LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. The article “Can We Biotechnologically Construct a Morally Better Human?” systematically assesses the theoretical controversies, practical paths, and core dilemmas associated with moral enhancement via biotechnological means. The critique of technological rationality is a core issue in reflection on Western modernity. Moral enhancement technology restricts human freedom, allows technological rationality to control and infringe on human nature, and thus serves as a new form of technological violence and technological discipline imposed on individuals for social control and to meet social needs. Such technology does not receive support from Confucianism or Taoism.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Modifying the human brain and body through biotechnology and similar techniques in the name of enhancing human morality is akin to putting a clockwork into an orange. Such an endeavour not only faces technical challenges – in particular, the mismatch between the neuroessentialism presupposed by moral bioenhancement and the working mechanism of human morality – but also deeply misconstrues the very nature of moral learning and development. Even more alarmingly, it carries the risk of paternalism due to its extreme reductionist understanding of morality, opening the door for manipulation and domination. Ultimately, the vision of a world populated by clockwork oranges is a disheartening one.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Jason T. Eberl and Matilda Ajibola’s paper shifts the discussion of moral enhancement from abstract debates about moral permissibility and moral value to a cautious analysis of the feasibility, effectiveness, and potential risks of moral enhancement technology based on the current state of scientific research. This paper provides a response to the question of whether we can biotechnologically construct a morally better human: it is impossible for biomedical moral enhancement to shape a “virtuous person”, because it bypasses the reflection, practice, and struggle that are necessary for the cultivation of virtue and thus fails to fulfil the fundamental criterion for moral subjectivity. However, while traditional methods can help individuals acquire genuine and stable virtues, both biotechnological interventions and traditional education may face the same dilemma: the difficulty of truly accessing the internal structure of individual moral subjectivity while promoting external norms.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. This commentary reviews the article “Neuroessentialism and the Dilemmas of Moral Bioenhancement”, which critiques the theoretical foundations of moral bioenhancement (MBE) from philosophical and evolutionary perspectives. The original text argues that MBE relies on an untenable neuroessentialist reductionism, overlooking the embodied, embedded, and culturally mediated nature of human morality. This commentary emphasises the article’s significance for bioethics in China, where rapid biotechnological development calls for nuanced ethical reflection. By integrating Confucian perspectives with contemporary “4E” cognition theory, the article provides a culturally resonant framework that resists simplistic moral enhancement proposals and promotes a holistic understanding of moral development.
道德生物增強（Moral Bio Enhancement, MBE）是指通過生物醫學手段（如藥物、基因編輯、神經調控等）直接干預個體的生理或心理過程，以提升其道德認知、情感和行為能力的實踐與理論探索。這一概念源於對“人類能否通過生物途徑超越自然道德局限”的哲學追問，近年來隨著神經科學、遺傳學和生物技術的發展而引發劇烈爭議。(撮要取自內文首段)
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Professor Xu Xiangdong’s paper addresses the value assumptions and logic of arguments for moral bioenhancement. Whilst affirming the promising prospects of moral bioenhancement, Professor Xu also critiques its fundamental flaws, namely its strong scientistic approach, neglect of the practical nature of morality, and, most critically, the manipulation of humans by technology and the “forgetting of human subjectivity”. Professor Xu consistently centres human moral life as the foundation and places humanity at the core of morality, which holds significant value for the establishment of a Chinese bioethics framework.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English ; abstract in Chinese. 本文以視別視角對傑森．T．埃伯爾和瑪蒂達．阿吉博拉對道德生物增強的分析進行評論。雖然他們將道德主體視為一般代理人，但我認為現實世界中最明顯的道德生物增強候選對象是男性，特別是在減少暴力方面。基於這種性別視角，我主張他們的分析忽略了受害者所承受的非增強成本，而受害者主要是女性和兒童。我進一步利用他們所提及的哈里．富蘭克福一階欲望和二階欲望理論，展示生物技術干預如何通過更好地將潛在施暴者的第一階攻擊性衝動與其更高階承諾對齊，來幫助解決家庭虐待這類典型案例。最後，我將持續證明任何充分的道德生物增強倫理都必須包含對攻擊性和暴力的生物學基礎的明確說明。
