Addressing insurgency requires the same application of operational art as utilized in conventional warfare planning. Counterinsurgency strategy will be driven by the nature of the insurgent movement, with campaigns constructed to use tactics appropriately so that key facets of the insurgent campaign are neutralized. It is especially important to determine whether terror is used as a tactic (a method of action) by an insurgency or as a stand-alone strategy (a logic of action) by a challenger divorced from a mass base. Insurgencies, in turn, will normally emphasize strategically either winning allegiance of the target population or using violence as a substitute for other methods. Each of these approaches requires the weighting of the appropriate campaign elements of the counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, having faced both approaches, is an especially useful case study.

American military leaders have a wide array of responsi- bilities that, at times, may seem difficult to reconcile. They are expected to win wars, to secure America's place in the world arena, and to fulfill their moral responsibilities to their soldiers, fellow officers, and the American public. I am going to argue that the continued success of the United States and the continued global progress of the democratic way of life require that American military officers understand and strengthen the relationship between the three spheres of responsibility just mentioned. The unifying concept for all of this is something one might call "the Western idea." 1 Consider first our war-fighting attitude. In August 1990, in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President George Bush ordered the deployment of US troops to the Persian Gulf. At that time, he spoke of having the opportunity to form a New World Order, an order unmarred by aggression between nations. He spoke also of "a defining moment" in history. For the US armed forces, the Gulf War was truly a defining moment. We went to combat with weapons, doc- trine, and personnel largely untried by war, and emerged vic- torious with our equipment, our doctrine, and the ability of our soldiers validated. But something else was validated— our war-fighting attitude—and we need to be clear about just what that was and is. One national columnist wrote approv- ingly, but without full understanding, of "a new tradition" in the American way of war: "Our warriors are kinder and gen- tler." 2 Others noted Bush's explicit invocation of just-war precepts to justify operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.3 Still others (rightfully) lauded our pilots for taking more risks than the conventions of war required, flying lower and straighter on bombing runs to reduce civilian casualties to the absolute minimum. 4