While repetition is widely recognized as a key mechanism in shaping cultural knowledge, its role in the formation of misinformation and conspiracy theories remains underexplored. This article examines Russian conspiracism by investigating the role of text reuse in the formation and dissemination of a conspiracy theory within text-based media. Drawing on a corpus of Russian-language websites and newspapers, we identify a prominent cluster that repeatedly promotes claims about an ancient Russian civilization and a multi-generational cover-up. Using a mixed-methods approach, we contextualize these websites and analyze their life cycles, loose interconnectedness, and “patriotic” profiles. The conspiracy theory examined in this case study circulated exclusively online, with the digital environment of the Runet accelerating its diffusion and entrenchment. Our findings of text reuse highlight the salience of lead-in introductions in shaping and reinforcing these narratives.
This article provides a pilot bimodal analysis of 20 texts in Russian and their accompanying AI-generated images (RuAI) from the RIA-Novosti news channel, totalling 16,650 words. The major goal of the study was to determine whether ChatGPT can provide this analysis of highly ideologically and culturally diverse texts and images under human supervision. The selected texts and images, spanning from April to May 2024, focused on the war in Ukraine and the involvement of Western countries. The qualitative analysis was conducted using ChatGPT 4.0 for discourse analysis tasks, including theme and subtheme identification and symbolism interpretation in the images vis-à-vis the texts they illustrate. The results indicate that ChatGPT 4.0 can successfully serve as a qualitative discourse analysis tool of texts in languages other than English. However, some limitations of ChatGPT analysis have been noted, such as a generic rather than specific identification of themes and subthemes. While ChatGPT successfully identified symbolism in AI-generated images, some minor details were overlooked due to insufficient exposure to Russian cultural and historical contexts. The article also suggests the emergence of a new bimodal genre in political propaganda—articles accompanied by AI-generated images that enhance the message. Although there are issues with the ambiguity and repetitiveness of some imagery, AI has the potential to be a significant tool in political propaganda as well as in discourse analysis.
The sanctions regime imposed upon Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was modified and reached hitherto unimagined levels after the Russian full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022. This article covers the Norwegian debate on academic sanctions, how the government’s statements are mirrored in the discourse of university rectors and pro-sanction academics, and how this pro-sanction discourse is opposed by academics articulating an anti-sanction discourse. Employing Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, this article argues that this conflict manifests in a discursive struggle where the soul of the university and academic freedom are at stake. While the issue of academic sanctions has been studied in detail by numerous scholars in recent years, the literature tends to focus upon the strategic and normative value, or lack thereof, of sanctions in specific cases. This study moves beyond these important issues by exploring what these discourses for and against sanctions mean for university autonomy and academic freedom, by exploring the discourses and their socially constructive capacities.The pro-sanction discourse defines the university as also having political functions, necessitating sanctions, whereas the anti-sanction discourse defines the university in a more autonomous fashion. Keywords: Discourse analysis, sanctions, new cold war, Russia, Norway
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 1999 intervention in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) remains one of the most contested episodes in the post–Cold War order, exposing the tension between the United Nations (UN) Charter’s prohibition on force and the moral imperative to prevent mass atrocity. Conducted without explicit Security Council authorization, it triggered enduring disputes over legality, legitimacy, and sovereignty. This article reassesses Kosovo’s role in the evolution of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), arguing that Kosovo was neither a legal precedent nor a replicable model but a constitutive rupture that reshaped—without resolving—the dilemmas of human protection. Using legal analysis, normative theory, and comparative case study, the article situates Kosovo within competing interpretations of humanitarian intervention and compares it with Libya (2011), the first explicitly authorized R2P operation. It shows that authorization did not eliminate legitimacy crises: Kosovo and Libya reveal distinct post-intervention failures—prolonged internationalization without political closure in Kosovo, and mandate expansion followed by collapse in Libya. The article further argues that Kosovo’s post-1999 stabilization was paired with a deferral of final-status settlement, producing a durable frozen conflict, and that this unresolved ambiguity has enabled the strategic misuse of the “Kosovo precedent,” notably in Russian discourse on Ukraine. Kosovo’s legacy, therefore, lies less in establishing a right to intervene than in illustrating the systemic risks that arise when coercive protection is decoupled from legal clarity and timely political settlement. Keywords: NATO, Kosovo, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian intervention, United Nations, Yugoslavia.
