The early Royal Society was an intellectual movement with remarkably homogenous epistemological and methodological features. Despite the petty squabbles fellows occasionally engaged in, general agreement existed among them about the principles, methods, and aims of their collective enterprise. On rare occasions, however, the society was genuinely infiltrated by someone with incompatible conceptions and principles, upsetting the sober equilibrium of society meetings. One spectacular example of such an intruder was the Cambridge-educated Oliver Hill who was fellow of the society from 1677 to 1682. This paper offers an account of Hill’s short tenure and studies some possible sources for better reconstructing two discourses, today lost, that he presented at meetings in December and January 1677/78. The paper aims to show how Hill, most often presented as a puritan mystic, also pursued a natural philosophical project in which he defended a speculative philosophy and spiritualist cosmology not unlike Henry More’s.
Selon l’historiographie traditionnelle, le Novum organum se distingue dans l’histoire de la logique par une provocation majeure : la disqualification du syllogisme comme opérateur de la science, au profit d’une induction pensée à nouveaux frais tant du point de vue de sa place dans l’édifice logique que du point de vue de sa structure. Pourquoi Bacon envisage-t-il un tel renversement ? Comment s’y prend-il pour l’élaborer conceptuellement ? On se propose de contribuer à répondre à ces questions encore peu traitées par les interprètes, pour clarifier la fonction assignée par Bacon à sa logique. On étudie en ce sens le plus long des aphorismes composant l’ouvrage et qui est consacré à la distinction de 19 mouvements primordiaux de la matière. Comment Bacon peut-il tout à la fois concevoir la logique comme un organon, c’est-à-dire comme l’instrument d’une philosophie naturelle à venir, et construire cette logique en prenant appui sur plusieurs des principes de cette philosophie ? On montre qu’il n’y a pas là une tension mais une nouvelle approche de l’instrumentalité logique. Bacon entend réfuter la logique d’Aristote, en tant que source de principes erronés de la philosophie naturelle, pour éviter qu’une fausse logique ne déteigne sur l’analyse de la nature.
Scholarship on the popular psychology of the early modern period has not infrequently neglected the English treatise on the government of thoughts, despite how prolific this species of writing came to be by the end of the seventeenth century. This literature was written by a highly diverse and eclectic group of authors, ranging from Cambridge theologians to High-Anglican clergymen and from natural philosophers to astrologer-physicians. It includes works by William Perkins (1607), Thomas Cooper (1619), Thomas Goodwin (1637), Robert Boyle (1645), Edward Reyner (1656), John Angell (1659), William Shewen (1679), William Penn (1682), Richard Saunders (1682), Richard Allestree (1694), John Sharp (1694), George Tullie (1694), and William Chilcot (1698). In this article, I look at two early treatises by Reformed theologians Perkins and Goodwin, and two late High-Anglican works by Allestree and Sharp. My aim is to reconstruct the precise conception of human “thoughts” foregrounded in this literature and examine two important consequences that stem from this articulation: (1) the elevation of the imagination to the status of an “arch-faculty” of the mind that participates in all other operations of the soul and (2) the tension between depravity and diversion that shapes the practical rules for self-government offered in this literature. I explore these alternatives to the standard faculty psychology and moral instruction found in competing genres of popular psychology and practical moral philosophy at the time, with the aim of complicating more traditional historical interpretations of Protestant self-regulation.
This paper attempts to advance our understanding of the emergence of the modern notion of physical Laws of Nature by situating the earliest known discussions of laws of nature, those of Descartes, in the context of the theory of principles and the broader neo-Aristotelian theory of knowledge acquisition. It is claimed that together these theories are an important, though hitherto overlooked, seam within the conceptual resources from which Descartes' distinctive and novel notion of Laws of Nature was developed.
