From all the territories with Romanian population, the Republic of Moldova is the only one in modern times that has known the direct experience of colonialism. After the fall of the USSR, but also for a long time before that, Moldova struggled to work through the colonial inheritance of Soviet times. An excellent opportunity to study this struggle is offered by literary memoirs, where while cultural prestige and social responsibility balance each other in the task to write up the collective pasts and to conduct a meaningful and aesthetically relevant self-analysis. Memoir-writing as an expression of the decolonization is what concerns us, and we choose two recent publications, Nicolae Negru's A Hostile Offspring (2024) and Constantin Cheianu's Mother Made Me an Existentialist (2025), which explore the abuses of the colonizer and the symmetric mistakes of the colonized, or the way in which the violence of the state infiltrates itself unwittingly inside the relationship between mother and son. We examine differing models of constructing the self in relation to the past and different types of autobiographical writing. In these memoirs, we see the decolonization of power as an ongoing creative, hermeneutical and memorial praxis that seeks to overcome already existing mental frames and behaviors and to deconstruct their colonial origin and design.
Since time immemorial, the thinkers' community has believed in the existence of a consistent relationship between beauty and truth, thus indicating a fascination among scientists for beauty. This preoccupation with the aesthetics of knowledge among scientists may have its origins in the Platonic tradition, which perceived the symmetry and elegance of perfect geometric bodies as indicative of their status as the fundamental structures of the universe. The investigations from this article will proceed in two directions. Firstly, the criteria by which a scientific theory or explanation is considered beautiful will be made explicit. Secondly, the connection between natural symmetries and the idea of beauty will be evaluated. It is unfortunate that the concepts of beauty and symmetry function as regulative ideas and selection criteria within the scientific domain, as this engenders confusion and the initiation of erroneous research programmes. In the final part of the article, I will investigate whether the preference of scientists for symmetry, harmony, simplicity, and beauty is related to a universal predisposition of the human mind towards symmetry and harmony. If this is the case, the transformation of beauty and symmetry into an epistemic guide, into regulative ideas of scientific research, would constitute a major cognitive bias. I will conclude that aesthetic constraints may be fertile sources of hypotheses; however, they can never be regarded as reliable criteria for establishing truth in the natural sciences.
Arendt's account of Eichmann's trial from 1961 remains highly relevant today precisely because it captures the essence of what she called "the banality of evil", namely thoughtlessness. By looking at Arendt's report on Eichmann from the perspective of her subsequent works, I argue that his inability to think can be better understood as a lack of what she calls later, in The Life of the Mind, "thinking" and "judging". From this perspective, we can see better what thoughtlessness means - namely, a lack of critical thinking, a lack of imagination, a lack of conscience - and understand better its connection with evil. It is important not to lose sight of this connection nowadays, when thoughtlessness is subtly encouraged by the digital algorithms and by the products of artificial intelligence that are increasingly shaping our reality. In today's world, "Eichmann" represents a very useful negative reference point.
Merleau-Ponty is one of the pioneers in the phenomenology of film and remains an unmissable landmark in this field of study. This paper examines Merleau-Ponty's contribution to the theory of cinema, by analysing the expressive means of film and their role in communicating emotions. Drawing on previously overlooked insights of Merleau-Ponty's reflections on moods and emotions, I argue that cinema is a genuine ally to existential phenomenology thanks to its capacity of revealing the unity between mind-body-world. Following Merleau-Ponty's thesis that the exteriority of the body (conducts, gestures, facial expressions etc.) gives us the affective interiority of the characters, I contend that cinema operates as a phenomenological laboratory of moods. Emotional attunements are not merely rendered visually, but lived in a chiasmic, intersubjective exchange between actor-character-film and spectator. Emotion unfolds in an intermediate space between the filmic image and the viewer's body. Because the viewer and film intertwine - we share the actor's affective dispositions - I argue that affective reversibility stands at the core of the cinematic experience. Films are not mere devices for representing subjectivity, but expressive structures that infuse our Befindlichkeiten. While acknowledging Merleau-Ponty's value to film phenomenology, I also highlight the ideological commitments and reductive tendencies of his externalist approach, which cannot fully grasp the complexity of film experience.
This paper seeks to sketch the premise for an aesthetic theory whose foundation is the existential experience of affliction, as construed in Simone Weil's philosophical thought. In Weil, one can trace an actual, self-standing, aesthetical concept that is rooted in a deeper ontology of metaxis that both critiques the Hegelian teleology of unhappy consciousness, and also rethinks aesthetics as the exilic metaxu "between Athens and Jerusalem". A metaxic aesthetics is, therefore, an elemental change of paradigm from a knowledge-based aesthetics towards an attention-based one.
