Disinformation through social media is widely considered as a threat to democracy and rule of law. Convergence of national legislation could add weight to the leverage of EU- states both as a group and individually towards platforms that disseminate disinformation. Convergence of national regulation may emerge from in depth consideration of security, past experience with authoritarianism, external and internal threats to democracy and a sense of common interest. When authoritarian parties get involved in government, further regulation of anti-democratic disinformation will likely be obstructed, and the spreading of such disinformation likely will increase.
The relevance of scientific research is due to a number of problems that arise in the field of protecting children from the spread of harmful information on the Internet. An increase in the level of crimes against children of a sexual nature, a sharp jump in the level of suicides, the manifestation of various types of addiction, ranging from gambling and ending with drugs, is a consequence of such an influence. The purpose of this work is to study the current legislation of Kazakhstan in this area and to find gaps in its functioning, as well as to propose an effective mechanism for the legal regulation of protecting children from harmful information on the Internet, taking into account international legal experience. The basis of the methodological approach is the dialectical method, which was used to study the legal regulation in the sphere of the use of Internet resources by minors, the analysis method was used to study the legal acts in this area. The results of this study are a comparative analysis of the legal regulation of the protection of children from harmful content on the example of the legal experience of Australia, Britain, Germany in comparison with Kazakhstan. Also, the legislation on the protection of children from harmful information in Kazakhstan was analysed in detail and the main gaps in the existing acts were identified. The study outlines possible ways to develop national legislation through the adoption of new regulations, the purpose of which should be to increase control over the privacy of minors’ data, restrict and block content that explicitly contains scenes of a sexual nature or violence, restrict advertising content, restrict access to information depending on from age. Also, it is going about the creation of special departments to regulate and control the issue of harassment and bullying, namely the Special Commissioner for Cyberbullying. The results obtained in this study can be used to protect children and prevent illegal actions against minors online at the legislative and local levels
The Russian Federation has committed numerous grave violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law since it launched its full-scale aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The forcible transfers and deportations of Ukrainians – the focus of this article - however already began a few days earlier, on 18 February 2022, with the announcement of evacuations in the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, occupied before 2022. Since then, the process of forcible transfers/deportations gained momentum, and was enforced in all the territories occupied by Russia after 24 February 2022. Despite Russia referring to the displacements as evacuations, examining the grounds invoked for these evacuations and the way the process was and is carried out, arguably shows that the displacements fail to comply with the rules on evacuation under international humanitarian law and in fact amounts to forcible transfers and deportations. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the process of forcible transfers and deportations of Ukrainians, conducted by Russia, including the timeline, geography and the policy designed to enable the process. The categories of people forcibly transferred and deported, as well as the violations they experienced prior, during and following the displacement are highlighted in order to determine the specific needs of the different groups involved in the process, including in relation to their potential future repatriation. Examining the decisions issued by Russian and occupation authorities, as well as the details of the process of forcible transfers and deportations in the different regions of Ukraine occupied by Russia, will help determine a pattern and planned nature of the act. Analysing the consequences of the displacement for the people deported highlights the urgency of setting up a mechanism of their return. The article concludes that the crime of forcible transfer and deportation is an ongoing one, and while the documentation efforts have been successful, issues arise with accountability and restitution. The entire international community should be mobilised to condemn and pressure Russia into stopping these unlawful practices and ensure the return of deported Ukrainians.
Reports of the OSCE’s death are an exaggeration. Without a doubt, the organization is in trouble.2 In the past few years, all ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act have been violated. There is war in Europe instead of cooperation. Since decisions in the OSCE are taken by consensus, the polarized geopolitical environment is making it difficult to agree on anything – from the agenda of meetings to who should hold leadership positions in OSCE institutions. No unified budget has been adopted since 2021. But the OSCE is still alive, it is one of the few remaining European security organizations where Russia and the West can talk and seek to manage relations peacefully. For that reason, it could play a key role in rebuilding the European security order when the time comes.
This paper examines the use of open-source intelligence (OSINT) during armed conflict and in humanitarian-emergency settings by States and non-State actors. It highlights real-world harms that can arise from the misuse of OSINT in such contexts, in particular through the lens of the rights to privacy and data protection, thereby demonstrating gaps in current terminology, regulatory frameworks, and ethical practices governing the use of this technology. Regarding OSINT’s use by States, the paper highlights the limits of existing legal frameworks regulating digital privacy and data protection in conflict settings, drawing on domestic regulatory frameworks and parallels from human rights law to identify key conceptual problems and regulatory limitations. Where non-State actors use OSINT, this paper highlights – via two case-study users, Bellingcat and the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – the ‘doctrinal gap’ that arises from the patchwork of ethical standards and the relative absence of legal restraints. This gap poses a risk of harm to individuals and communities affected by OSINT activities that needs to be rectified, initially through the development of an evidence-based ‘theory of harm’.