This paper assesses the extent to which the EU’s development cooperation activities contribute to diffusion of its norm of sustainable development (environment) to Vietnam. In the post-Cold War era, EU normative influence has largely operated through technical assistance, financial instruments, policy dialogue, and capacity-building programs directed at developing countries. By analyzing key programming documents and aid instruments, the study demonstrates that environmental sustainability is not merely rhetorical but systematically mainstreamed into the EU’s cooperation frameworks in Vietnam. The paper further investigates how these normative expectations interact with Vietnam’s domestic priorities, assessing the degree to which EU-driven initiatives have informed policy agendas, institutional practices, and governance approaches within the recipient state. Through this dual assessment of EU intentions and Vietnam’s strategic responses, the article provides insights into the nature of EU normative power in Southeast Asia, the mechanisms enabling or constraining norm localization, and the EU’s evolving post-crisis image in its engagement with Vietnam—a former colony of an EU Member State. The findings suggest that norm diffusion has occurred, albeit selectively and pragmatically, shaped by Vietnam’s developmental concerns and policy autonomy. Acknowledgement and funding Some parts of the paper are based on the unpublished Phd thesis entitled “Analysing Normative Power Europe through Trade and Development Cooperation Policies towards Vietnam” undertaken at Sant’Anna University (Italy) and Ghent University (Belgium). We would also like to thank the Vietnamese Ministry of Education & Training for their support, under the research grant B.2023-SP2-07.
In recent years, China has focused on expanding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in Europe. Despite the presence of giants such as Huawei, the DSR has faced various challenges due to the security concerns of European states, further influenced by the positions of the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA). One of Beijing's responses involves the 2024 European Football Championship, whose main sponsors are Chinese. Considering that this action falls under the category of soft power and Public Diplomacy, this article analyses how these sponsorships can contribute to the expansion of the DSR in Europe. Thus, our investigation unfolds around the following research question: How did China use diplomacy and soft power to promote the Digital Silk Road during Euro 2024? Using a primarily qualitative approach, our study concluded that China, through its companies, seeks to entice European consumers, making them more receptive to the potential expansion of its digital corridor in European territory.
The politicization of international organizations undermines their integrity and effectiveness. This article focuses on the attempts to block and hinder Kosovo’s membership in the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), illustrating how states that do not recognize Kosovo use their political clout to hinder its membership. Despite Kosovo fulfilling all the necessary requirements, a few influential states have obstructed its accession by exploiting their roles within these organizations. The article highlights biased actions by member states, revealing a pattern of politicization and manipulation. It discusses the impact on neutrality, impartiality, and rule-based governance, calling for robust mechanisms to protect the integrity of international organizations. The article contributes to the broader debate on how member-state politicization affects the functioning of international organizations in a polarized world.
This study investigates the disintegrative impact of Brexit on the European Union’s institutional framework. Disintegration may occur in the form of other member states leaving the union. Still, it can also manifest in terms of institutional reform in the direction of increased intergovernmentalism and executive dominance, resulting in a renationalization of the EU’s policymaking competences. The article contributes to the literature on European disintegration and differentiated integration by addressing the causal impact of Brexit as a driver of flexible institutional designs to meet the diverging demands of EU member states. The authors’ research is grounded in a constructivist approach, which draws from several theoretical accounts of European integration, proposing that Brexit has and will continue to result in increasing institutional differentiation in the EU. The authors test this hypothesis through an embedded single case study that examines how member states reacted to the new European power balance. The authors focus on proposals for institutional reform, particularly in relation to the Common Foreign Security Policy and the European Stability Mechanism.