The early Royal Society was an intellectual movement with remar- kably homogenous epistemological and methodological features. Despite the petty squabbles fellows occasionally engaged in, general agreement existed among them about the principles, methods, and aims of their collective enterprise. On rare occasions, however, the society was genuinely infiltrated by someone with incompatible conceptions and principles, upsetting the sober equilibrium of society meetings. One spectacular example of such an intruder was the Cambridge-educated Oliver Hill who was fellow of the society from 1677 to 1682. This paper offers an account of Hill's short tenure and studies some possible sources for better reconstructing two discourses, today lost, that he presented at meetings in December and January 1677/78. The paper aims to show how Hill, most often presented as a puritan mystic, also pursued a natural philosophical project in which he defended a specula- tive philosophy and spiritualist cosmology not unlike Henry More's.
Scholarship on the popular psychology of the early modern period has not infrequently neglected the English treatise on the government of thoughts, despite how prolific this species of writing came to be by the end of the seventeenth century. This literature was written by a highly diverse and eclectic group of authors, ranging from Cambridge theologians to High-Anglican clergymen and from natural philosophers to astrologer-physicians. It includes works by William Perkins (1607), Thomas Cooper (1619), Thomas Goodwin (1637), Robert Boyle (1645), Edward Reyner (1656), John Angell (1659), William Shewen (1679), William Penn (1682), Richard Saunders (1682), Richard Allestree (1694), John Sharp (1694), George Tullie (1694), and William Chilcot (1698). In this article, I look at two early treatises by Reformed theologians Perkins and Goodwin, and two late High-Anglican works by Allestree and Sharp. My aim is to reconstruct the precise conception of human "thoughts" foregrounded in this literature and examine two important consequences that stem from this articulation: (1) the elevation of the imagination to the status of an "arch-faculty" of the mind that participates in all other operations of the soul and (2) the tension between depravity and diversion that shapes the practical rules for self-government offered in this literature. I explore these alternatives to the standard faculty psychology and moral instruction found in competing genres of popular psychology and practical moral philosophy at the time, with the aim of complicating more traditional historical interpretations of Protestant self-regulation.
According to traditional historiography, the Novum Organum stands out in the history of logic for its major provocation: the disqualification of the syllogism as the operative tool of science, in favor of a newly conceived induction-both in terms of its role within the logical framework and its internal structure. Why does Bacon envision such a reversal? How does he go about developing it conceptually? This study seeks to contribute to answering these questions, which have been relatively neglected by interpreters, in order to clarify the function Bacon assigns to his logic. To this end, it examines the longest of the aphorisms composing the work, which is dedicated to the distinction of 19 fundamental motions of matter. How can Bacon conceive of logic as an organon-that is, as the instrument of a future natural philosophy-while at the same time constructing this logic based on several principles of that very philosophy? The article argues that this does not entail a contradiction, but rather introduces a new approach to logical instrumentality. Bacon aims to refute Aristotelian logic, insofar as it serves as the source of erroneous prin- ciples of natural philosophy, in order to prevent a false logic from distorting the analysis of nature.
In a famous fragment of the Pens & eacute;es, Pascal explains that it is through the heart that we know first principles. But what is the meaning of this knowledge? The editors of Port-Royal took the radical decision to replace the occurrences of "heart" in this fragment with the expression "feeling and intelligence [ sentiment et intelligence]", thus marking the equivalence of these two notions. However, given that Pascal contrasts the heart with reason, and that intelligence is, for both Pascal and Descartes, synonymous with reason, how are we to understand this modification? Some commentators have seen it as an absurdity, proving that it could not have been made by interpreters like Arnauld and Nicole. In this article, I first show, on the contrary, that it is precisely a chapter of the second edition of The Logic ofPort-Royal that offers the key to the difficulty. While Arnauld and Nicole are faithful to the Cartesian synonymy of intelligence and reason everywhere else, in this chapter they distinguish between these two notions, taking Descartes' distinction between intuitus and reason from the Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Secondly, I contest this interpretation of the Pascalian heart: the heart, as an originally passive capacity of feeling, differs from the Cartesian intuitus.
