In Pakistan, events in 2025 largely served to consolidate the power of Pakistan’s hybrid civil–military (democratic–authoritarian) regime, led by Chief of the Army Staff Asim Munir, President Asif Ali Zardari, and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. An ongoing political crackdown on supporters of former prime minister Imran Khan and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, was paired with a 27th constitutional amendment that further politicized the appointment of superior-court judges. An expansion of military operations targeting insurgents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, including unprecedented cross-border airstrikes on Kabul and Kandahar, also unfolded alongside a four-day air war with India. The aftermath of that war, including US intervention leading to a fragile ceasefire, provided an opening for some improvement in US–Pakistan relations.
In 2025 Malaysia’s prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, looked to further consolidate his power and influence over domestic politics, moving to shore up support within his party and his coalition government, with the ultimate aim of re-election in the next general election. Some of Anwar’s moves were considered problematic and even undemocratic, with many Malaysian politicians and activists once again exasperated by the lack of progress on reforms. Internationally, Malaysia maintained a significant presence as chair of ASEAN, with Anwar playing a leading role in pursuing peaceful negotiations over conflicts in the region, and in handling the uncertain terrain of relations with the US. Yet despite these domestic and international initiatives, his nationwide support remains tepid at best, and he is no certainty to be re-elected as prime minister should he continue to pursue that aim. Many parties in his coalition are either unhappy or would change coalitions should an opportunity arise. Anwar’s attempts to consolidate his power, therefore, largely come from insecurity and weakness, rather than strength.
Should the United States abandon its policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan, and replace it with a policy of strategic clarity committing it to the defense of this island? This study points to various trade-offs pertinent to both approaches but argues that on balance, the latter policy is more problematic. It introduces theories and evidence from the international relations literature on extended deterrence and historical research on past episodes of war initiation (World War I, Pearl Harbor, Korea, Vietnam, and the Falklands/Malvinas). Wars have happened under conditions of both strategic ambiguity and clarity, thus cautioning against categorical assertions about their deterrence effectiveness and encouraging a more careful consideration of their scope conditions. Although this study’s title refers specifically to the debate on US policy toward Taiwan, it seeks to contribute to an understanding about extended deterrence in general.
Vietnam’s 2025 reform agenda marked a sharp departure from the caution that typically precedes Party Congresses. This article argues that an unusual concentration of political authority enabled a coordinated push for ambitious administrative, territorial, economic, and governance reforms ahead of the 14th Communist Party Congress. Institutional restructuring, provincial consolidation, cadre rotation, private-sector repositioning, and large-scale infrastructure investment advanced in tandem with tighter Party discipline, expanded information control, and the continuation of intense anti-corruption enforcement. In foreign policy, Vietnam pursued strategic autonomy while navigating heightened external pressures. Together, these developments reveal a reform strategy that couples accelerated development with strengthened Party control, bearing the clear imprint of General Secretary Tô Lâm’s leadership.
Competition over forming a government or joining a coalition preoccupied political parties and leaders in 2024 and 2025, so that they missed the undercurrent of Gen-Z movements that would force Prime Minister Oli to resign and seek protection from the army. Political leaders missed the opportunity to build on macroeconomic stability and deliver a stable government. The influence of trade unions and interest groups linked to political parties delayed the passing of important legislation on education and civil services. Meanwhile, the government sought to restrict citizens’ freedom of speech and ignored the concerns of victims in the transitional justice process. The relationship with India remained at a very low level. Nepal saw politics as usual.
This article describes the mutual erosion of democratic norms under divided government in Taiwan in 2025. The opposition alliance has leveraged its legislative majority in ways that have been argued to constrain the Constitutional Court and disrupt the legislative process. The ruling party has countered by expanding executive discretion and refusing to countersign bills. With the failure of recall strategies and the dysfunction of judicial arbitration, the executive and legislative branches are in constitutional gridlock. This elite infighting has intensified citizens’ affective polarization, damaged democratic resilience, and eroded established constitutional norms and procedural justice.
This year-ender examines Philippine politics in 2025 through the lens of the May midterm elections and their effects on political, economic, and foreign policy incentives. As elections approached, institutional reform stalled and unresolved elite rivalries were reorganized into electoral competition, most visibly through impeachment efforts, alliance breakdowns, and Senate contests. Economic performance remained narrowly based, driven primarily by consumption amid weak investment, persistent planning constraints, and limited structural change, yet sufficiently stable to reduce pressure for difficult reforms. At the same time, corruption in infrastructure became unusually visible, exposing long-standing patterns of politically mediated contracting but without producing durable accountability. In foreign affairs, sustained pressure from China in the West Philippine Sea reinforced a familiar strategy centered on presence, legal framing, and alliance signaling rather than resolution. The result was continuity rather than transformation, as power, policy, and posture were reordered by electoral incentives rather than institutional change.
In 2025, the second Trump presidency brought disruptive changes to American foreign policy in Asia. Trump’s April announcement of sweeping global tariffs and the 2025 National Security Strategy (published in December) made economic security the centerpiece of national security policy to a much greater degree than before, including in the US–China relationship and in US alliances and partnerships. Across the region, countries adjusted by emphasizing their investments in the US, their ability to provide goods that matched US economic security priorities, and their commitments to higher defense spending, aligning their diplomacy with the articulated priorities of the new administration. The region’s focus on key leader engagements with President Trump in 2025 and going into 2026 suggests longer-lasting shifts not just in the substantive focus of American foreign policy in Asia, but also in the process by which countries in the region navigate the political environment and craft their relationships with Washington.
