This article introduces the concept of Entangled Twins (ETs) as an interdisciplinary framework emerging from a sustained dialogue between Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) research and phenomenological philosophy. Building on the Digital Twin (DT) paradigm while critically reworking its representational logic, ETs are conceived as relational configurations in which human users and AI-driven systems become dynamically entangled, with significant implications for agency, responsibility, and human-centered design. The theoretical framework draws on phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity and embodiment (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre) together with design-oriented concerns in HCI.Within this perspective, human–machine interaction is conceptualized in terms of aWe-subject: a plural and co-constituted configuration of agency. Through this interdisciplinary approach, a prototypical audio-augmented experience is examined as a phenomenologically informed case, elucidating the conditions under which human–machine entanglement can emerge. On this basis, the paper argues that ETs raise distinctive questions concerning responsibility and agency, articulating an ethics of entanglement capable of informing the human-centered aspirations of Industry 5.0.
This article offers a selective, concise comparison of the ancient Greeks’ ideas about happiness with contemporary metrics and AI-mediated wellbeing apps. It argues that these schools’ views of happiness provide criteria for assessing the trajectory of today’s approaches of development to the subject of happiness. Using a critical–analytical approach, it presents and compares those schools with major happiness metrics (e.g.,World Happiness Report, Better Life Index, Happy Planet Index, Gallup Global Emotions) and popular wellbeing applications (Headspace, Calm, Insight Timer, Happify). The findings clarify where ancient insights align or clash with current practices and offer implications for wellbeing technologies. The paper also evaluates whether AI can support eudaimonia without eroding autonomy or commodifying the inner life. The article raises awareness that we are entering a new phase of understanding happiness, in which technology influences our choices and becomes not only a tool, but also a co-creator of our everyday experiences.
This article examines artificial intelligence and shows how it is embedded in a history of technology. It develops a philosophical classification of tools as technologies based on the degree and nature of mediation that technology provides between humans and the world. Drawing on phenomenological and post-phenomenological conceptions—in particular the work of Ihde, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—it identifies five distinct stages in the historical development of technology, ranging from simple passive extensions of the body to advanced artificial intelligence systems. Each stage is defined by a qualitatively different mode of technological mediation between humans and the world, each transforming human perception and intentionality in increasingly complex ways. The most recent contemporary fifth stage in the evolution of technology, is characterized by the use of artificial neural networks, and the article demonstrates that a significant break from lower artificial intelligence systems separates this technology. Unlike simpler machines, these systems exhibit partial autonomy, are not epistemically transparent, and their outputs are unpredictable, forcing us to rethink their instrumental nature and the nature of instrumentality itself.
Recent advances in large language models (LLMs), together with renewed speculation about artificial consciousness, have intensified debates concerning meaning and semantic intentionality in artificial systems. This paper advances a restricted and conditional thesis: even if LLMs were to possess some form of consciousness, this would not suffice to establish intrinsic semantic intentionality. To clarify this claim, I introduce a hieroglyph-copying thought experiment showing that consciousness, even when accompanied by goal-directed or procedural intentionality, does not guarantee normatively assessable semantic content. Drawing on this result, I argue that contemporary LLM architectures—despite their ability to generate contextually appropriate linguistic outputs—operate through probabilistic optimization processes that do not by themselves ground epistemic commitment or truth-directed representation. The argument does not deny the sophistication of LLM representations nor attempt to resolve competing theories of meaning. Rather, it isolates and defends an insufficiency thesis: consciousness alone does not ground intrinsic semantics. The apparent meaningfulness of LLM outputs is therefore best understood as dependent on human interpretive projection rather than as an internally grounded semantic achievement.
This article introduces the concept of Entangled Twins (ETs) as an interdisciplinary framework emerging from a sustained dialogue between Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) research and phenomenological philosophy. Building on the Digital Twin (DT) paradigm while critically reworking its representational logic, ETs are conceived as relational configurations in which human users and AI-driven systems become dynamically entangled, with significant implications for agency, responsibility, and human-centered design. The theoretical framework draws on phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity and embodiment (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre) together with design-oriented concerns in HCI.Within this perspective, human–machine interaction is conceptualized in terms of aWe-subject: a plural and co-constituted configuration of agency. Through this interdisciplinary approach, a prototypical audio-augmented experience is examined as a phenomenologically informed case, elucidating the conditions under which human–machine entanglement can emerge. On this basis, the paper argues that ETs raise distinctive questions concerning responsibility and agency, articulating an ethics of entanglement capable of informing the human-centered aspirations of Industry 5.0.