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Regarding the path of moral cultivation, Confucian ethics differs fundamentally from the underlying logic of Jason T. Eberl and Matilda Ajibola’s article. Confucian ethics, based on the belief that ‘cultivating benevolence depends on oneself’ and the inclusive character of ‘non-coerciveness’, holds that external technological interventions for moral enhancement are unnecessary for those who have already achieved moral maturity and impossible for those with moral deficiencies.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Jason T. Eberl and Matilda Ajibola’s article “Can We Biotechnologically Construct a Morally Better Human?” offers profound insights grounded in virtue ethics, emphasising that moral improvement should rely on autonomy and practice. The authors’ proposition that traditional methods of moral enhancement hold advantages in terms of both ethical and practical feasibility is well taken. However, their proposed implementation of this approach appears conservative, as the article overlooks the potential of non- biotechnological tools such as artificial intelligence and virtual reality to supplement traditional moral cultivation. Furthermore, the authors propose an exception for bioenhancement in cases of “weakness of will” (akrasia). However, the ambiguous boundaries of this exception could lead to a “slippery slope” whereby the scope of intervention is expanded to the point at which technology gradually substitutes for the internal effort essential to moral growth. Overall, while the article constructs a solid ethical defence in theory, it falls short in demonstrating practical feasibility in an era of advanced technology.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. 道德生物增強一開始是某些理論家為了回應生物保守主義者對人類增強計劃的批評而提出的一個構想，後來被發展為一項實質性倡議，即通過直接調控人腦來改進人們的道德行為。通過批判性地審視這項倡議的基本預設，本文旨在表明，只要我們恰當地理解了人類認知和人類道德的本質，我們就不可能僅僅通過對人腦進行神經生物學干預來增強人類道德，因此，道德生物增強倡議不僅簡單化了我們對道德及其在人類生活中的地位的深思熟慮的理解，而且因其對一種極端的還原主義的承諾而是誤導性的。 The concept of moral bioenhancement was initially proposed by theorists in response to bioconservative critiques of the human enhancement project; later, it was advanced as the basis for an initiative to improve human beings’ moral behaviour by directly regulating the human brain. By critically examining the assumptions of this initiative, this article aims to show that it is impossible to enhance human morality merely through neurobiological intervention in the human brain, given the intrinsic nature of human cognition and human morality. Therefore, the moral bioenhancement initiative not only simplifies our understanding of morality and its position in human life but is also misleading, due to its commitment to an extreme version of reductionism.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Professor Xu Xiangdong’s paper “Neuroessentialism and the Dilemmas of Moral Bioenhancement” offers a systematic critique of both moral bioenhancement (MBE) and its underlying theory, neuroessentialism. A key insight of the paper is that the validity of an ethical theory hinges on the soundness of its underlying methodology. Neuroessentialism, grounded in reductionism, erroneously reduces human moral understanding and motivation to mere neural activities in the brain. Meanwhile, the MBE initiative, which seeks to improve moral behaviour through biomedical means, is a technologically premature and scientism-driven utopian endeavour that risks eroding human autonomy and the meaning of moral life. A further crucial implication of the paper is that bioethics researchers must steadfastly preserve the field’s philosophical foundations and defend the dignity of human life.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English ; abstract in Chinese. 埃伯爾（Eberl）和阿吉博拉（Ajibola）主張在特定條件下通過生物技術手段實現道德增強。我們注意到兩位作者在論文中關於道德增強的社會正當性辯護。這種辯護使得對道德增強施加相關的規範性（政治性）約束變得必要。因此，兩位作者若能更多地從政治維度考量其所持有的觀點，將會有所裨益。 基於此，我們的評論結合政治自由主義的關鍵理念，探討了兩位元作者的視角與自由主義在善的問題上的中立性之間的張力。作為這一討論的一部分，我們詳細闡述了助推（nudging）——兩位作者為實現道德增強所訴諸的一種手段——為何也面臨著自由主義的挑戰。
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. In the article “Neuroessentialism and the Dilemma of Moral Bioenhancement”, Professor Xu Xiangdong transcends conventional ethical critiques centred on freedom, autonomy, and justice, as well as practical debates concerning technological risks and regulatory frameworks. Against the backdrop of the global human enhancement trend, he reframes the discourse on moral bioenhancement through a critique of neuro-essentialism. Rather than focusing solely on whether moral bioenhancement technology is feasible or desirable, Professor Xu elevates the discussion to a more fundamental philosophical inquiry: what it means to be human in the age of artificial intelligence.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. The frontier issue of “moral enhancement” is fraught with inherent dilemmas. Its appeal lies in its oversimplified understanding of human nature, and its fundamental fallacy stems from its reliance on neuroessentialism – a theory incapable of accounting for the situated, culturally embedded, and dynamically emergent nature of morality. In a groundbreaking synthesis, Professor Xu Xiangdong integrates “4E” cognition theory with the Confucian concepts of self-cultivation and personhood, demonstrating that morality constitutes a form of wisdom grounded in practice, embodiment, and social interaction, which cannot be technologically “encoded”. Genuine moral progress arises from nurturing inner virtue through education and practical experience, which remain the only viable path that truly honours the essence of human morality.