This paper underscores the theory that efficacious law enforcement intelligence addresses current problems of criminal insurgency including acts of terrorism, asymmetric warfare and low intensity conflict, and suggests possible solutions. By introducing the notion of crime as insurgency, a new paradigm may be developed that could assist practitioners and academics alike in analyzing, solving and managing crime. By shifting the perspective for both military and civilian forces from their traditionally reactive stance, to a proactive posture, and merging national security with homeland defense on the most perplexing issues and threats facing US security, this work may provide a base upon which new and actionable policies can be designed. Public administrators must take seriously the lessons from past failures. The single most important supposition being, sound policy is reliant upon good intelligence.
The provision of Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) encapsulates the traditional approach towards countering terrorism on the British mainland, which emphasises minimum force, proportionality, police primacy and the rule of law, with the military retained as a supporting instrument, being employed only as a measure of last resort. Recent terrorist incidents in major urban centres do, however, question the effectiveness of these established methods. This analysis initially codifies the conceptual issues that underscore the tensions between civil policing and military anti-terrorist approaches in the UK, and proceeds to evaluate and compare a number of operations that indicate the nature of the challenges facing the MACP apparatus. In particular, potential shortcomings in the MACP provisions are identified in the form of threat perception and deployment and enforcement gaps. The assessment finds that there are facets of MACP that are of enduring relevance in the current era, yet a continuing need persists to reconcile police and military imperatives toward serious civil disorder contingencies and conditions of emergency.
Over the past decade, information operations (IO) have become a central feature of America's way of war. The Department of Defense's (DOD) focus on technology has left perception management (PM), defined as actions taken to influence foreign audiences’ perceptions and behaviors, as IO's second-class citizen. This article postulates that in today's media environment and with adversaries skillfully using propaganda to skirt America's will, perception management is key to military success. The author offers possible improvements for strengthening Dodd's PM capabilities and approaches.
Police investigations of terrorist incidents are rarely straightforward. This paper reports the findings of research that looked at low-level paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland which have taken place during the ceasefire era. Of 500 incidents studied, 28 were followed by the arrest of suspects. The study examines what factors were important for linking later arrests with other features of the incident. These results are discussed in terms of the wider implications for the successful investigation of paramilitary offences and in terms of the specific implications for investigative policing within Northern Ireland.
The war against terrorism has brought Somalia, a country located in a key strategic region, back onto the radar of US and Western security concerns. Following a vicious civil war, a failed peace support operation and several attempts to start a peace process, lawless Somalia, a country without government, has gained the potential to be exploited as a terrorist base. Although this country in the Horn of Africa does not represent a direct and immediate threat to the US or its Western allies, its potential to destabilize the region is extremely high. This article offers an analysis of Somalia's potential to become a ground for terrorist activities and suggests a two-track approach. On the one hand, US foreign and security policy in Somalia needs to be more assertive; on the other, the only way to prevent Somalia from becoming a fertile ground for international terrorist groups is to help stabilize the country. In order to achieve this objective, it is crucial to adopt any initiative aimed at strengthening Somalia's civil society.
In peace-support operations, employees of international humanitarian organisations often clash with those of the military. A lack of familiarity with each other's practices and values, embedded in their respective organisational cultures, is often seen as the culprit. This article presents and illustrates a road map to manage such cultural differences between cooperating organisations. We found that the military culture, in our Bosnian case study, was seen to operate as a hierarchical culture (characterised by formalisation, stability, predictability and efficiency). The culture of international humanitarian organisations, on the other hand, was depicted as clan-type (characterised by teamwork, participation and consensus). To facilitate the creation of cultural awareness as well as respect for, and reconciliation of, cultural differences we recommend several concrete actions that could improve civil-military cooperation.
