What are robots today, what are they becoming, and what can they do? This article traces the shift introduced by cybernetics, which redefined robots as systems capable of perception and behavioral adaptation. Within this framework, contemporary AI is examined as a robotic agent whose training datasets act as sensorial environments shaping its cognitive and agentive functions. The final section focuses on human-AI interfaces, from PCs to embedded media, arguing that their transparency reinforces extractivist dynamics. The article concludes by returning to Wiener's cybernetics as a lens for critically addressing emerging socio-ethical challenges in contemporary media ecology.
The art world has always had a strong evocative power given by its ability to create a sense of connection between the artist and the viewer. In recent years, some neuroscientists have started to explore the role of art by investigating the mechanisms of embodied simulation that allow us to resonate with the observed work through the simulation of emotions, actions, and bodily sensations. This paper aims to investigate these mechanisms and provide a critical analysis of the most relevant research on the topic, especially studies on the behavioural responses of viewers observing an image of a proposed work of art in fMRI or of the enjoyment of a work of art in a museum (whether original or a digital reproduction), with the intention of offering interesting insights into the state of the art of a recent field of inquiry that arose with the onset of neuroaesthetic investigation.
Self-criticism is a transdiagnostic factor associated with various psychopathological manifestations, making accurate assessment crucial. Multiple conceptualizations of self-criticism exist, along with various instruments designed to measure it. However, there are no clear guidelines for selecting the most appropriate tool for clinical use. Given the growing research and clinical interest in this construct, this study reviews the primary instruments used in the literature to identify the most recommended ones. Findings indicate a lack of consensus on assessment tool selection. It remains uncertain whether this choice depends on the specific aspect of self-criticism being analyzed or the underlying research hypotheses.
The advent of linguistically generative AI models (LLM, GPT) poses new theoretical challenges but also offers the opportunity to revisit classical questions. Our reflection begins with two questions: is there a disciplinary field that addresses these challenges? Does it correspond to cybernetics? We are convinced that it does. However, for this to be possible, an update of cybernetics is necessary, along with an integration with the enactive perspective. This integration can only be achieved by constructing a shared and technically precise definition of the concept of information, and it would take shape as an enactive cybernetics. An enactive declination of cybernetics draws on both the technical-quantitative paradigm of cybernetics and the dynamic-qualitative one of enactivism. The validity of this integration can be observed in the interaction between user and LLM, understood as the dynamic configuration of a coupled system. The article is structured as follows: (1) a reflection on the term information; (2) an examination of the meanings of information in the field of cybernetics; (3) a description of the characteristics of an enactive cybernetics and its implications; (4) some illustrative observations on the model in the case of the user-LLM coupling.
Developed as a critical response to Trumpism and Long-Termism: AI and Biopolitics of Extinction by Antonino Pennisi and Alessandra Falzone, this study analyzes the convergence of deterministic decisionism and AI as a trigger for a new biopolitics of extinction.The central thesis posits that culture has transitioned into a << systemic pathology >> due to a fundamental << kinetic divergence >>: the exponential acceleration of technological evolution structurally outpaces the adaptive latency of human evolution.This misalignment is exacerbated by a media ecosystem generating << algorithmic blindness >> regarding existential risks. Consequently, longtermism is framed as an << ontological error >> - mistaking the data map for the biological territory-that sacrifices present agency for abstract futures. Ultimately, the paper questions whether a maximization-oriented culture can self-limit, presenting technology as a Pharmakon: simultaneously the poison of our biological roots and a paradoxical cure.
Drawing on cybernetics and systems theory, this paper rethinks AI through the lens of autopoiesis. It traces a line from feedback control to second-order cybernetics, showing how machine learning (ML) inherits feedback, estimation, and decision while remaining allopoietic. Autopoietic living systems self-produce their components; ML systems produce outputs for external use and depend on human goals, data, and infrastructure.Yet, when embedded in social communication (Luhmann), generative models perturb autopoietic reproduction and yield quasi-autopoietic effects.The article surveys recursive AI training, info-autopoiesis, embodied/chemical AI, and human-AI hybrids, and argues for design and governance while preserving ontological distinction between life and machine.