This article investigates the growing challenges in Russian-American diplomacy in the post-Soviet environment. To this end, the study focused on the crisis of Iraq and, more specifically, the US-British bombing of Iraq in 1998 as a source of tension in bilateral relations. In doing so, declassified communications between the US President Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin were reviewed following a discussion of American and Russian foreign policy towards the Iraqi crisis. The review of communications demonstrated that both leaders actively attempted to avoid further divergence by keeping friendly and consensus-building communications while insisting on their differing positions. The Yeltsin-Clinton correspondence also showed that they tried to avoid unilateral action and develop their strategies within international frameworks such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA. In this regard, Bill Clinton ostensibly sided with UNSCOM, whereas Boris Yeltsin supported the UNSC framework where Russia could exert more influence. The study concluded that, despite these efforts, the US-British bombing of Iraq further alienated the Russian government and affected the post-Soviet world order. These conclusions are significant in that they demonstrate challenges to American diplomatic hegemony and show the earliest roots of divergence in Russian-American presidential diplomacy.
This paper explores the role of parliaments in sanctions policy in Canada, the United States, and the European Union. The study contrasts the varying levels of parliamentary involvement and oversight within these jurisdictions. It highlights Canada’s formal but underutilized parliamentary powers, the proactive legislative role of the US Congress that actively shapes and monitors sanctions policy, and the EU’s executive-dominated approach with limited parliamentary input. The findings partially refute the hypothesis that parliaments play a marginal role in sanctions policy and underscore the importance of robust legislative oversight in ensuring that sanctions policies are democratically accountable.
This research examines how Russia, with a focus on Putin, shapes its messages by analyzing his interactions with foreign journalists between 2012 and 2019. To understand how these messages work together, the study employs the concept of ‘internarrativity,’ which explores how narratives are interlinked and reinforce one another. The author argues that it is essential to analyze communication narratives as interconnected webs of meaning, rather than independently. The study's findings illustrate how Putin's concept of a ‘Strong hand’ government system is constructed and strengthened by other associated narratives, legitimizing the need for authoritarian control in Russia for both national and international audiences.
This article investigates the development of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Russia before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. First, the authors present an index they constructed from CSR reporting data of 45 leading firms. The article demonstrates that the degree to which firms in Russia have institutionalized CSR practices and norms varies extensively. Second, by building on neo-institutionalist theory and mechanisms of isomorphic change, it explores the global and domestic pressures that promoted CSR institutionalization in Russia’s authoritarian capitalism. The findings from the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) show that there is no uniform path, but rather multiple, equifinal routes to CSR institutionalization. Two types of mimetic isomorphism—modelling CSR activities after best international practices and path-dependent Soviet-type experiences—are crucial to explaining CSR institutionalization in Russia. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, international practices could become less important, while the domestic pressures to further CSR institutionalization will remain relevant.