The 2003 conflict between Iraq and the US-led Coalition resulted in liberation for the country, enabling its citizens to experience freedom they have not had for decades. While the US-led operation was successful, insurgent movements have hindered the reconstruction efforts and the rebuilding of the government in Iraq. The tactics used by these insurgent groups are not that of ‘traditional’ warfare, therefore the US and Coalition forces adapted their tactics to respond to this new threat. It is argued that with the application of the Manwaring Paradigm (also known as the SWORD Model), the US and Coalition forces successfully responded to the insurgent movements during the period leading up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005. Notes 1. Note that LIC has many other phrases used to describe it, such as ‘Uncomfortable Wars’, ‘Gray Area Phenomena’, and ‘Operations Other than War’. However, for the sake of consistency, this article will use the term ‘Low Intensity Conflict’. 2. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds), Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p.7. 3. Ibid., p.16; and L.T.C. Phil Battaglia, ‘The Manwaring Paradigm and the Iraqi Insurgency’, forthcoming, p.4. 4. Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, ‘Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3 No. 3 (1992), pp.276–83. 5. Ibid., p.272. 6. Manwaring and Fishel, p.281. 7. Battaglia, p.10. 8. Manwaring and Fishel, pp.284–5. 9. Battaglia, p.11. 10. Manwaring and Fishel, p.285. 11. Corr and Sloan, p.12. 12. Manwaring and Fishel, p.285. 13. Ibid., p.282. 14. Corr and Sloan, p.13. 15. Battaglia, p.16. 16. Manwaring and Fishel, p.286. 17. Ibid., p.287. 18. Max G. Manwaring (ed.), Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p.23. 19. John T. Fishel, personal interview by Melissa Bazarian, 9 Dec. 2004. 20. Max G. Manwaring (ed.), Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting a New World Disorder (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p.109. 21. Ibid., pp.123–4. 22. Ron Moore, Waging Peace: The Clausewitzian Dimensions of Peace Enforcement Operations ( National Defense University, National War College, 2000), < www.ndu.edu/library/nz/n005602f.pdf>, p.3. Accessed 10 October 2004. 23. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin Books, 1954), p.379; and Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking, 2003), pp.207–21. 24. Thucydides, p.213; Kagan, pp.99–109. 25. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.84. 26. Ibid., p.101. 27. Ibid., p.101. 28. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993), p.99. 29. Christopher Bassford, review of On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, originally published in Defense Analysis, June 1996, < www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CREV/CWZREV.htm>. Accessed 7 November 2004. 30. Clausewitz, p.101. 31. Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, ‘Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity’, originally published in Parameters, Autumn, 1995, < www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Trinity/TRININTR.htm>, p.3. Accessed 7 November 2004. 32. Moore, pp.7–8. 33. Ibid., p.8. 34. The concept of legitimacy and the moral right to govern is covered in Corr and Sloan, Manwaring and Fishel, Manwaring (1991) and Manwaring (1993). It is a recurring theme in these publications, therefore a specific citation cannot be provided. 35. Manwaring and Fishel, p.273. 36. ‘Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath’ International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 6, < www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1674&1=1> p.4. Accessed 13 October 2004. 37. Ibid., p.4. 38. Ibid., pp.4–5. 39. Ibid., p.5. 40. Ibid., p.6. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid., pp.6–7. 45. Ibid., p.7. 46. Ibid., p.7. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid., pp.7–8. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., p.8. 51. David Rieff, ‘Were Sanctions Right?’, New York Times Magazine, 22 July 2003, p.40. 52. ‘Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath’, p.8. 53. For full text of Resolution 1441, please access the following link: < http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>. Accessed 12 November 2004. 54. Colin Powell, ‘Iraq Has Had One Last Chance’, Vital Speeches Of The Day 69, No. 9. (15 Feb. 2003), pp.276–88, < www.proquest.com/>. Accessed 12 November 2004. