
Although the EU formally lacks a specific competence in the field of national civil service systems, it increasingly affects the organisation and the conditions of employment of the Member States' officials in order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law. This Article tests this claim by examining the set of provisions and principles that empower the EU to affect the national civil service systems, with a focus on the dynamics of public salaries at national level. Against this background, the Article analyses how the principles of independence and impartiality operate as vectors of Europeanisation, indirectly constraining national remuneration regimes despite the exclusion of pay harmonisation under Article 153(5) TFEU. To support such a conclusion, the Article presents two examples: on the one hand, it examines the case law regarding the independence of national judiciaries and how this affects the pay regime of national judges; on the other hand, it examines the case law and the secondary law provisions applying to national regulatory authorities established under EU law. The conclusion is that the EU has progressively increased its powers in this policy field, even with regard to national salaries.
This article gives an overview of the six contributions that make up this Special Issue dedicated to bias and impartiality in European Public Administration. The articles address the principle of impartiality and the closely related requirements of independence, neutrality, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest in public administration. Overall, this Special Issue asks how public power can be exercised in an impartial manner where the public authority itself, its officials, or the institutional structures within which they operate, have interests that may affect the exercise of their functions. Reading the contributions together, this introductory contribution identifies six dimensions of impartiality: individual, institutional, procedural, substantive, multi-level, and functional. It argues that there can be no single institutional model of impartial administration, as the appropriate safeguard depends on the type of decision, the interest at stake, the institutional position of the decision-maker, and the potential consequences of bias. Comparing different fields of administrative law and levels of government, the six contributions identify different legal techniques for managing the same underlying risk, rather than a single universal definition, and distinguishes impartiality from related concepts; independence is not identical to impartiality, just as neutrality is not identical to the absence of conflict of interest. Impartiality is presented as a principle concerning the architecture of public decision-making, requiring attention to institutional design, the distribution of competences, procedural safeguards, judicial review, and the interaction between public law and private law. This introduction closes by asking whether the recognition of no-conflict-of-interest requirements may contribute to a more general European understanding of impartiality within the right to good administration.
The European Commission's decision to address short-term rentals within its affordable housing agenda should not be seen as a sudden policy change, but as the result of sustained local regulatory pressure, developments in the case law, and growing political attention at the EU level. As the impacts of short-term rentals have spread beyond a small number of high-profile cities to a wider range of urban areas, the issue can no longer be addressed solely through internal market and digital governance frameworks. This Perspective argues that the Commission's housing framing reflects a long-awaited recognition of the scale and territorial nature of housing pressures linked to short-term rental activities. Even though the Affordable Housing Plan seems to enable context-sensitive local regulation, it may also reinforce existing limits on local autonomy under a new policy framework, depending on how housing impacts are defined at the EU level. This contribution cautions that, without sufficient regulatory flexibility for locally tailored interventions, EU action may risk translating local regulatory efforts into centrally designed solutions that fail to reflect place-specific housing conditions.
Governments must act impartially when granting permits, yet this becomes complex when they develop projects themselves and simultaneously serve as the permitting authority. In such situations, safeguarding objective decision-making is essential, raising the question of whether internal organisational separation is sufficient or whether broader administrative or political independence is required. The European 'no conflict of interest' principle (NCOI-principle), embedded in Directive 2011/92/EU on environmental impact assessment and applied in the recent Sogent judgment, obliges Member States to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure that competent authorities act objectively when they initiate projects themselves. This contribution analyses the meaning of the NCOI-principle and compares its implementation in the Netherlands and Flanders. A striking difference is that the Netherlands relies solely on internal procedural separation, whereas Flanders may shift permitting authority to a higher level of government. These divergent approaches prompt broader reflection on how independence is safeguarded when governments apply for their own permits. In that context, the question also becomes relevant as to when a government can be regarded as granting a permit 'to itself'. The contribution concludes by examining whether the NCOI-principle could evolve into a general principle of good administration or be absorbed within an existing general principle of good administration, applicable beyond environmental law.
This paper analyses the evolving landscape of legal supervision of municipal activities in Europe, focusing on the transition from professional to political control within the Hungarian administrative system. Utilizing a multidisciplinary approach that integrates comparative legal analysis and an empirical case study, the research examines three primary European models: the Anglo-Saxon, Napoleonic, and German systems. While Western European trends generally favour professionalization and judicialized oversight, the study identifies a concerning shift toward politicized supervision in "new democracies" and states experiencing democratic backsliding. The Hungarian case study serves as a salient example of this transformation. Since the centralization reforms of 2011–2012, the Hungarian model has moved away from its decentralized roots toward a system where supervisory authorities—led by political appointees— exercise strengthened control over local governance. Analysis of judicial practice before the Kúria reveals significant administrative bias since 2018, characterized by a focus on politically sensitive policy areas and a disproportionate targeting of opposition-led municipalities. The findings suggest that in polarized political environments, the flexibility of regulatory frameworks can be misused, transforming legal supervision from a tool for ensuring legality into an instrument for partisan control.