This article examines how the interests, objectives, strategy and policy of the European Union (EU) towards the countries of the Eastern Partnership have changed over time, with a focus on Georgia. The article explains the essence of Europeanization and integration processes in this region, as well as the new role the EU plays in the post-Soviet region. The case of Georgia is used as an example. The article examines how Georgia's status gradually changed from a recipient of EU humanitarian aid to an EU candidate country. The article analyzes various official EU documents that subsequently became guides for the formation of the EU policy about the Eastern Partnership countries. The article also draws attention to the contradictory geographical identity of individual Eastern Partnership countries, most notably the South Caucasus, including Georgia. The article shows how war became the main variable influencing the fundamental revision of the EU policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries and examples include the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 and the Ukrainian-Russian war. The article examines how the war in both cases became a trigger for the development of new geopolitical projects and concepts on the part of the EU. Nouvel alignement régional dans l'espace post-soviétique : L'UE en tant qu'acteur actif dans les pays du partenariat oriental (Le cas de la Géorgie) Les intérêts, les objectifs, la stratégie et la politique de l'Union européenne (UE) à l'égard des pays du Partenariat oriental ont évolué au fil du temps. L’auteur étudie cette évolution à travers le cas de la Géorgie. Il explique l'essence des processus d'européanisation et d'intégration dans cette région, ainsi que le nouveau rôle que joue l'UE dans la région post-soviétique, montrant que le statut de la Géorgie a progressivement changé, passant de celui de bénéficiaire de l'aide humanitaire de l'UE à celui de pays candidat à l'UE. L'analyse porte sur divers documents officiels de l'UE qui sont devenus par la suite des guides pour l'élaboration de sa politique à l'égard des pays du Partenariat oriental et sur les identités géographiques contradictoires des différents pays du Partenariat oriental, notamment dans la région du Caucase du Sud, avec la Géorgie comme exemple clé. L’auteur montre comment la guerre est devenue la variable principale influençant la révision fondamentale de la politique de l'UE à l'égard des pays du Partenariat oriental, grâce aux exemples de la guerre russo-géorgienne de 2008 et de la guerre russo-ukrainienne de 2022. Enfin, il s’intéresse au fait que la guerre a déclenché, dans les deux cas, de nouveaux projets géopolitiques de la part de l'UE, étayés par de nouveaux concepts.
Competing regional cooperation mechanisms in Central Asia provide a unique opportunity for a case study of overlapping regionalisms pursued by three core external actors: the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation (RF), and the European Union (EU). The authors’ analysis is focused on the increasingly competing trade routes or corridors in Central Asia as well as the rivalry and interdependency between the participating countries. The research question addressed is what are the distinctive roles of the core powers—EU, RF and PRC—in reshaping the region? The mapping of the most important external-driven regional initiatives in Central Asia, their goals and achievements presented in this article, provides supporting evidence to a potential divide-and-conquer strategy pursued by the three external powers in Central Asia. The use of bilateral agreements and privileged relations with certain countries (Kazakhstan) hinder the development of regional cooperation. Le remodelage de l’Asie centrale : Le rôle des acteurs extérieurs Les mécanismes concurrents de coopération régionale en Asie centrale offrent une occasion unique d'étudier les différentes politiques régionales poursuivies par trois acteurs extérieurs essentiels à la région : la République populaire de Chine (RPC), la Fédération de Russie (FR) et l'Union européenne (UE). L'analyse des auteurs se concentre sur les routes ou corridors commerciaux de plus en plus concurrentiels, ainsi que sur la rivalité et l'interdépendance entre les pays participants. Quels rôles jouent les principales puissances - la RPC, la FR et l’UE - dans le remodelage de la région ? La cartographie des principales initiatives des politiques régionales de provenance extérieure à l’Asie centrale, ainsi que leurs objectifs et leurs accomplissements, présentée dans cet article, apporte des preuves à l'appui d'une stratégie de division et de conquête poursuivie par les trois puissances en Asie centrale. Par exemple, l’usage d’accords bilatéraux et les relations privilégiées entretenues avec certains pays, comme le Kazakhstan, entravent le développement de la coopération régionale.