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. ‘The Final Ultimatum’, Economist.com/Global Agenda, 17 March 2003, 1, < www.proquest.com/>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 58. George W. Bush, ‘President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours: The Final Ultimatum’, Vital Speeches Of The Day, 69, No. 12 (1 April 2003), pp.354–6, < www.proquest.com/>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 59. Accessed at < http://icasualties.org/oif/>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 60. Bruce Hoffman, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Rand Corporation Occasional Paper (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004), p.16. 61. Hoffman, p.16. 62. The full text of this briefing can be accessed at < www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030630-secdef0321.html>. Accessed 12 November 2004. 63. Linda Robinson, ‘Troublemakers, Beware; An Up-close Look at the U.S. Effort to Defeat Iraq's Angry Insurgents; Baghdad’, U.S. News & World Report, 12 July 2004, pp.23–30, < www.proquest.com/>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 64. Hoffman, p.17. 65. Hoffman, pp.17–18. 66. Hoffman, p.15. 67. ‘Resistence’, Occupation of Iraq, 2003–2004, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occuption_of_Iraq,_2003–2004>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 68. Mujahid Mohammed, ‘Militants in Mosul Try to Avoid Fallujah Mistakes’, < www.dawn.com/2004/12/05/int11.htm>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 69. Ibid. 70. ‘Insurgents target Iraqi civilians working for U.S.’, CBC News (website), 5 Dec. 2004, < www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2004/12/05/iraqattack041205.html>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 71. Battaglia, p.10. 72. Ibid., p.10. 73. Dr John T. Fishel's sense is that the US military officer's assessment was likely the correct one. 74. Ibid., p.10. 75. Mackubin Thomas Owens. ‘Two, Three, Many Fallujas’, The Weekly Standard, 6 Dec. 2004, pp.8–9, < www.proquest.com/>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 76. Thomas E. Ricks, ‘U.S. Troop Level in Iraq to Grow’, Washington Post, 2 Dec. 2004, sec. A. 77. Battaglia, p.11. 78. Ibid., pp.11–12. 79. Ibid., p.12. 80. ‘Elections’, Occupation of Iraq, 2003–2004, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occuption_of_Iraq,_2003–2004>. Accessed 11 December 2004. 81. Battaglia, p.12. 82. Ibid., p.15. 83. Ibid. 84. Hoffman, p.15. 85. Owens. 86. Edward T. Pound and Jennifer Jack, ‘Special Report: The Iran Connection’, U.S. News & World Report, 22 Nov. 2004, pp.34–44, < www.proquest.com/>. 87. Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Rebels Aided By Allies in Syria, U.S. Says’, Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2004, sec. A. 88. Owens. 89. Battaglia, p.16. 90. Hoffman, p.10. 91. Battaglia, p.17. 92. Ibid., pp.16–17. 93. ‘Analysis: Efforts to Train Iraq's New Army’, All Things Considered (NPR), 22 Jan. 2004, < www.proquest.com/>. Accessed 1 December 2004. 94. Ibid. 95. Yochi J. Dreazen. ‘“Lack of Security” Is Plaguing Iraq; Theft of Explosives Cache Underscores the Problems Facing U.S., Iraqi Forces’, Wall Street Journal, 26 Oct. 2004, Eastern Edition, < www.proquest.com/>. Accessed 12 November 2004. 96. Battaglia, p.19. 97. Ibid. 98. Ibid., p.20 Additional informationNotes on contributorsMelissa S.M. Bazarian Author's Note This analysis was conducted in December 2004, prior to the Iraqi elections held in January 2005. The elections were widely regarded as successful, with a large voter turnout. The most important outcome was the establishment of Host Government Legitimacy, effectively providing the newly elected officials with the moral right to govern Iraq. This event was key in ensuring that the government has a stable foundation that will be resistant to corruption and challenges from opposition. While the insurgency continues at this time, it is not to the same degree as prior to the elections. [update????] This shows that the continued application of the Manwaring Paradigm will be effective in combating the insurgent movements in Iraq. Melissa Bazarian March 2005
Strategic intelligence is the product of various means to ascertain threat/s and action, including the evolution of responses to threats, perspectives of threats, and assessments of successes and failures of such actions. This article promotes the idea that good intelligence enables good policy, and examines how the Nevada Division of Investigation, a state-level investigative agency with general law enforcement responsibilities engaged in strategic intelligence research. The research methodology is an adaptation of the Delphi Technique. It employs a three-round iterative process seeking to generate the strongest possible consensus, after expressing opposing views, to potential resolutions (policies and programs) on major criminal justice issues. Serving as a model for futures research, this study rests on the premise that the decision-maker is primarily interested in having informed individuals present options and supporting evidence for consideration.