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. This commentary discusses the prospect of genetic moral enhancement, focusing on the moderate Genetic Virtue Project (GVP) articulated in “Can We Biotechnologically Construct a Morally Better Human?” While the GVP aims only to strengthen an individual’s natural receptivity to virtue acquisition, this commentary argues that from both legal and policy perspectives, this approach remains fundamentally problematic. Theoretically, it creates an irreconcilable conflict between parental reproductive autonomy and the future autonomy of the embryo, as irreversible genetic alterations preemptively undermine the very basis for an individual’s self- determination. Practically, its implementation is infeasible due to the legal principle of technological neutrality and the impossibility of legally establishing unified moral content. As modulating moral emotions cannot guarantee morally right action or motivation, the path to moral improvement must involve enhancing traditional moral education and social design rather than pursuing biotechnological shortcuts.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. This commentary responds to Professor Xu Xiangdong’s article “Neuroessentialism and the Dilemmas of Moral Bioenhancement”. Whilst Professor Xu’s work offers a compelling and profound critique of the fundamental presuppositions of moral bioenhancement (MBE), highlighting the limitations of neuroessentialism and its oversimplification of moral life, this commentary argues that his critique may overemphasize the radicalism of MBE and overlook its potential value in limited contexts. A distinction should be drawn between “radical MBE” and “moderate MBE”, and the potential of the latter should be explored within a framework that considers it supplementary to moral education.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Focusing on the novel issue of moral bioenhancement, this article critiques the concept of ‘moral genetic enhancement’ on three fronts: its lack of a scientific basis, the inevitability of value conflict, and its destructive impact on the social–moral fabric. The article ultimately advocates for robust ethical oversight and public engagement to preserve the wholeness of human nature and the human essence of morality.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English ; abstract in Chinese. 埃伯爾和阿吉博拉提出了一種溫和版本的適用於道德生物增強的美德倫理學路徑。他們認為生物增強技術可以用來幫助克服某些意志薄弱問題，但基於美德倫理的要求和實踐考量，我們更應通過強化傳統道德增強方法，如更優質的教育和社會設計，為道德增強提供更穩定、持久且真實的方法。本評論對他們關於直接增強與間接增強的區分，過程與結果的二分，自然與人工的二分，以及理想化的傳統方法提出質疑。這些問題可能削弱他們的論證效力，即試圖證明美德倫理學能為反對道德生物增強提供決定性依據。最終，借助有關道德生物增強學者的觀點，本文試圖證明美德倫理學與主體性生物增強技術之間看似不相容的關係值得重新審視，甚至可能被顛覆。
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Professor Xiangdong Xu’s article “Neuroessentialism and the Dilemma of Moral Bioenhancement” systematically critiques the theoretical foundation and practical conception of moral bioenhancement (MBE). The article first examines the logic behind the claim that MBE can address global risks by directly regulating emotions and motivations through biotechnology, revealing its underlying premise as neuroessentialist: reducing moral capacity to a mere neural mechanism. The author refutes this position using “4E” cognition theory, arguing that morality is inherently embodied, context-embedded, and dependent on cultural practices and cannot be reduced to a technologically modifiable object. Through analysis of addiction cases and the Genetic Virtue Project, Professor Xu points out that neuroessentialism not only misconstrues the practical wisdom of virtue but also ignores the complex roles of social factors. Finally, the article elucidates the three main dilemmas facing MBE: low technological feasibility, undefined moral goals, and the erosion of individual autonomy by coercive intervention. Using the Confucian concept of “becoming a complete person” as a contrast, the author emphasises that morality is generated through self-cultivation within social relationships. The article is rigorously argued, integrates multidisciplinary perspectives, and offers a profound reflection on technological simplification.
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. This commentary underscores the need for vigilance regarding the technological risks associated with moral bioenhancement, a stance that aligns with China’s current policy direction for strengthening the governance of science and technology ethics. It argues that the ethical review of moral bioenhancement technologies should pay particular attention to fundamental risks concerning personal identity, free will, and value pluralism. From the perspective of Confucian virtue ethics, moral cultivation relies on self-reflection, moral exemplarity, and genuine relational experiences, and it thus cannot be replaced by pharmaceutical or neuro-modulatory interventions. Ultimately, the commentary advocates for a cautious stance towards moral bioenhancement, upholding the principles of technology for good and human-centredness to safeguard human dignity and ethical subjectivity amidst rapid technological development.
