The only specifically minority-related body of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) which was established in July 1992 after the proposal by the Netherlands.3 Its establishment was a response by the OSCE states to their inability to prevent the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. It fitted into the increased emphasis which the OSCE states in general were placing on domestic and international conflict prevention and crisis management and more specifically on contentious minority issues. Thus, the High Commissioner is defined as an instrument of international conflict prevention with regard to those tensions involving national minority issues which, in his/her judgement, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area which could affect peace, stability or relations between OSCE states. The mandate of the OSCE High Commissioner reflects the recognition of the political nature of minority issues. The High Commissioner's tasks are framed in political terms and his/her tools are essentially tailored to deal with political issues, although of necessity legal factors are included as well. Eventually, the HCNM will formulate non-binding recommendations for the state concerned and will ensure the necessary follow-up, including by means of subsequent visits.4 The first and so far the only High Commissioner has been Max van der Stoel, a former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands who was appointed in December 1992 and started work on 1 January 1993. As HCNM, Van der Stoel

As an international body working for conflict prevention and crisis management the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in, Europe (OSCE) has frequently been seen as a ‘soft’ option in European peacemaking and peacekeeping, relying almost exclusively on non‐coercive means. Recent history, however, has raised the question whether the OSCE would be more effective employing ‘harder’ options such as the use of military forces. Rob Zaagman is here arguing on behalf of the independent working group of the Netherlands Helsinki Committee, that OSCE peacekeeping is a preferable alternative to bilateral peacekeeping, and it should, in order to fulfil its tasks in the best possible way, have access to military peace keeping forces. The report discusses the organisation, of a regular OSCE peacekeeping operation (PKO) while concluding with a discussion on the rule of consensus, recommending the use of majority vote to decide hard options.

AbstractThis article attempts to understand concurrent efforts by inter-governmental agencies in the areas of minority protection and ethnic conflict prevention. The analysis specifially aims (1) to assist in differentiating between the numerous inter-governmental organs, bodies, and mechanisms, including the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, with a role in addressing minority issues, and (2) to begin the process of identifying interrelationships, overlaps, and gaps in existing capacities. In addition to the High Commissioner, the minority-related activities of the UN, the Council of Europe, and the Council of Baltic Sea States are all reviewed. The essential view is that 'the effectiveness of international response to minority questions lies not in the efficacy of single institutions but in synergetic cooperaton among them'.

Yuri Reshetov. the head of the Soviet delegation, dubbed it the new European constitution. His American counterpart, Max Kampelman, called it a programme for democratic action. Both referred to the Document of Copenhagen, which had been adopted on 28 June 1990 by the 35 delegations to the second Meeting oj the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (CHD). In this way, they wanted to express their understanding that the Document constituted in its field the single most important step forward in the CSCE process since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.