This article examines US Army psychological operations (PsyOp) as practiced during the waning years of the Cold War in Latin America. Certain themes, especially legitimacy, in-group/out-group, and safety/fear are demonstrated to be recurrent in regional PsyOp campaigns, largely because they seem to activate rich inference systems in the human brain. Yet anthropologists and other scholars of Latin America have paid little attention to military PsyOp. Despite our natural susceptibilities, we can best evaluate propaganda (and other claims to knowledge) by following the advice of Karl Popper: competing theories, including politically loaded ones, should always be explanatory and subject to criticism.
Terrorism is not insurgency, though the latter invariably incorporates the former in its campaign to form a counter-state. Maoist ‘people's war’ has proved such a challenge to state response precisely because it incorporates terror as a tactic within the larger voluntarist effort ‘to make a revolution’. Examining this dynamic in two cases of Maoist insurgency, Peru and Nepal, produces two conclusions of particular relevance for states and policymakers: in anticipating internal violence, voluntarism is as critical a component as objective circumstances, with deliberate action actually able to shape those circumstances in a weak state setting. Further, inappropriate state response is itself a key factor in contributing to this dynamic. The implications are sobering in an era when states worldwide are attempting the difficult transition to democracy even as they are challenged by development demands exacerbated by heightened popular expectations. In such settings, terror is able to tip the scales in situations which otherwise would hang in the balance, thus allowing voluntarist actors to engage in activity not unlike that envisaged in foco theory, where Ché Guevara posited that guerrilla action itself could produce the conditions for the revolution.
Melissa S. M. Bazarian holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from American University in Washington, DC, where her studies focused on counterterrorism and low intensity conflict. Ms. Bazarian has an interest in asymmetric threats and the Middle East, and spends her free time reading materials on the subjects. Ms. Bazarian currently works in the national security field for a global consulting firm, and also has experience in international development. She resides in Arlington, VA.
Addressing insurgency requires the same application of operational art as utilized in conventional warfare planning. Counterinsurgency strategy will be driven by the nature of the insurgent movement, with campaigns constructed to use tactics appropriately so that key facets of the insurgent campaign are neutralized. It is especially important to determine whether terror is used as a tactic (a method of action) by an insurgency or as a stand-alone strategy (a logic of action) by a challenger divorced from a mass base. Insurgencies, in turn, will normally emphasize strategically either winning allegiance of the target population or using violence as a substitute for other methods. Each of these approaches requires the weighting of the appropriate campaign elements of the counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, having faced both approaches, is an especially useful case study.
The Belfast Agreement of 1998 was hailed at the time as a breakthrough in conflict resolution both in Northern Ireland and as a model for international emulation. In fact it has turned out to be neither; rather it has been a sad exercise in surrendering to terrorism and the cause of increased sectarian segregation and enmity. The core of the problem lies in the ‘constructive ambiguity’ at the heart of the Agreement – that is, a form of words that all could sign up to because each party could interpret them differently. This may have enabled everyone to sign up, but also implied they were signing up to different things and therefore were not in agreement. Consequently clever word games and spin by politicians and senior civil servants have created an, in some ways, worse situation, largely because real, substantive issues were ducked. This in turn has its roots in postmodernism, whose baleful influence can be seen throughout not only the Agreement but most government policy over the past 20 odd years.
Addressing insurgency requires the same application of operational art as utilized in conventional warfare planning. Counterinsurgency strategy will be driven by the nature of the insurgent movement, with campaigns constructed to use tactics appropriately so that key facets of the insurgent campaign are neutralized. It is especially important to determine whether terror is used as a tactic (a method of action) by an insurgency or as a stand-alone strategy (a logic of action) by a challenger divorced from a mass base. Insurgencies, in turn, will normally emphasize strategically either winning allegiance of the target population or using violence as a substitute for other methods. Each of these approaches requires the weighting of the appropriate campaign elements of the counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, having faced both approaches, is an especially useful case study.
