Abstract Integrated information theory (IIT) accounts for consciousness through its explanatory identity: an experience (the explanandum) is identical to a causal structure (or Φ-structure, the explanans). In other identities in science (e.g. ‘water is H2O’), the power of the explanans (H2O) comes from the presumption that it somehow exists more fundamentally. Yet when our explanandum is experience itself, as in IIT, we must recalibrate the norms of explanation to the fact that experience exists immediately and irrefutably, while whatever we may posit about the world beyond experience is always an inference within experience.
Abstract Do the words we use reveal how we feel? While much research has explored language use in social media, little is known about how the content of spontaneous thoughts and experiences, such as daytime mind-wandering and nighttime dreaming, reflects well-being, and ill-being. We analyzed 1 496 mind-wandering reports (N = 152) and 1781 dream reports (N = 172) using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count. Participants also self-reported their well-being and ill-being. Linear mixed-effects models showed that ill-being (negative affect, anxiety, and depression symptoms) was associated with the use of negative tone and negative emotion words (including anxiety, anger, sadness words) in mind-wandering reports. Ill-being (specifically, negative affect) was also associated with greater use of anxiety words in dream reports. Well-being (eudaimonic well-being and peace of mind) was associated with the use of positive tone words in mind-wandering reports, but this association was not robust in sensitivity analyses. These findings indicate that the way people describe their feelings in reports of different conscious states reflects aspects of their mental health and may contribute to future diagnostic tools in psychology and psychiatry.
Abstract The proposition that the enteric nervous system sustains a form of consciousness is seldom entertained in mainstream neuroscience, yet it follows from a disciplined reading of contemporary theories of mind. We argue that the 400–600 million neurons embedded in the mammalian gastrointestinal wall, taken together with the vast interoceptive surface they supervise, the enteroendocrine–immune interface, and the microbial community they co-regulate, constitute a substrate that satisfies, on several of the leading theories of consciousness, the criteria those theories use to attribute experience elsewhere. We synthesize evidence on enteric autonomy, chemo- and mechanosensory resolution, vagal and humoral signalling, self/non–self-discrimination at the epithelial–immune boundary, comparative data from invertebrates whose nervous systems are dominated by gut-like plexuses, and convergent clinical signatures (irritable bowel syndrome, food intolerances, psychedelic nausea, glucagon-like peptide-1 signalling) that are difficult to accommodate under a purely sensorimotor account. Throughout we distinguish two claims that are easily conflated: that the gut makes a large and underappreciated contribution to the single consciousness of the whole animal, and that enteric processing constitutes a second, much simpler locus of experience of its own. Most of the available evidence bears on the first, and we set out five lines of investigation that would discriminate between them. We conclude that gut consciousness is a testable hypothesis, likely corresponding to an ‘animal’ mode of consciousness dominated by interoceptive feel, drive and affect, and we propose empirical directions for its further investigation.
Abstract The study of consciousness is divided between mechanistic accounts that overlook subjective experience and phenomenological approaches limited to neural correlates. We propose a unified framework by grounding our ConCrit model of consciousness and critical brain dynamics within Spinoza’s ontological monism. Spinoza’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism—mind and body as attributes of one substance—provides a metaphysical basis to dissolve the explanatory gap between neural processes and lived experience. Within this framework, three properties which are maximized near criticality correspond, under Spinoza’s parallelism, to mental dimensions: entropy corresponds to experiential richness—the diversity of idea under the attribute of Thought, internal susceptibility to reflexive capacity or degrees of autonomy, and scale-free dynamics to the structural alignment with the common order of nature that, under the attribute of Thought, is expressed in adequate ideas. Thus, we propose that brain activity near criticality under the attribute of Extension is the very same phenomenon that, under the attribute of Thought, is conscious experience. This synthesis reinterprets leading theories—including Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Entropic Brain Hypothesis—as complementary views of a shared underlying reality. By situating ConCrit within Spinoza’s monism, we argue that consciousness is not emergent or epiphenomenal but the parallel manifestation of universal organizational principles, offering a conceptually unified and interpretively transparent framework for neuroscience.
Abstract Stimuli presented outside conscious awareness can influence behavior, yet the extent to which such information supports complex decision-making remains unclear. The present study examined the limits of unconscious influence across three levels of decision complexity. Participants made decisions based on stimuli presented using sandwich masking. Stimulus presentation parameters were held constant across conditions, while decision requirements varied. Simple decisions required no contextual integration, intermediate decisions required the integration of masked information with consciously presented context, and complex decisions additionally required logical inference. The results showed that decision accuracy decreased with increasing complexity: it was highest in the simple condition (58%, with strong Bayesian evidence for above-chance performance), lower but still above chance in the medium condition (54%), and not reliably above chance in the complex condition. This suggests that unconscious influence can extend beyond simple decisions but becomes increasingly unreliable when decisions require more demanding integration or inferential processing. Our findings indicate that one of the functional roles of consciousness may be to support the flexible use of information in higher-order cognitive processes and are broadly consistent with theoretical approaches such as the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory. Significance Statement Advancing the discipline: The study advances our understanding of consciousness by testing how far unconsciously perceived information can be used in decision-making. Identifying this potential boundary is important for understanding the nature of unconscious perception and the function of consciousness. Novelty: The novel aspect is that the experiment compares various levels of decision complexity without changing the settings of subliminal stimuli presentation. Previous analyses of the limits of unconscious perception were based on comparisons between different paradigms, which made conclusions more difficult to formulate. Importance: The study may influence discussions about the function of consciousness and may also provide support for theories of consciousness. It is relevant to researchers working on unconscious perception, evolution of consciousness, and theories of consciousness. Highlights Unconsciously presented premises influenced participants’ decisions. Three levels of decision complexity were tested: simple decisions without context, medium decisions with context, and complex decisions requiring inference. Decision accuracy declined as task complexity increased. Above-chance performance occurred only in the simple (58%) and medium (54%) conditions, while complex inference-based decisions were not reliably above chance. Information integration and logical inference may mark the limits of using unconsciously perceived stimuli.