Empathy in human communication is a complex phenomenon that involves both cognitive and emotional processes.With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), there has been increasing interest in how AI-powered systems convey (or mimic) empathy through language, influencing user trust and interaction experiences. However, there is no clear definition of the specific communicative strategies that characterize empathy in either human or AI interactions. Drawing from interactional linguistics, discourse-pragmatic analysis and empathic AI research, this study examines how empathy is linguistically constructed in human-human online peer support interaction and human-AI communication.
Is reflective awareness beneficial or rather detrimental to the control of expert action? Cybernetics, the study of self-regulating systems, can help us answer this question in the context of high performance. Each of the three historical waves of cybernetics contributes to explain why experts tend to underperform when they closely monitor their own activity as they perform - for example, when sportspeople, craftspeople, and artists are instructed to single out and track some component processes of their actions. First-wave cybernetics provides the foundations for understanding skilled behaviour as the fine-tuned regulation of perceptual variables through negative feedback and adaptive control. Second-wave cybernetics highlights how habitual patterns emerge from recursive, self-organising interactions between embodied observers and their environments. Third-wave cybernetics examines skilled habits within systems of practices and social forms of regulation, showing how agents maintain local autonomy within broader organisational and normative structures. I argue that all the three strands of cybernetics provide robust arguments in favour of Radical Habitualism, the thesis that habitual, pre-reflective control is the fundamental enabler and the distinctive hallmark of optimal skilled performance and that reflective control is, in turn, inherently suboptimal. Corroborated by empirical research in sport & performance psychology and supported by the models of expert control developed by cyberneticists, the radically habitualist framework presented in this paper aims to offer a unified anti-representationalist, and anti-intellectualist account of skill & expertise, reconciling ecological, enactivist, and pragmatist perspectives on action control.
The act of naming represents a decisive exercise of power, yet the discipline of << artificial intelligence >> (AI) is currently undergoing an identity crisis regarding its own moniker. Leading experts have increasingly characterized the term << AI >> as a misleading misnomer that creates obstacles to accurate understanding. This essay investigates the historical origins of the term from the 1956 Dartmouth meeting and evaluates recent proposals to rename the discipline using neologisms such as << applied statistics >> or << SALAMI >> .Arguing that these alternatives are insufficient, the author advocates for paleonymy-the reuse of an old name-by proposing a return to << cybernetics >>. The shift is justified by identifying three distinct advantages: cybernetics focuses on communication and control rather than an ill-defined concept of << intelligence >>; it avoids the epistemological << problem of other minds >> by decoupling language use from thought; and it rejects human exceptionalism in favor of a holistic, posthuman framework. Ultimately, the essay contends that because the original choice of the phrase << artificial intelligence >> was a political strategy to avoid association with Norbert Wiener, it may be prudent to reverse course and reclaim what is called AI as a communication science.
In the article Trumpism and Long-Termism. AI and Biopolitics of Extinction (published in "Reti, saperi e linguaggi, Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences"),Antonino Pennisi and Alessandra Falzone (2025) reflect on the relationship between Long-Termism and Trumpism, identifying the latter as the potential and most decisive vehicle for the former's realization. According to the authors, decisionism, determinism, and linguistic and factual violations of the Trumpian approach facilitate the rise of this new form of hyper-technological neocapitalism which, supported by researchers from various backgrounds and financed by transnational entrepreneurs, aims at a long-term regulation of biological-social reality enabled and supported by the use of artificial intelligence. Although the trajectories of Long-Termism are inspired by a partly forward-looking ethical-projectual framework, Pennisi and Falzone highlight profound epistemological and political-operational shortcomings: on one side, this recent techno-political movement rests on theoretical premises that are scarcely grounded in biological-evolutionary terms-the very terms that, according to the authors, especially in relation to corporeality, might jeopardise and destabilise the dream of artificial intelligence. On the other side, what is alarming is the way Trump-ism is peculiarly appropriating Long-Termist assumptions, attempting to consolidate its grip and extend its reach in pursuit of its own aims: the impetuous and inconsistent manoeuvre, embodied primarily by the current President of the United States as its main interpreter and executor, risks transforming the ostensibly well intentioned principles of Long-Termism into trajectories that yield very little that is solid or fruitful. This contribution seeks to integrate a reflection unfolding along the inextricable threshold where politics and technology intersect, beginning from a fundamental premise: both Trumpism and Long-Termism are phenomena that are not only pervasively diffused but also irrevocably situated. As collective scenario-concepts-participated in and intertwined-they take the form of a model with variable geography which, on the one hand, depends on the spaces and times in which it manifests itself and, on the other hand, modifies those coordinates in turn. In other words, Trumpism and Long-Termism must not only be territorialised but also contextualised in terms of their roots and scope. This operation-grounded in the interrelation between trans-scalarity and trans-mediality and oscillating between geo-political-economic and geo-cognitive themes-aims to reinforce the central thesis by developing some of its principal trajectories.
