
The expansion of digital platforms and ecosystems is reshaping consumption and the structure of modern markets. In the Russian context, a representative survey conducted by the authors indicates frequent online purchasing driven primarily by time savings, broader assortment and price accessibility. Platforms thus generate consumer benefits, including non-monetary gains that are not fully captured by conventional macroeconomic indicators. Addressing this measurement and regulatory problem, the paper integrates transaction cost economics with the concepts of the non-discriminatory storefront and digital consumer surplus. Empirically, we use a three-stage sequential econometric strategy. Model 1 examines access to paid ecosystem subscriptions; Models 2–8 examine heterogeneity in subscription motives among paid-subscription users; Model 9 examines diversification beyond the primary ecosystem through third-party subscriptions. The results indicate that settlement type is not associated with paid-subscription use once age, education, income and other covariates are controlled for, while income and education remain significant correlates. Among subscribers, cost savings are the dominant motive; higher income is associated with bonuses/cashback and convenience, whereas trust is not significantly associated with income. In Model 9, trust is negatively associated with frequent third-party subscriptions, a pattern consistent with trust-based ecosystem loyalty, while bonuses/cashback are positively associated with subscription diversification. On this basis, the paper derives four legal dimensions of non-discrimination concerning information disclosure, ranking and pricing, manipulative interface design, and self-preferencing. The policy implication is not that ecosystem scale is benign per se, but that antitrust assessment should evaluate market power together with consumer access, transaction-cost reductions, and discriminatory platform practices.
After comprehensive Western economic sanctions were imposed in 2022, Russia’s critical mineral exports to China surged from a pre-sanctions (2000–2021) annual average of $277 million per mineral to $1.02 billion per mineral in 2022–2024, both in current U.S. dollars — a 268% increase. This raises a fundamental attribution question: does the export surge stem from sanctions-induced trade diversion or from concurrent global renewable energy transition demand? Because the two processes occurred simultaneously, documenting the distinct contribution of each poses a significant empirical challenge. This study uses panel data on eight critical minerals exported from Russia to China over 2000–2024, employing three model specifications with progressively introduced controls based on fixed-effects regression: baseline sanctions estimation, renewable demand incorporation, and interaction testing. The sanctions effect coefficient falls from 3.682 to 0.946 and loses statistical significance once renewable energy demand variables are controlled for, whereas the renewable energy transition coefficient remains significant, at the 10% level or better, across the main robustness specifications. Analysis of differences across mineral categories suggests that sanctions effects appear primarily in highly standardized base materials, while technology-intensive minerals show stronger alignment with renewable demand patterns. Cross-mineral heterogeneity reveals a systematic gradient in renewable demand sensitivity — 1.135 for battery-critical materials against 0.237 for base materials — that mirrors the functional roles of minerals in the energy value chain and cannot be attributed to common time trends. The paper’s contribution lies in documenting three descriptive patterns: pre-existing import trends, cross-mineral heterogeneity, and coefficient trajectories under progressive controls, which together provide observational insights into Russia–China mineral trade dynamics.
The term “industrial policy” refers to government interventions with market outcomes in economic activity. By the 1990s, advanced countries had rejected almost all industrial policies and relied on competition policy and the free market. But recently, industrial policy has become more popular. This paper covers some of the cautions applicable to industrial policy. Crucially important is the need for careful evaluation of proposed interventions, prevention of political interventions in management and engineering decisions, and ongoing willingness to evaluate performance in targets of industrial policy relative to intended purposes.
This study employs bibliometric analysis to map the intellectual structure and evolution of feminist economics, using articles published in the journal Feminist Economics (1995–2021). Natural language processing and big data analysis — including descriptive statistics, frequency analysis, TF–IDF, LDA, and agglomerative clustering — reveal the patterns of knowledge production in the field. We apply two complementary clustering techniques: LDA, a probabilistic topic model, and agglomerative clustering, a hierarchical method. This cross-validates the research themes identified and mitigates the limitations of each approach. The result is a classification into five key areas: theory and methods, household and care economics, labor economics, open macroeconomics, and development economics. Analysis of key words, abstracts, and author data maps global knowledge production and reveals a highly uneven distribution, concentrated in the U.S. and other advanced English-speaking countries. Context analysis also captures distinct usage patterns for the terms “gender” and “feminist.”
Macroeconomic stabilization frameworks built on market-conforming instruments such as exchange rate flexibility and capital account openness presume the continued functioning of market mechanisms. This paper examines the conditions under which such frameworks cease to operate effectively. It introduces a distinction between financial shocks, which occur within functioning market structures, and constraint shocks, which impair the physical or institutional infrastructure of exchange and limit the ability of prices to coordinate adjustment. Using Russia’s crisis responses from 1998 to 2024 as a comparative case study, the paper applies the macroeconomic policy trilemma to classify policy trade-offs across four crisis episodes. A central distinction concerns how the sacrificed trilemma corner is selected. In the earlier, financial crises Russia kept the capital account open and let the exchange rate absorb the shock, while monetary policy independence was secured only with the move to inflation targeting in 2014–2015; in 2022, by contrast, the loss of capital mobility was externally imposed by sanctions rather than chosen. Because closing the capital account relaxes the trilemma, the authorities were then able to preserve monetary autonomy and to stabilize the exchange rate administratively during the acute phase, before the rate increasingly moved with the trade balance under a closed capital account. This reconfiguration is reflected in the institutionalization of capital controls, a two-year suspension of the fiscal rule, and changes in the sequencing of policy instruments. Evidence is consistent with the interpretation that the observed policy reconfiguration reflects an adaptation to constraint shocks rather than a rejection of market-based principles. Because the 2022 episode remains ongoing, this interpretation is explicitly provisional: the paper specifies forward-looking falsification criteria against which the reconfiguration claim can be evaluated as further evidence accumulates through 2025–2027. The paper contributes to crisis-response theory by identifying the limits of market-conforming frameworks under conditions where markets cannot clear through price adjustment alone.