Since gaining independence, Central Asian countries have maintained stable and friendly relationships with China. Through China-led bilateral, regional, and multilateral projects, China and Central Asia have significantly strengthened their strategic partnership and elevated the importance of their relationship in the region-building process. As a result of these interactions, Central Asia is emerging as an active regional actor. This article characterizes China and Central Asia’s interactions as Warleigh-Lack's (2006) “regionalization” and examines the impact of this process on diffusing China’s model of regionalism in Central Asia. Specifically, the article aims to answer the question: what are the implications of China and Central Asia’s regionalization processes for shaping the region and for the presence of a third actor, Russia? Employing Acharya’s (2004) “norm localization” analytical framework, the article argues that the current Central Asian regional cooperation model can be described as an indirect (recipient-driven) influence of China and Central Asia’s regionalization processes within the scope of the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCO), bilateral strategic partnership agreements and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It posits that, of the various types of indirect diffusion of institutional and policy models of regionalism, the new Central Asian model of regional cooperation entails a “lesson-drawing” diffusion mechanism from the Chinese model of regionalism. La régionalisation Chine-Asie centrale et son impact sur la région d'Asie centrale et au-delà Depuis leur accession à l'indépendance, les pays d'Asie centrale ont entretenu des relations stables et amicales avec la Chine. Grâce à des projets bilatéraux, régionaux et multilatéraux menés par la Chine, la Chine et l'Asie centrale ont considérablement renforcé leur partenariat stratégique et accru l'importance de leurs relations dans la construction de la région. Grâce à ces interactions, l'Asie centrale en tant que telle est en passe de devenir un acteur régional important. L’auteure caractérise les interactions entre la Chine et l'Asie centrale comme un exemple de la « régionalisation » de Warleigh-Lack (2006) et examine l'impact de ce processus sur la diffusion du modèle chinois de régionalisme en Asie centrale. Quelles sont les implications des processus de régionalisation de la Chine et de l'Asie centrale pour la construction de la région et pour la présence d'un troisième acteur d’importance, la Russie ? S'appuyant sur le cadre analytique de « localisation des normes » d'Acharya (2004), l'auteure soutient que le modèle actuel de coopération régionale en Asie centrale peut être décrit comme une influence indirecte (par les bénéficiaires) des processus de régionalisation de la Chine et de l'Asie centrale dans le cadre de l'Accord de coopération de Shanghai (OCS), des accords bilatéraux de partenariat stratégique et de l'Initiative route et ceinture (IRC). Elle postule que, parmi les différents types de diffusion indirecte des modèles institutionnels et politiques de régionalisme, le nouveau modèle centrasiatique de coopération régionale implique un modèle de diffusion inspiré du modèle chinois de régionalisme.
With only about half of the members of the United Nations recognizing its declaration of independence, the lack of universal consensus on Kosovo’s independence in 2008 has put the country’s status legal status as a legitimate state in limbo. The Serbia-Kosovo land swap deal has been proposed as a way to break the deadlock and potentially lead to the international recognition of Kosovo. This article evaluates the applicable legal standards under international law form both of the scenarios—that Kosovo is and is not a sovereign state. It explored the issues from the perspectives of purely territorial exchange, groups of people in terms of the legality of population exchanges and rights of self-determination and minority rights. It also investigates the implication of the land swap on individual human rights issues under the existing legal framework, thereby considering if the deal is compliant with international law and providing food for thought. Le projet d'échange de territoires entre la Serbie et le Kosovo : la perspective du droit international L'absence de consensus sur l’indépendance du Kosovo en 2008 a laissé le statut juridique du pays en suspens : seulement la moitié des États membres des Nations unies le reconnaissent comme un État indépendant. L'accord d'échange de territoires entre la Serbie et le Kosovo a été proposé comme un moyen de sortir de l'impasse et d'aboutir à la reconnaissance internationale du Kosovo. Dans cet article, l’auteur évalue les normes juridiques applicables en vertu du droit international dans les deux scénarios, à savoir si on suppose que le Kosovo est ou n'est pas un État souverain. Les problèmes soulevés par le projet d’accord sont abordés sous les angles de l'échange purement territorial, des groupes de personnes (en termes de légalité des échanges de population), du droit à l'autodétermination et des droits des minorités. L'échange de territoires a également de fortes implications pour le cadre juridique actuel sur les droits des individus, ce qui pousse à une examination de la conformité de l’accord au droit international et fournit des pistes pour une réflexion plus approfondie sur ce type de projets territoriaux.