We discuss the sanctions against Russia from three perspectives: legal, economic, and political. The sanctions fit into a trend towards recomprehensivation and the use of autonomous rather than UN sanctions. We highlight (1) new sanctions-senders and sanction innovation, indicating which of those are a context-specific development and which are potentially of a more lasting nature, (2) the determinants and economic dynamics of sanctions that are important for an intermediate evaluation of this case, and (3) the uncertainty of the ultimate political outcome of large-scale sanctions. The case suggests that autonomous sanctions are and will remain a central response to serious violations of international law and that they thus require further legal thought.
In February 1989, the Union of Socialist Republics’ (‘USSR’) left Afghanistan following a ten-year invasion. Although an Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation and Justice was drafted, in the quest for peace, justice for victims of the atrocities was never prioritised by authorities and the international community. Thirty-three years later, on 24 February 2022, President Putin of the Russian Federation announced the commencement of a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Even as the invasion continues, questions remain as to how Ukraine will approach and implement transitional justice. Although there are clear differences between the invasions, if history is to be instructive, there is much to be learnt from the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, the response to it, and the Soviet legacy apparent in the Russian invasion of Ukraine which are of relevance to the transitional justice process in Ukraine and the international rule of law. Drawing on these historical perspectives, this paper aims to generate further discourse on peace, justice and accountability for victims, ensuring past mistakes are not repeated.
This study looks into Ukraine's minority politics after the Revolution of Dignity of 2014. It analyses the inclusivity of minority politics against three key parameters institutional framework, dialogue mechanisms, and non-discriminatory policies. The research is conducted through an in-depth comparison analysis of minority politics of two post-revolutionary presidents - Petro Poroshenko (full term) and Volodymyr Zelenskyi (first two years). The conclusion is made that the political elites failed to drive an inclusive course towards ethno-linguistic minorities. The inclusivity along the three criteria has been provided impetus either on ad-hoc basis or not at all. On the level of policies, a regression can be observed. The underlying cause for the state not succeeding in achieving an inclusive minority course is that the two administrations had predominantly divergent motives for addressing this topic. As a result, the implementation of some inclusivity-oriented measures suffered and the minority-related discourse became highly politicized.
While the Central Asian states try to balance their foreign policy options and to develop ‘multi-vector’ strategies, the region is tilting eastwards, especially towards China. What does this imply for two other external powers in the region: Russia and the European Union? This article reflects on the future prospects for the EU to play a role of significance in Central Asia and for Russia to manage its position as the region’s former overlord. The uninterrupted continuity of authoritarianism in Central Asia suggests that the EU has exerted only a very limited influence in the region, while the interests of Russia and the local regimes seem to run in parallel. Yet we see both external powers adapting their strategies in part to the changed (geo)political situation in the region. In this article we interpret these changes and draw tentative conclusions about what they may mean for the future of the Central Asian countries, especially where the perceived contradiction between security and human rights is concerned.
Central Asia is a region where the OsCE has been engaged for more than two decades, including with missions and field presences in all five participating states. This engagement reflects the hope that these countries will gradually align themselves with the values, principles and norms of the organization. The region, however, presents the following challenges. First, Central Asian states strictly adhere to state sovereignty and want to constrain the OsCE's involvement in domestic affairs. Second, these states prioritize the organization's economic and ecological dimension, and want to reduce the importance of its human rights dimension. Finally, the activity programmes of the remaining OsCE field presences in the region are subject to the approval of host governments.
This essay surveys the recent history of Central Asian mobilization to foreign conflicts and insurgencies and offers a discussion potential for a new wave of migration that the fall of the Afghan government and a victorious Taliban insurgency could present for the region. It argues that new developments have increased the importance of understanding the causes of conflict migration from Central Asia to both ensure successful re-integration of returnees and prevent a new wave of conflict migration. This contribution presents evidence that a one-dimensional focus on ideological or theological motivations for past waves of conflict migration is a poor explanatory mechanism for the broader conflict. A complex, localized, and multi-factor approach provides a much better explanatory model for mobilization to both local violence and foreign conflict.
Prescriptive analyses of small arms and light weapons (SALW) transfer regimes have been advanced, but comparative assessment of the selling and importing of this weaponry is undeveloped. That includes examples of major arms sellers transferring this weaponry into locations embroiled in armed conflict. After surveying existing SALW restraints and their shortcomings, the extent to which due diligence risk considerations shape relevant arms selling conduct is considered. Existing explanatory frameworks discussed are found incomplete. Accordingly a model is outlined addressing impediments to the due diligence risk assessments required to meet international humanitarian and human rights legal obligations. For SALW sellers, they include executive dominance of sale purchase decisions; strategic imperatives; economic and commercial incentives; and capacity to conduct independent auditing of arms sales conduct. Within conflict afflicted recipient locations, they include defective public accountability; corruption; impunity; and inability to effect peaceful dispute settlement. Utilising these determinants, dyads embracing major SALW sellers transferring this weaponry into locations of persisting armed conflict are considered.