This article explores the multiple senses of biopolitical art and examines the subtle distinctions between bioart and biopolitical art. The first part of the the so-called Auschwitz aporia as developed by Agamben. It focuses on the subjectivity of survivors of traumatic historical experiences, such as the Holocaust, who testify to the struggle endured in the death camps, occupying the dual role of testis and superstes-partial witnesses to a fully personal tragedy that demands objective sharing to ensure historical accuracy and prevent such atrocities from recurring. Biopolitical art is presented as a form of artistic expression that portrays both regimes of biopower-oppression and control affecting the lives of marginalized and discriminated communities-and the forms of resistance employed by these subjects when confronting authoritarian regimes. The second part of the paper highlights biopolitical art's capacity, following Esposito, to depict both the immunity developed by oppressed communities in response to violence and the sense of community they seek to reconstruct in long processes of historical recovery and social inclusion, decades after the Holocaust. This research provides insight into how biopolitical art is rooted in post-Romantic aesthetics and the ways it has been employed, at least in its early stages, not only to document life under unbearable conditions for marginalized subjects but also as political spectacle for actors exercising biopower and sovereignty.
This paper reconsiders Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenology of the face in dialogue with Giorgio Agamben's reflections on bare life and Rainer Maria Rilke's Archaic Torso of Apollo. It argues that the "ineffable truth" of the face-its resistance to representation-can only be understood when conceived as incarnation, as flesh that simultaneously reveals and conceals transcendence. By bringing together Levinas's notion of illeity and Agamben's meditation on the threshold between human and animal, the study contends that ethical exposure and biopolitical abandonment share a common locus: the vulnerability of the body. Reading Rilke's fragmentary torso as an "epiphany of flesh," the essay suggests that the command You must change your life is not a moral injunction but an appeal issued by exposed life itself-an address that precedes subjectivity and transcends the human. The paper thus seeks to rethink the ethical significance of the face beyond anthropological limits, proposing that incarnate life in all its ambiguity is the true site of transcendence, where ethics and ontology, vulnerability and authority, become indissociable.
This article investigates the profound role of narrative language within religious contexts, particularly Christianity. Starting with Nietzsche's metaphor of humanity as a "rope identity as inherently narrative and dynamic, constantly woven and reshaped through storytelling. The article questions why religions, despite the modern dominance of visual media, continue to emphasize narrative language over more precise or logical forms of communication. Drawing on thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur and Umberto Eco, it argues that narratives uniquely construct meaning, facilitate identity formation, and transform human understanding of self, God, and the world. Biblical and religious narratives are highlighted as paradigmatic examples, serving not only to reveal divine identity but also to profoundly affect and reshape human identity. Ultimately, the article proposes that narratives remain essential because they bridge temporal, existential, and spiritual dimensions, providing coherence, healing, and transformative insight to human existence. " stretched between the animal and the & Uuml;bermensch, the article explores the human
The Bnei Baruch Kabbalah Education & Research Institute is a worldwide organization which popularizes modern version of Kabbalah. Although Kabbalah in its academic interpretation is a mystical branch of the Jewish religion, Bnei Baruch members strongly oppose to associate their Kabbalah with religion in general, with Judaism in particular, and with mysticism as well. Instead, in Bnei Baruch's texts it is commonly argued that this system of Kabbalah is a science and a scientific mode of researching the world. I will examine whether the kabbalistic theoretical terms and conceptions, that Bnei Baruch speaks of, can be given some empirical sense. In my analysis, I follow the standard of methodological naturalism.
This article explores the moral dimension of understanding, focusing on the concept of interpretive injustice. Drawing on work on epistemic injustice, it examines how language and interpretive practices reflect and perpetuate dominance and oppression. Two forms of interpretive injustice are defined: ignorance and misinterpretation. Ignorance arises from a lack of engagement with minority hermeneutical resources, while misinterpretation involves the misattribution of meanings by dominant groups. The article argues that interpretive injustice causes both epistemic and moral harm. It also challenges the emphasis on macro-level power dynamics, suggesting that interpretive injustice can also be done to members of dominant groups. Interpretive injustice need not be systematic to constitute a moral wrong. The refined definition of the notion recognises that interpretive injustice occurs when an utterance is interpreted using the hermeneutical resources of a different sociolinguistic group despite relevant differences between these resources.
Empathy is widely considered to be a valuable trait, and yet some dimensions of it have been argued to be incompatible with virtue. More concretely, the nature of virtue seems to preclude virtuous agents from empathizing with their vicious or weak-willed fellow humans. This introduces a tension in the idea of virtue, as we would seem to necessarily have to sacrifice something of genuine value in order to become virtuous. I argue that this tension can be avoided if we reconsider the affective and motivational profile of the virtuous agent.
The didactics of foreign languages offers valuable theories for examining both written and oral productions of foreign speakers. It also provides essential tools to enhance the teaching-learning process. Our article begins with the premise of clearly delineating communicative strategies and lexical confusions, drawing on various scholarly articles to establish a theoretical framework, supplemented by examples from actual oral and written texts. The primary difference between communicative strategies and lexical confusions lies in their impact on message transmission. Communicative strategies serve to maintain the integrity of the message, ensuring that meaning is conveyed effectively. In contrast, lexical errors can significantly hinder communication, as they may lead to misunderstandings by the interlocutor regarding the intended message.