The focus of this paper will be, on the one hand, on a prime example of the historical issues and practices related to the teaching of the habits involved in the art of artificial memory: on Lambert Schenckel, a didactic genius, possibly the most important teacher that the tradition of the art of memory ever saw; on Martin Sommer, his follower and betrayer; on the true history of the Gazophylacium artis memoriae. This, on the other hand, will allow us to highlight relevant aspects of the seventeenth-century reshaping of certain habits of the human mind, setting them on a background where the habit-forming practices on which the art of memory is based, and their teaching, can be seen not so much as a merely instrumental component, but rather as a relevant social phenomenon in themselves, that accompanies a seemingly contradictory transformation of individual and social needs.
In this paper I explain how, for Spinoza, humans can acquire the “habit of virtue” from “fatal necessity” (Ep.58). Spinoza claims that no decision can be made without memory of the thing that one wants to do. However, his rejection of free will also implies that nobody can freely select what to remember. It seems that, as it is not in the power of an individual to freely choose what to remember and do, it is not possible to establish a disposition towards virtuous behavior. To solve this puzzle, I focus on the way in which memory interacts with reason, in Spinoza’s system. I argue that this interaction allows the unfolding in time of reasoning processes. Reasoning can, in turn, be conceived as a kind of habit, which generates and sustains virtuous behavior. First, I clarify what the notion “habit of virtue” signifies for Spinoza. Then, I briefly review his account of memory. Next, I elucidate his conception of reason and its building blocks, “common notions.” On these grounds, I show how reason can be understood as an activity by which mnemonic associations are reconfigured. Finally, I point out how reason relies on memory to preserve itself in time, determining virtuous habits.
This paper argues that, contrary to what one might think, early modern rationalism displays an increasing and well-grounded sensitivity to certain metaphysical questions substantial form was designed to answer— despite the fact that the notion itself was in such disrepute, and emphatically banished from natural philosophy. This main thesis is established by examining the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz through the framework constituted by what have been designated as the two aspects, metaphysical and physical, of substantial form. This examination shows that Descartes ends up assigning to soul a notable metaphysical task formerly assigned to substantial form, whereas Spinoza advances a theory of essences motivated by the philosophical concerns behind the two aspects of substantial form. Leibniz finally makes a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and metaphysics as he develops a dynamistic theory that deliberately aims at understanding substantial form in a new fashion. This line of development is designated as one major factor contributing to the separation of philosophy and natural science.
The significance of the 'Republic of Letters' as a Pan-European and cross-national concept is often addressed in scholarship on early modern intellectual history. Focusing on an extensive digital epistolary corpus of authors of East Central European descent from c. 1600 to c. 1800, this article aims to readdress this argument by analyzing the currency of the most frequently used terms in Latin that denote a sense of scholarly community (viz. respu- blica literaria and orbis literatus) from a combined quantitative and qualitative approach. Based on the results of this analysis, it is argued that with respect to this geography, terms referring to the Republic of Letters were not as vital and ubiquitous as modern scholarship may perhaps lead one to believe. As the supposed increasing geographical spread and frequency of these terms are oftentimes mentioned as signs of the growing currency of their underlying concept, it is important to realize that their continental occurrence seems, in fact, limited at best and erratic at worst. Consequently, it is argued that concerning the analysis of individual authors, the methodology adopted in this study can only yield a meaningful discussion in the case of a relatively large number of occurrences, as the absence of these terms could be regarded as the default 'standard' in the regions under discussion-and possibly beyond.
My goal in this paper is to show that two theses that are widely adopted among Kantian ethicists are irreconcilable. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I briefly sketch the contours of my own positive view of Kantian ethics, concentrating on the issues relevant to the two theses to be discussed: I argue that agents can perform actions from but not in conformity with duty, and I argue that agents intentionally can perform actions they take to be contrary to duty. In the second, I focus on Barbara Herman's non-accidental rightness condition from "On the Value of Acting from Duty." In the third, I focus on Christine Korsgaard's guise of the objectively good from "Formula of Humanity." In the fourth, I explain why the positions developed by Herman and Korsgaard are irreconcilable and I make a suggestion about how to move forward.