The article offers an interpretation of cybernetics within a theoretical framework that distinguishes two dominant paradigms for thinking about technology. The first, an organological paradigm, understands technology as an activity structured according to a means-ends logic. The second, a mediological paradigm, conceives technical mediation as a process in which subjectivity is produced as an effect rather than presupposed as a starting point. Against these two approaches, cybernetics is presented not as a third paradigm, but as a mode of thinking that disrupts and destabilizes the very distinction between them. This claim is supported through an analysis of how cybernetics has been received and critiqued by representatives of both the organological and the mediological traditions. In conclusion, the article shows how this tension between organological and mediological perspectives continues to structure contemporary debates on artificial intelligence, and it assesses both the potentials and the limits of the cybernetic approach, particularly with respect to the problem of subjectivity.
The question addressed in this paper is whether guilt serves as a source of information in the assessment of time resources. Across two studies, we examined whether state-induced guilt leads to an overestimation of the time required to complete a series of activities and an underestimation of the number of tasks one can accomplish within a given time frame. Additionally, we investigated whether individuals high in trait guilt exhibit these tendencies more than others. Participants with high and low levels of trait guilt were included in the study. Three affective states were induced: guilt, anxiety and a neutral condition. Participants were asked to estimate both the time required for various daily activities and the number of such activities that could be completed within a fixed time period. Contrary to our predictions, individuals high in trait guilt underestimated the time required to complete a given number of activities and overestimated the number of tasks they could accomplish within a set time interval after experiencing guilt induction - rather than following anxiety or neutral affect induction. We discuss these findings in relation to the prudential mode and the distinct roles of deontological and altruistic guilt in the evaluation of time resources with no-interpersonal tasks.
Shame is a complex emotion that can affect multiple aspects of one's sense of self. In this paper, I will address a particular type of shame, which I will call scopophobia, that concerns one's body perception and is triggered by being looked at by others in a way that is perceived as judgemental. In the first section of this paper, I will provide an account of this construct, focussing both on its origins in the gaze of others and its effects on body perception.Then, in the second section, I will explore how scopophobia evolves in the context of the contemporary mediascape. More in particular, I will examine how body perception can undergo transformations when subjects adopt pixel-based representations of themselves, or avatars.After distinguishing between avatars that replace or reinforce the users' actual bodily appearance, I will discuss the potential of both categories to improve subjective body perception and reduce vulnerability to shame.
The year 2025 may be remembered as the onset of a new political philosophy in power: biopolitical longtermism. Longtermism is a recent techno-political movement that brings together renowned philosophers, mathematicians and artificial intelligence experts, funded by a wealthy and ideologically motivated transnational entrepreneurship. Biopolitics, in contrast, is a highly contentious political philosophy that has experienced significant opposition and divergent interpretations.Accord-ing to its founder, Michel Foucault, biopolitics is the point of intersection and clash in the human world between the spheres of power and corporeality.A radically opposing view to Foucault's biopolitics emerged in the Anglo-Saxon context in the new millennium.This model is bio-evolutionary and ethological, based on the idea of deeply understanding how to reconcile conflicts, differences, and disparities, as well as processes of cooperation, solidarity, and social redistribution, aided by powerful natural processes such as reproduction and immigration. From a philosophical standpoint, longtermism can be interpreted as the technological translation of biopolitics.What cannot afford to normatively regulate the biological world will be undertaken by Artificial Intelligence. Our assertion is that this project could soon become a reality. Its realization seems to hinge on the deterministic-decisionism of Donald Trump.Within this framework would fall all the astonishing violations-linguistic and factual-of the political-diplomatic conventions shared by the global community since the post-war era, which we have witnessed in the early months of 2025.The article concludes with an analysis of the errors of longtermism in relation to its possible evolutionary foundations, and in particular to the technical weakness of the notion of extinction which should constitute its theoretical fulcrum.