This article examines whether quasi-intentional organisation characterised by anticipation, adaptation and retention can arise in distributed systems composed of simple agents without global goal representation. The analysis draws on observations of Camponotus barbaricus ants that construct and stabilise pine-needle barriers in the absence of central control. An agent-based model implemented in NetLogo formalises selected construction dynamics through local rules governing exploration, material deposition and reinforcement of stable configurations. Three operational indicators are introduced to examine system-level organisation: pre-disturbance increases in construction activity, directional changes in structural stability across iterations and reconstruction of previously stabilised patterns after partial removal. The model functions as a constrained artificial-life environment for analysing purposive-looking organisation emerging from distributed interaction and environmental traces. The concept of quasi intentionality is situated within biosemiotic accounts of environmental semiosis and a relational ontology of agency, and is discussed in relation to current approaches to symbiotic and beneficial artificial systems.
In this paper, the problem of scene understanding in the context of autonomous robotics is considered. The implemented solutions, based on various types of artificial intelligence systems, are described and the perspectives of their development are discussed. In particular, the problem of cognition that reflects the structure and nature of the environment in which the artificial autonomous agent operates, is studied. The specifics of scene models and algorithms for their construction and verification of their adequacy are discussed. The presentation of the existing partial solutions, including the results obtained by the authors, is the starting point of the analysis. Possibilities of new approaches are analysed, especially those that are biologically inspired. The potential fundamental limitations are studied. These problems are discussed in the context of epistemology and in the frame of cybernetics. The analysis of the relationship between philosophy and artificial intelligence in the aspect of cognitive vision systems of autonomous robots is the aim of this paper.
This article attempts to reconstruct and analyze some selected philosophical views of the Polish physicist Małgorzata Głódź, especially within the context of her links with the interdisciplinary milieu in Kraków (known as the “Kraków School of Philosophy in Science”). It emphasizes the significant role that Głódź played in the historical development of this intellectual tradition. The main portion of this article highlights the connections between Głódź’s philosophy and the philosophical ideas propagated by Michał Heller, the School’s main founder, and his students and other collaborators. The article also indicates elements of her philosophical achievements that deserve attention from the perspective of today’s philosophical challenges.
Linsbichler is a gifted economist and philosopher. He delves mightily and thoroughly into the difficult thickets of basic praxeology, the methodology of the Austrian school of economics. Not content with merely probing the meaning and importance of the synthetic a priori, he pushes further into the very justification of this foundational element of Austrianism. I learned a lot from reading this splendid essay, most of with which I enthusiastically agree. However, there are a few divergences between the two of us, and the present paper is devoted to exploring them. My procedure in this response is one of mentioning numerous quotations from the author, interspersed with my own comments and reactions. That is because I greatly appreciate this gifted economist’s contribution to Austrian methodology. What are the specifics? One error is that he does accurately distinguish between analytic, empirical, and synthetic a priori. Another is his misunderstanding of “human action”. My debating partner opines that Mises (1998) merely suggests that human being act. In actual point of fact in the of this latter author, that is the very title of his most famous book, and contains the very core of praxeological economics. Then Linsbichler fails to accurately distinguish between mere behavior and human action. Further there is a dispute over the source of ideas. My learned colleague maintains it is empirical. I demur. He is of the opinion that empirical criticisms can be relevant to praxeological findings. I attempt to correct him on this matter. He takes the position can something can be “mildly aprioristic”. I demonstrate that this concept is an all or none phenomenon; no gradations.
Eugene Wigner’s 1960 article on the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” used the word “miracle” of the fit between abstract mathematics and physical reality. William Lane Craig has developed a theistic argument from Wigner’s hints, claiming that the best explanation of the “miraculous” fit is divine creation. It is argued that this argument does not succeed. An Aristotelian realist philosophy of mathematics renders the applicability of mathematics to physical reality unmysterious by showing that mathematics, like any other science, is a study of certain aspects of reality, hence there is no miracle of fit. However, that does not preclude other arguments for the existence of God involving mathematics, for example design arguments from the elegance of the universe’s structure, fine-tuning arguments or ones from the nature of mathematical understanding.