The aim of this article is to look in a new light at the writings of Emil Cioran in which he deals with the question of faith and religion. An author known mainly for the controversies raised by his scandalizing aphorisms, Cioran could be better understood if his writings were passed through a hermeneutic filter that would take into account the criteria of the principle of equity proposed by G.F. Meier. However, bearing in mind the fragility/difficulty/sensitivity of any interpretation, it emerges that any passage to another level of understanding is by no means a purely intellectual effort, but rather implies the assumption of the existential transformation that each text produces.
The homiletical discourse of the Eastern Christian Church-on which tradition this paper focuses-is considered standardised and prescriptive, as it also plays an important liturgical role. My research identifies and presents those ambon proclamations that best circumscribe and fall within Aristotle's three means of persuasion-ethos, pathos, and logos. It is also essential to consider where persuasive declamations are present in these homiletical discourses. Therefore, it will be related to the conventional parts of an oration in Classical rhetoric.
I have in mind, to begin with, a well-known painting by Van Gogh, Vincent's Chair. Some of the simple things you see there (for example, a chair, a pipe, a door, a bed or a crate) seem utterly ordinary and somewhat randomly placed. Except that, if we linger over them, they become unexpectedly strange. They ultimately reveal absence as such and a certain loneliness that descends over the place. The "image" in this painting has been interpreted in many ways. They have taken into account, for example, its new style and how it re-signifies elements of the real world, the painter's correspondence with his brother Theo, but also what he himself said about the painting ("my empty chair"), or his friendship with Paul Gauguin. Psychoanalysis was not slow to intervene. Phenomenological description or existential analysis were even more relevant. But I do not believe that there are or should be "interpretive keys" and "messages". In this case, a certain understanding of the work does not presuppose any such thing. Moreover, I find more suggestive precisely those interpretations that open up, discreetly, to the extraordinary world that such a painting reveals, its free play full of contrasts.
The present study offers a comparative overview of two fundamental concepts in the philosophies of Plato and Jung, namely the Idea and the Archetype. The objectives of our research are: (1) to succinctly present the meanings of the Jungian Archetype; (2) to distinguish between the Archetype in itself and the archetypal representation, concerning the issues of consciousness, experience, and transformation; (3) to demonstrate the ambivalent nature of the Archetype, with reference to studies such as Christ as a Symbol of the Self and Answer to Job; (4) to conduct a comparative analysis between the Jungian Archetype and the Platonic Idea through three key arguments which we will further discuss in this paper. Broadly speaking, the conclusions we will draw bear both scientific and moral significance. This is because the Archetype can be called an Idea in the Platonic sense only by adopting an arbitrary approach, which requires understanding the Idea as a psychologized transcendental concept - a transcendence of consciousness, rather than of experience.
The arguments in favor of a simulated world, as put forth by Descartes, Putnam, Bostrom, and Chalmers, were constructed to achieve different goals. Bostrom advanced the argument for the existence of mathematical and informational foundations of the world, and Chalmers proposed the perspective of simulation realism. When viewed through the lens of methodology, the arguments put forth by Descartes and Putnam proved fruitful. When considered from a metaphysical perspective, the arguments put forth by Bostrom and Chalmers did not resolve any existing metaphysical issues. The objective of this article is twofold: firstly, to illustrate the inconsistency of simulation realism; secondly, to propose that the simulation hypothesis and simulation realism are merely consequences of the pervasive adoption of new technologies, namely the Internet, virtual reality, and artificial intelligence. Due to the technological metaphors used, the hypothesis of simulation and the realism of simulation have the merit of making a series of classical philosophical problems accessible to educated people in the 21st century. Among these is the problem of the foundations of reality, the possibility of the existence of a creator, the possibility of knowledge, the problem of human nature, the nature of consciousness, and so on.
This article aims to contribute to the intercultural dialogue by discussing and sharing some recent developments in aesthetics in the (untranslated) work of the Romanian philosopher Stefan Afloroaei (b. 1952). From the impressive thematic corpus of his writings, I will discuss here the exploration of the sense and metaphysical meaning of beauty, which is congruent with the metaphysical questions about the "meaning and sense of life" (Afloroaei 2021). I will show how, by exploring the "paradox of beauty" (Afloroaei 2008; Afloroaei 2008b; Afloroaei 2018; Afloroaei 2018b), such as the often mysterious or strange beauty present both in the familiar world of everyday life and in art, Afloroaei successfully gives fresh answers to longstanding questions in aesthetics, as well as another, more charming face to metaphysics. The focus here is on questions regarding beauty and truth in painting (Heidegger 1971, Derrida 1987), which are explored starting from a painting by Vincent van Gogh, Vincent's Chair(1888).