In the digital age, the concept of stealth has evolved beyond physical concealment to encompass online anonymity, privacy protection, and digital deception.This paper explores the role of privacy-enhancing technologies in safeguarding user identity, the challenges of maintaining anonymity in an increasingly surveilled world, and the rise of deepfakes as both a tool for obfuscation and a threat to authenticity. By examining the interplay between these elements, we highlight the ethical, technological, and societal implications of digital stealth and its impact on privacy, security, and trust in online interactions.
Linguoculturological modeling of phraseological units characterising negative emotional states can inform us on the relationship between languages and the cultural/psychological background of their speakers. Unfortunately,Alshynbekova et al. (2024) do not provide a model that accounts for the differences and similarities between phraseological units in Kazakh and Chinese and how they characterize emotional states. Chinese phraseological units display symbolic representations derived from classical and philosophical literature. Kazakh phraseological units, instead, display a complex metaphorical construction process with references to animals and nature and strong connections to nomadic cultural experiences. Despite such differences, both languages use sophisticated metaphorical mechanisms to encode negative emotional experiences, transforming abstract psychological states into tangible, comprehensible linguistic representations.Whether this is a universal feature pervasive in world languages is a research question that has yet to be addressed.
This paper explores the defacement of sacred images as a complex, relational act that transcends mere destruction. Drawing on theories of cognitive agency, spatial embodiment, and liturgical architecture, it examines how medieval images functioned as intentional artefacts - objects embedded in ritual, space, and social meaning. Central to the analysis is the rood screen, interpreted as an image-place that organized space, mediated access and vision, and reinforced liturgical hierarchy. Through the lens of ambonoclasm - a term denoting both the removal and the physical mutilation of rood screens - the paper investigates episodes of English iconoclasm between the Reformation and the Gothic Revival. Emphasis is placed on the performative violence of facial defacement and the paradox of images gaining meaning through damage. The concept of ambonoclash is then introduced to describe the symbolic tension between erasure and reconfiguration. The paper concludes by connecting historical iconoclasm to contemporary visual culture, suggesting that even mutilated images continue to shape collective memory and aesthetic perception.
This paper explores the cognitive semiotics of impersonation, emphasizing its digital manifestations. Through the lens of the FACETS project, it examines how digital technologies, from generative AI to deepfakes, challenge traditional notions of personhood. Impersonation is analyzed as a semiotic phenomenon, encompassing natural mimicry, human performance, and digital emulation. The study bridges interdisciplinary perspectives, from ethology to AI ethics, highlighting how digital impersonation disrupts the ontological status of individuality. It interrogates whether personhood remains anchored to biological uniqueness or is redefined by technological mediation, ultimately questioning the ethical implications of an era dominated by synthetic and augmented identities.
Many authors have raised a difficult problem about deflationism: how to fit into the deflationary analysis of truth the fact, widely perceived in the common feeling, that truth depends on reality? This problem provokes a choice that every deflationist is forced to make: to lock oneself in a deflationism which uses the T-sentences alone as sufficient analyses of truth and which, consistently, refuses to see truth as tied to reality, or accept that the integral deflationism denies a widely shared aspect of truth-namely that true propositions are such according to certain states of the world-, and seek accordingly a strategy to maintain the basic principles of deflationism by admitting, at the same time, a correspondence intuition which nevertheless causes the risk of logical incoherence. I will argue that the correspondence intuition is important for a theory of truth and that a well-structured correspondence theory is always preferable to deflationary positions because it already contains an explanation of the relationship between the truth of propositions and the facts of the world.
The question of meaning proves to be a divisive and challenging subject for AI. Scholars and professionals in the field of Large Language Models have been debating this issue for years without finding a consensus.The disagreement lies not only in the interpretation of results but also in the theoretical assumptions that should lend scientific validity to discussions about models. This paper aims to provide a unified theoretical framework for understanding meaning in AI systems like the renowned ChatGPT. The proposed framework is based on Saussurean structural linguistics, which proves effective in describing model functioning and resolving many of the issues raised in specialized literature.
