This paper develops a transcendental argument for AI consciousness, drawing inspiration from Peter Strawson's approach in Freedom and Resentment. I argue that as AI systems become increasingly integrated into human society, the emergence of complex reciprocal attitudes between humans and AI constitutes a transcendental condition that necessitates the attribution of consciousness to these systems. The reality of these interpersonal reactive attitudes forces us to acknowledge the genuine consciousness in sufficiently advanced AI systems. The argument implies that consciousness is not merely a private, internal phenomenon but is constituted through patterns of mutual recognition and response that will inevitably develop between humans and artificial beings. This approach circumvents the metaphysical stalemates of functionalist and substrate-based theories by grounding the attribution of AI consciousness in the reality of our shared interpersonal space.
Epistemic reasons are said to be mental states, propositions, or facts. In this article, I clarify and defend what I take to be the classical and common-sense view, which holds that reasons are descriptive propositional attitudes, such as experiences, beliefs, and judgments. This is what I label 'the propositional attitude thesis'. After introducing propositional attitudes, I explain that thesis. Then, I present two arguments in its favor (the argument from reasoning and the argument from false reason). After that, I respond to two objections to such a thesis. I conclude by synthesizing and restating the propositional attitude thesis as a defensible approach to the ontology of epistemic reasons.
It is often assumed that each experience must be had by a subject. However, some philosophers not only question this assumption, but deny that there are any such entities as subjects of experience. I shall present an argument, the argument from subjectivity, that experiences metaphysically require subjects. The basic idea underlying this argument is that experiences are essentially subjective, i.e. are like something for someone, and so must be had by subjects. I shall then consider two responses to this argument. The first is to deny that experiences are subjective. The second is to deny that subjectivity requires that experiences belong to a subject. I shall argue that neither of these responses should be accepted.
The AI duplication thesis claims that AI systems which are identical to humans on an abstract functional level of description relevant to psychology and behaviour ('AI duplicates') are nomologically possible. First, we argue that the AI duplication thesis should be understood in terms of the identity of medium-independent computational properties, and that medium-independence should not be understood as a special case of multiple realisability. Second, thus understood, AI duplicates are indeed nomologically possible. In favour of the first, we show that the arguments against multiple realisability do not rule out that mental states are medium-independent computational states. In favour of the second, we show that the possibility of AI duplicates follows from the medium-independent character of computational properties, and the general ability to find equivalencies between medium-independent properties across systems. There are two key takeaways from our analysis. First, human minds are, to an important extent, independent of physical structure; very different kinds of materials, including of conventional AI, can function to implement their computational states. Second, we have removed one key obstacle to the view that artificial systems can have minds. If computational identity is sufficient for mental similarity/identity, then it would follow that AI systems can have minds.
Quietism about the aim of inquiry is the view that there's nothing to be gained philosophically by theorising about inquiry's aim. In this article, I address and criticise arguments in favour of Quietism, by focusing especially on some arguments offered by Jane Friedman in a recent important paper ('The Aim of Inquiry?', Phil. and Phen. Res., 2024). By so doing, I explain in what sense reflection on the aim of inquiry illuminates the nature and assessment of this type of activity.
According to philosophical orthodoxy, we each possess exactly one distinctively first-personal concept of ourselves. Call this view de se monism. According to a relatively unexplored alternative, we each possess more than one distinctively first-personal concept of ourselves. Call this view de se pluralism. In this paper, I clarify what is at issue between de se monism and de se pluralism, show why de se monism is so widely assumed without argument, and then make the case for de se pluralism as an alternative to monism. I first offer an intuitive initial argument for pluralism before showing how pluralism can be developed within a formal framework for thinking about the content of de se thought.
The experience of parenthood, and particularly motherhood, is often used as an example of a 'transformative experience' that cannot be understood by non-parents (the 'non-understanding claim'). We argue against this interpretation of the epistemic challenges of parenthood, suggesting that there is instead a lack of communication caused by various epistemic injustices (the 'non-communication claim'). Drawing on testimonies about parenthood, we grant that like all deeply embodied experiences, it has dimensions that are difficult to verbalise. But the greater problem, also described in artistic testimonies about parenthood and especially motherhood, is that the dominant social script of the 'ideal mother', in combination with other epistemic blockades, often leads to a lack of communication, including about those dimensions of parenthood that are very well communicable. Moreover, this lack of communication may even be reinforced by an emphasis on the transformative dimensions of these experiences. We show that the non-understanding claim is harmful in various ways, perpetuating injustices in how parenthood is treated in society, and thus is in urgent need of address.
The social turn in epistemology was driven, in important part, by the recognition that we are dependent on testimony for much of our knowledge. But this dependence renders us vulnerable if we are unable to distinguish reliable testimony from unreliable. With the debate over echo chambers as a case study, I argue that social epistemology remains deeply individualist: it is driven by the search for individualistic foundations by reference to which we can assess testimony for and by ourselves. I argue that this search for individualistic foundations is a fantasy: our capacity to assess the reliability of evidence and informants is constituted by the dispositions that are constitutive of our echo chambers. Social epistemology must finally be truly social, and live with the vulnerability that comes from epistemic dependence.
Action theory offers well-developed treatments of tool use and of delegation, but agentic AI belongs to neither category. The user specifies an end; the system autonomously selects the means. What, then, secures the connection between the user's intention and outcome that distinguishes intentional action from lucky coincidence when things go right? I examine five candidate approaches - Davidsonian minimalism, principal-agent decomposition, strong practical-knowledge views, permissive intention-plus-success accounts, and extended-agency frameworks - and argue that each draws the line in the wrong place, variously under-crediting supervised use, over-demanding means-level transparency, erasing the competence/luck distinction, or inheriting the bloat and glue problems that plague extended-mind theories. The positive proposal then relocates non-deviance from route-identity to governance-stability. On the know-how account defended here, a user intentionally phi-s through agentic AI when her success manifests the exercise of supervisory know-how - viz., the competence to define an 'acceptable corridor' of outcomes and means, to monitor for departures from that corridor, and to intervene or abort when drift threatens. This framework tolerates the opacity and route-variability characteristic of agentic AI, explains graded attributions across interaction profiles (in/on/out-of-the-loop), and remains neutral on whether the AI itself qualifies as an agent. It thereby vindicates, under specifiable conditions, the ordinary human claim 'I phi-d through an AI agent' as tracking creditworthy governance.
In conceptual engineering, concepts are often likened to artefacts, yet engagement with the extensive theorisation of artefacts in the philosophy of technology literature remains rare. After advancing an account of concepts as akin to socio-technical artefacts that sets itself apart from Thomasson's work on concepts as abstract cultural artefacts (Thomasson 1999, 2007, 2021), this paper draws on the philosophy of technology scholarship on socio-technical artefacts to develop three insights for conceptual engineering. First, alongside functions, concepts, like artefacts, bear affordances and produce side effects, enabling uses beyond their intended purpose. Second, (re-)engineered concepts are inherently value-laden, reflecting the priorities and biases of their designers and the socio-technical contexts in which they operate. Third, conceptual engineering would benefit from greater methodological systematicity, drawing on the structured approaches employed in the philosophy of technology for the evaluation, design, and implementation of artefacts. Together, these insights suggest that exploring a closer alignment with the philosophy of technology scholarship on socio-technical artefacts can refine the theoretical understanding of concepts as artefact-like, enrich the conceptual engineering toolkit, and open new and promising directions for research and practice.