This study is dedicated to the development of (dis)trust of the measures taken by the authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using the concept of biopolitics, we analyze reactions of social network users and their communication with the authorities. For this purpose, throughout one year we have studied posts in one of the official public pages of Saint Petersburg authorities. The posts concerned various anti-COVID measures: vaccination, mask requirement, distance learning, and other restrictions, and comments on them. For the analysis, we used the AntConc program. Based on the findings, we identified three discourses. The most prominent two are those of dissent and resistance. These are based on users’ distrust, doubts, and unwillingness to follow the prescribed measures. Within these two discourses, users communicate with different public authorities more actively. Communication follows the same pattern: in response to questions, the authorities provide template references to legislative decrees regulating specific restrictions and vaccination, which does not build trust and further exacerbates the discontent among users. The discourse of consent is based on expressing solidarity with the measures taken and revolves around some users persuading others of the benefits of vaccination, social distancing, and face masks. As there are virtually no opportunities for active and legal resistance to biopolitical measures, we presume that in practice discursive resistance results in the invention of evasion tactics: not wearing a mask, not vaccinating, trying to get a hold of a fake QR code, etc. La construction biopolitique de la confiance et de la méfiance : Le discours public sur la gouvernance pendant la pandémie à Saint-Pétersbourg Cette étude est consacrée à la construction de la confiance et de la méfiance à l'égard des mesures prises par les autorités pendant la pandémie de COVID-19, dans le cadre de la ville russe de Saint-Pétersbourg. Les auteurs analysent les réactions des utilisateurs des réseaux sociaux et leur communication avec les autorités sous l’angle de la biopolitique, plaçant cet article à la croisée des idées de Foucault et d’Agamben. Pour ce faire, les auteurs ont étudié pendant un an les messages postés sur l'un des groupes de réseaux sociaux officiels des autorités de Saint-Pétersbourg. Ils concernaient diverses mesures anti-COVID : vaccination, port du masque, apprentissage en ligne, ainsi que d'autres restrictions. Les résultats de l’analyse opérée avec le programme AntConc ont permis aux auteurs d’identifier trois discours, dont les deux plus importants sont ceux de la dissidence et de la résistance, qui augmentent grandement la propension des utilisateurs à communiquer avec les autorités. Les auteurs font l’inventaire du continuum de discours qu’ils ont relevés, allant des discours libéraux et orientés vers la compréhension de la biopolitique comme une norme de gestion efficace aux discours disciplinaires et à la perception des mesures et des restrictions comme des tentatives de contrôle. Ces derniers discours sont fondés sur la méfiance, les doutes et la réticence des utilisateurs à suivre les mesures prescrites. La communication des autorités, qui se concentrait sur ses actes législatifs, n'a pas suscité la confiance et a augmenté le mécontentement général, tandis que les utilisateurs, voyant un manque de résistance active aux mesures biopolitiques, ont eu recours à des tactiques d'évasion telles que le refus du port de masques et l'utilisation de faux codes QR.
