China’s War of Resistance Against Japan, which began with the September 18 Incident in 1931, was an integral part of World War II. The first six years constituted a phase of localized resistance. As Japan’s invasion expanded, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China ended their civil war and forged a united front to fight the aggressors. Following the Lugou Bridge Incident in 1937, the conflict escalated into a full-scale war. The Chinese theater exhibited two prominent characteristics: first, a significant disparity in strength, with China relatively weak and Japan strong; second, the strategic importance of both the conventional main front led by the Kuomintang and the front behind enemy lines led by the Communist Party. This article examines the war guidance principles and military strategies of the two parties, elucidating the respective roles of the two fronts in the War of Resistance, China’s contributions to the global anti-fascist war, and the long-term impact of World War II on China’s development.
Driven by discontent with perceived technological stagnation, a distinctive political faction, frequently referred to as the Tech Right, has consolidated significant influence within Silicon Valley. The ideological foundations of this movement are a synthesis of techno-accelerationism, libertarianism, and techno-nationalism. Concurrently, the Tech Right and the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement have increasingly converged, establishing a political coalition. This alliance exhibits a tiered structure comprising a core faction of Tech Right ideologues, an intermediate layer of policy-making actors, and a peripheral group of stakeholders. Through shaping legislative agendas and technological policy frameworks, this faction has substantially extended its influence over the broader US political landscape. Despite this convergence, fundamental contradictions persist within the Tech Right–MAGA alliance, particularly regarding divergent interests and conflicting stances on immigration policy. The ascension of the Tech Right has not only reoriented American foreign policy, but it has also exacerbated techno-geopolitical competition between the United States and China.
Despite the rapidly expanding literature on China’s engagement in Africa, US policy responses remain analytically fragmented. This article conceptualizes US think tanks as epistemic–political intermediaries between academic research and policy decision-making. It provides a systematic assessment of 386 publications produced by 28 US think tanks between 2005 and 2025. The analysis shows that think tank engagement has expanded and become more specialized over time, with thematic attention shifting from development-oriented perspectives toward geostrategic and security framings. Publication trends broadly correspond to major Chinese initiatives in Africa, suggesting that shifts in China’s Africa policy have played an important agenda-setting role within US policy discourse. At the same time, institutional positioning shapes analytical approaches, with Washington-based and university-affiliated centers differing in methodological orientation and interpretive emphasis. Across the literature, three recurring debates—development versus competition, opportunity versus vulnerability, and the implications of China’s security presence—structure distinct interpretive positions. A case study of infrastructure finance and debt sustainability further illustrates how similar empirical evidence produces divergent policy conclusions. Taken together, the findings highlight the growing securitization and strategic reframing of China in Africa and contribute to scholarship on foreign policy knowledge production under conditions of great power competition.
The fight against plastics has been emerging on the agenda of global governance. The G20 has witnessed a distinctive role in global governance, while paying more attention to plastic governance. International plastic negotiations have opened the door of international institutions for addressing global plastic pollution. This article identifies the Asian and European members of G20 and observes their positions on global plastic governance. It finds that they have divergent views on global plastic governance, as the European members focus on controlling plastic pollution, East Asian advanced economies favour the discourse on circular economy and major developing countries such as China and India raise the justice discourse. This divergence is mainly determined by the nature of and role of the stakeholders in the plastic industry, their long-term positions on international environmental negotiations and a shift of the plastic discourses towards the production discourse at the international level. Following this, the SDG 12 concerning sustainable production and consumption should be a core objective of G20 for achieving its plastic cooperation.