How are refugees mobilised in identity based conflicts? How do internally displaced persons and refugees become utilised as a multidimensional source of agitation and escalation? Are there steps th...
For years the government has been concerned about terrorists and unconventional weapons – but is the threat real? The threat is definitely real, but may not be from the source you would expect. The threat is not from biological and chemical weapons as experts seems to think – yes the information is readily available, but production and dissemination are far more complicated than what the public has been lead to believe. Even the threat from radiological devices, otherwise known as ‘dirty bombs’, is not realistic. The weapon is extremely dangerous to make, very heavy and produces a low mass casualty rate. Instead the threat stems from terrorists acquiring, producing or stealing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons today are small enough that we would never be able to find them, and they can be remotely detonated.
The public lynching of Rashaad Staggie, a notorious gang leader in Cape Town, and the further killing of 24 drug dealers by members of PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) led to the group being labelled as vigilantes in South Africa. Subsequent bomb attacks in the Western Cape, primarily in the Cape Town area, although not claimed by PAGAD were attributed to the group. This article explores the rise and fall of PAGAD and considers whether the group's actions constitute vigilantism or terrorism.
As an integral component of the Military Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP), 1995–99, Special Operations Forces (SOF) performed as a true confidence-building measure (CBM). They succeeded in changing the behaviour of states, helping to resolve a longstanding conflict. MOMEP consequently serves as an example of risk management and reduction measures that insure regional stability. Further, it is an example of a regional multi-national military peacekeeping effort (PKO), conducted by conventional forces from various nations with influence and guidance from SOF, that succeeded without the reliance upon the United Nations.
This essay uses the SWORD model developed by Max Manwaring to analyze the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and assess the coalition efforts in rebuilding the country, fighting the insurgency and transferring authority to an Iraqi government. This essay was written in late February 2004. The essay looks at the current situation in Iraq and uses a graphical ‘conflict mapping’ technique developed by the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre as a visual tool to portray the principal actors in Iraq and their interrelationships. Next, the author applies the seven dimensions of the SWORD model to the on-going counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq. The seven dimensions of the SWORD model are (1) military actions of the intervening power, (2) support actions of the intervening power, (3) host government legitimacy, (4) degree of outside support to insurgents, (5) actions against subversion, (6) host country military actions, and (7) unity of effort. The model suggests that coalition efforts are hampered by a lack of host g...
Defense transformation is the most important issue in the United States today. For this reason, the United States is working with NATO to try to achieve a global military transformation in western countries. In Latin American countries, however, the situation is different due to the existence of other variables that have an impact on the armed forces organizational structures. In this article, the author analyzes defense transformation in the United States and the situation in South America, placing emphasis on the nature and the constitutional framework as the most important transformational axis in Latin America, whereas in the United States the center of gravity is the transformation of military capabilities. Notes 1. Declaration of San Carlos de Bariloche, October 1996. 2. In some countries such as Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and others, the police is part of the Defense Ministry. 3. I think that threats are situations in which the will of an adversary or enemy is involved. Things such as unemployment, hunger, illiteracy, poverty, etc. are problems, structural failures of society, or shortages. 4. See for example Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Antiwar (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993). 5. Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003, p. 3. 6. The concept was first brought up in the National Security Strategy (2002). However, it is an old concept that has been written about, among others, by Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1965). See also Elaine Bunn: 'Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect', Strategic Forum, No. 2000, (July 2003). 7. In the United States, there is a distinction between dissuasion and deterrence. The first is more of a diplomatic attitude, and the second places more emphasis on the military instrument. 8. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report and the Department's Annual Report to the president and the Congress. 9. For many former military people, this unusual situation was not well understood. This generated a debate in the newspapers at the time. 10. Military Transformation. A Strategic Approach, Autumn 2003, pp. 20–26. 11. Military Transformation. A Strategic Approach, Autumn 2003, p. 30. 12. The concept of Adaptation is explicated in Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, Managing Change: Capability, Adaptability, and Transformation (Defense Horizons, June 2001). 13. An alternative to transformation which is a more generalized process is achieving greater polyvalence in the military instrument. However, polyvalence does not always ensure efficiency in all the areas it purports to include.