The epistemology of modeling in science is a topic that has received no shortage of attention from both philosophers and scientists. Models, with their ubiquitous unrealistic and false assumptions, raise a myriad of interesting epistemic questions. Many have picked up a concern expressed by biologist Richard Levins, which is that, for many models, it is unclear if any particular result is a product of the realistic assumptions, or if the result, is in some critical way, dependent on an unrealistic assumption. His suggestion of a solution to this problem, the use of robustness analysis, has similarly been picked up by many as a plausible solution to this concern. Since Levins’ time, taxonomies of modeling assumptions and types of robustness analyses have been developed. One common connection made is that of tractability assumption, or assumptions introduced for the purpose of mathematical tractability, and derivational robustness analysis, or a robustness analysis that tests the influence of assumptions on the derivation of some result. Derivational robustness analysis is often singled out as being particularly well-suited for resolving the epistemic concerns introduced by tractability assumptions. In this paper, I argue that, despite how it is commonly approached in the literature, tractability assumptions do not present a consistent set of epistemic concerns. Given this, derivational robustness analysis cannot be used to resolve the epistemic concerns raised by all tractability assumptions. In use this to motivate some concerns about how well-suited the taxonomy that includes tractability assumptions is to discussions about the epistemic concerns of unrealistic modeling assumptions.
"The Singularity Is Nearer" by Ray Kurzweil is a bold manifesto of technological optimism, envisioning a future where humanity transcends its limits. While thought-provoking, the book is criticized for being overly idealistic, neglecting the ethical, social, and existential dilemmas of such profound changes. It emphasizes possibilities without fully addressing the challenges, highlighting that technology alone cannot solve humanity's most pressing issues.
Homeostasis, a fundamental biological mechanism, enables living organisms to maintain internal balance despite changing environmental conditions. Inspired by these adaptive processes, research into artificial intelligence (AI) seeks to develop systems capable of dynamic adaptation, introspection, and empathetic interactions with users. This article explores the potential of implementing homeostatic mechanisms in AI as a foundation for emotional intelligence and self-regulation. Key questions include the distinction between simulation and actual experience, the role of machine introspection, and the emergence of qualitative states akin to phenomenal experiences. Drawing on Antonio Damasio’s theory and classical concepts from cybernetics, the article investigates how homeostatic principles might inspire the development of AI, paving the way for more flexible and context-aware technologies.
Artificial intelligence (AI) offers transformative advancements across sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, and environmental sustainability. However, a pressing ethical challenge remains: aligning AI systems with human values in a manner that is stable, coherent, and universally applicable. As AI increasingly mediates human perception, shapes social interactions, and influences decision-making, it raises profound ethical concerns about its impact on human dignity and social well-being. The prevailing consensus-based approach, advocated by figures such as Google DeepMind’s Iason Gabriel, suggests that AI ethics should reflect majority societal or political viewpoints. While this model offers flexibility, it also risks moral relativism and ethical instability as social norms fluctuate. This paper argues that consensus-based ethics are inadequate for safeguarding fundamental values—especially human dignity—which should not be subject to shifting public opinion. Instead, it advocates for a moral framework that transcends cultural and political trends, providing a stable foundation for AI ethics. Through case studies like social media recommendation algorithms that exploit users’ vulnerabilities, particularly those of children and teenagers, the paper highlights the risks of AI systems driven by profit-oriented metrics without ethical oversight. Drawing on insights from moral philosophy and theology, particularly the works of Joseph Ratzinger, it contends that aligning AI with moral reasoning is essential to uphold human dignity, prevent texploitation, and promote the common good.
The purpose of this article is to present Andrzej Lewicki’s account of cognition as orientation in the environment, comparing it with James J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. To do so, we conduct a comparative analysis of the former’s theory of indicators and the latter’s theory of affordance. The theoretical frame for our study is cognitive ecology, a research tradition characteristic of various studies of cognition, including contemporary ones. This allows us to show that, despite differences in the backgrounds and methodologies of these researchers, Lewicki can be considered one of the pioneers of contemporary ecological trends in cognitive science, although his influence has not been as widespread as that of Gibson. Our analysis proceeds in several steps. We begin with an overview of the biographies, backgrounds, and interests of the two researchers, as well as a brief introduction to cognitive ecology and related terms. Next, we discuss action/value indicators theory and affordances theory. We then compare Lewicki’s and Gibson’s approaches in more detail in terms of their use of similar research heuristics. The article ends with conclusions that go beyond historical issues.
