of different sets of “carrot and stick” political approaches, mostly carried out via ideological, economic, military, diplomatic, and multilateral foreign political means, both towards these post-Soviet states and Russia. In each state of the post-Soviet space, Washington applied a unique set of political practices and tactics, often following the same goal of undermining Moscow’s power and stimulating decentralisation processes among the former Soviet republics.