The COVID-19 pandemic brought about some extraordinary shifts in citizens’ preferences about intergovernmental responsibilities in several federal states and has therefore provided an especially interesting context to contribute to the ongoing debate about the scope, direction, and determinants of attitudinal change in citizens’ preferences in situations of protracted crisis. Although there is evidence of the role of partisanship and some other factors during normal times, the importance that partisanship may have with respect to other factors in accounting for changes in citizens’ preferences during these crises still needs to be established. Does partisanship account for attitudinal changes during a crisis, or do citizens have other predispositions, such as individual core beliefs about federalism, perceptions of government performance, or trust in government, which could account for the scope and direction of these changes? The article relies on an original national survey of 7,175 respondents collected during the transition from the first to the second wave of the pandemic in Spain and examines the shift in citizens’ preferences in three policy domains: healthcare, nursing homes, lockdown declaration and management. It finds that partisanship and attribution of responsibility are relevant to explaining shifts in preferences for intergovernmental responsibilities, whereas, contrary to expectations, individual beliefs about autonomism are not significant. The authors’ findings contribute to the broader literature on the configuration of public preferences for multilevel governments and to understanding blame management and accountability during crisis situations in federal democracies. Les préférences des citoyens en matière de responsabilités des échelles gouvernementales pendant la crise du COVID-19: Le cas de l'Espagne La pandémie de COVID-19 a entraîné des changements extraordinaires dans les préférences des citoyens en matière de responsabilités entre les différentes échelles gouvernementales dans plusieurs États fédéraux, et a donc fourni un contexte particulièrement intéressant pour contribuer au débat en cours sur la portée, la direction et les facteurs déterminants des changements d'attitude dans les préférences des citoyens en temps de crise prolongée. Bien qu'il existe des preuves du rôle de la partisanerie et de certains autres facteurs en temps normal, l'importance que la partisanerie peut revêtir en temps de crise par rapport à d'autres facteurs reste à établir. La partisanerie explique-t-elle les changements d'attitude pendant une crise, ou les citoyens ont-ils d'autres prédispositions, telles que les croyances fondamentales individuelles sur le fédéralisme, les perceptions de la performance du gouvernement ou la confiance dans le gouvernement, qui pourraient expliquer l'ampleur et la direction de ces changements? Les auteurs se fondent sur une enquête nationale originale menée auprès de 7 175 individus interrogés lors de la transition entre la première et la deuxième vague de la pandémie en Espagne et examinent l'évolution des préférences des citoyens dans trois secteurs d'action publique: les soins de santé, les maisons de retraite, la déclaration et la gestion du confinement. L'étude révèle que la partisanerie et l'attribution de la responsabilité expliquent les changements dans les préférences pour les responsabilités intergouvernementales, alors que, contrairement aux attentes, les croyances individuelles en matière d'autonomie n’ont pas d’effet significatif. Les conclusions des auteurs contribuent au discours plus large sur la configuration des préférences du public pour les gouvernements à plusieurs niveaux et à la compréhension de la gestion de la responsabilité dans les démocraties fédérales en situations de crise.
This paper examines the evolution of the media in the Czech Republic during the first three decades as an independent state (1993-2023). The paper reflects on the media’s role in the changing political landscape, where economic and political interests intertwine, exploring the transition from a state-controlled system to a media landscape characterized by extensive foreign ownership and, ultimately, a concentrated domestic ownership market. It traces the initial privatization of media outlets, followed by the flood of foreign ownership it attracted to an unexpected shift in ownership, marked by the exit of international media companies and the rise of domestic oligarchs, resulting in a media environment distinguished by influence over ideology. The paper balances the nation’s thirtieth anniversary by suggesting that the challenges of media capture that characterized the preceding decade have begun to recede, only to be replaced by a new type of capture, this time in the context of platforms. De la capture des médias à la capture des réseaux sociaux : Trois décennies de médias libres en République tchèque Dans cet article, l’auteur examine l'évolution complexe des médias tchèques au cours des trois premières décennies d’indépendance de la république (1993-2023). Il propose une réflexion sur le rôle des médias dans un contexte politique en pleine transformation, où les intérêts économiques et politiques s'entremêlent, et explore la transition de la machine de propagande contrôlée par l'État vers un écosystème dominé par la propriété étrangère et, finalement, vers ce même écosystème capturé par des oligarques locaux. Il retrace la privatisation initiale du marché, l'afflux de capitaux étrangers qu'elle a attiré, puis le retrait inattendu des sociétés internationales et la montée en puissance des oligarques, qui peuvent influencer l'idéologie nationale grâce à leur contrôle des médias. L’auteur dresse le bilan médiatique de la République tchèque, à son trentième anniversaire, suggérant que les défis engendrés par la capture des médias par les oligarques qui ont caractérisé la décennie précédente ont commencé à s'estomper, pour être remplacés par les défis d'un nouveau type de capture, cette fois dans le contexte des réseaux sociaux.