Turing proved the unsolvability of the decision problem for first-order logic (Entscheidungsproblem) in his famous paper On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. From this proof it follows that attempts to specify a solution for the Entscheidungsproblem through pattern detection in automated theorem proving (ATP) must fail. Turing’s proof, however, merely predicts the non-existence of such solutions; it does not construct concrete examples that explain why specific attempts to solve the decision problem by pattern detection fail. ATP-search often runs in infinite loops in the case of unprovable, i.e. not refutable, formulas and one can ask why finite patterns of repeated inference steps cannot serve as criteria for unprovability. We answer this question by constructing pairs of formulas (ϕ,ϕ′) such that ϕ is provable (refutable) and ϕ′ is unprovable (satisfiable in an infinite domain) but all but the last proof step of the ATP-search for ϕ is a proper part of the endless ATP-search for ϕ′. We generate such pairs of formulas by mimicking computable sequences for a certain kind of universal Turing machine, namely, splitting Turing machines (STMs), via sequences of inference steps in ATP. In contrast to Turing’s and the textbooks’ method to formalize Turing machines, our method does not rely on further axioms and allows us to transfer the straightforward insight that the halting problem cannot be solved through pattern detection to the case of the Entscheidungsproblem. Our method is a constructive alternative to general undecidability proofs that explains why a scientific problem, namely the Entscheidungsproblem, is unsolvable in a specific way. This explanation provides a better understanding of the failure of pattern detection, which is of interest to: (i) the programmer, who is concerned with prospects and limits of pattern detection, (ii) the logician, who is interested in identifying logical properties by properties of an ideal notation, and (iii) the philosopher, who is interested in proof methods.
The article attempts to reconstruct and analyze selected philosophical views of Leszek Sokołowski—a Krakow physicist and cosmologist who published many works dealing with issues on the border of science and philosophy (including metaphysics). An important aim of the article is also to place Sokołowski’s views in the context of the concept of “philosophy in science” (by M. Heller) and the phenomenon of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science. In this paper, I suggest that Sokołowski’s views fit into the philosophy initiated by Michał Heller, and Sokołowski himself can be considered a member of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science.
Nozick (1977) formulated a challenge to Austrians related to the application of the Law of diminishing marginal utility in the context of notion of indifference. To be able to claim that the value or attributed utility of the subsequent units of goods decreases, we must compare comparables, even if deliberate choice means that we have chosen a particular as being value-different. This causes a logical paradox. One cannot be indifferent and demonstrate a particular preference at the same time. It is mutually exclusive. The paper discusses a critique of Wysocki (2021), who proposes a solution to the paradox in terms of a counterfactual perception of the Law. The critique points to the essence of why neo-Misesians cannot resolve the paradox, which lies in the interpretation of the origin of valuation within the particular value scale. The paper offers an alternative solution based on Hayek's concept of mental order-ness with the implication of the general applicability of the Law to any order in reality.
Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a conventionalist defense of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories.
It all started in 2021 when we sparked a rather specific debate within Austrian economics in Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) – traditionally abbreviated as ZFN. The story unfolded as follows. First, Wysocki submitted a paper on the concept of indifference, as it is normally understood in the Austrian school of economics. To his astonishment and great relief, this then rising journal (now the one with well-established reputation, its Scopus ranking being as high as Q2 under the rubric of philosophy) accepted the submission in question and published it promptly in ZFN 71 as (Wysocki, 2021). It was an honour and a privilege, especially given the fact that Austrian economics – with all due respect to its scientific achievements – is nowadays not a mainstream economic current, to say the least. Hence, being published in ZFN only added to the strength of Wysocki’s belief that the journal is clearly unbiased towards any sort of philosophy of science. The very fact that Wysocki published a paper on indifference in Austrian economics and the fact that he spread the news about ZFN being also open to publishing maverick (after all, as already observed, Austrian economics is not a branch of mainstream economics) papers related to philosophy of science prompted Walter Block (a prominent Austrian economist) to submit to ZFN his rejoinder to Wysocki’s original paper on indifference, with the said response being ultimately published in ZFN 72 as (Block, 2022).