In 2025, the “grand compromise” forged in 2023 between the Thaksin-backed Pheu Thai Party (PT), conservative parties, and the military unraveled. Initially, this “deal” allowed PT to form a quasi-conservative coalition government and Thaksin to return from exile. The alliance quickly faced internal rivalries, reformist opposition, and intensifying tensions over Thaksin Shinawatra’s growing authority. The coalition collapsed in late August after critical missteps, culminating in the Constitutional Court’s removal of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra for ethics violations, followed by Thaksin’s imprisonment and financial penalties from legacy corruption cases. From September 2025, the conservative Bhumjathai Party led a minority government with supply and confidence from the progressive People’s Party. Disputes over reform led to the dissolution of the House of Representatives in mid-December, with elections set for February 2026. Meanwhile, economic stimulus measures failed to spur growth, and Thailand’s border dispute with Cambodia worsened.
This study examines gender differences in the sense of civic duty to vote and how these differences shape voter turnout in Taiwan. I use nationally representative survey data from Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, collected through stratified multistage sampling with probability proportional to size, with binary logistic regression and mediation models. I find a modest decline in the overall sense of duty to vote over time, while women consistently report a stronger sense of civic duty than men. Support for democracy, sense of political efficacy, political interest, party identification, and age are all positively associated with civic duty. Further, the sense of duty to vote significantly mediates the relationship between gender and voter turnout, indicating that women’s higher turnout is partly driven by their stronger sense of civic obligation. These findings highlight civic duty as a key mechanism linking gender and electoral participation.
Between 2024 and 2025, Sri Lanka experienced a political rupture without precedent as the National People’s Power won overwhelming electoral mandates, shattering dynastic rule, and promising systemic transformation. Yet the government’s first 15 months revealed how thoroughly sovereignty had already been circumscribed. Economic policy was bound by inherited IMF programs and creditor-shaped debt restructuring. Foreign relations required simultaneous subordination to India and China. Security-sector reform foundered as land appropriation and wartime impunity persisted. When Cyclone Ditwah struck, in November 2025, it exposed the cruelest paradox. Fiscal consolidation had constrained capacity for climate adaptation in a country responsible for negligible emissions yet catastrophically vulnerable, revealing how structural forces shape what even decisive electoral victories can accomplish in the contemporary Global South.
This article reviews India’s political, economic, and strategic trajectory in 2025. Domestically, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party consolidated political control with electoral successes, even as tensions surrounding minority rights, caste politics, and center–periphery relations persisted. Economically, India maintained robust growth despite heightened uncertainty stemming from US trade policy. The Indian economy benefited from policy stimulus, export diversification, and selective sectoral exemptions in US tariffs. Internationally, India faced serious diplomatic challenges, particularly following military clashes with Pakistan and a sharp deterioration in US–India relations under a second Trump presidency. In response, New Delhi leaned more heavily into multialignment, pursuing détente with China, reaffirming ties with Russia, and expanding economic diplomacy elsewhere. Taken together, 2025 highlights how India’s growing power expands its strategic options while New Delhi has not escaped the challenges of societal heterogeneity at home nor a challenging era of great-power politics abroad.
Across Asia’s democracies and hybrid regimes, legitimacy increasingly derives from the capacity to deliver—to produce growth, welfare, and order—rather than from procedural or ideological foundations. This article examines the rise of performance-based governance as a new source of political legitimacy across diverse Asian contexts. Drawing the examples of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea, I argue that the “mandate of performance” has redefined the relationship between state capacity and democratic accountability. Executives now seek validation through visible delivery rather than institutional reform, fusing populist charisma with technocratic control. While such performance politics enhances state responsiveness, it also normalizes centralization and weakens checks and balances. The result is a distinctive Asian pattern of governance—simultaneously pragmatic, popular, and post-liberal—revealing how democracy is being reconstituted through the politics of delivery.
In 2025, North Korea intensified its construction and economic development efforts as it approached the final stages of its Five-Year National Economic Development Plan. In the lead-up to the ninth Party Congress, scheduled for January 2026, the regime strategically harnessed its political, economic, military, and diplomatic resources to highlight measurable successes under Kim Jong Un’s leadership. Domestically, the government reinforced administrative control by enhancing the power of party organizations and directing significant material resources to local construction projects considered vital for the regime’s stability and survival. On the international front, North Korea worked to bolster socialist ties with China and Russia, perceiving global development as moving toward a multipolar world order. In inter-Korean relations, the regime maintained its hostile “two-state” policy, which is not likely to change in the near future because it stems from structural problems that have significantly widened the gap between North and South Korea.
In 2025, South Korea experienced a historic transition, moving from the turmoil of martial law to a new administration under President Lee Jae-myung. This article examines this “democratic comeback” following the presidential impeachment and early election, while highlighting persistent challenges to institutional resilience. Domestically, the expansion of special prosecutors and the debates over prosecutorial reform deepened concerns about the judicialization of politics. Internationally, Seoul navigated a transactional alliance with the second Trump administration while leveraging the Gyeongju APEC summit for diplomatic recalibration. Economically, the government faced slowing growth and US trade uncertainties while advancing an AI-driven development strategy. In contrast, the cultural sector thrived, with the popular movie KPop Demon Hunters demonstrating the nation’s robust soft power.
While economic inequality undermines social cooperation globally, China’s widening income gap makes sustaining social cohesion a critical policy issue. This study empirically examines how two distinct strategies—lowering the top (reducing the income share of the top earners) and raising the bottom (increasing the income share of the bottom earners)—asymmetrically affect prosocial behavior. In a randomized experiment, we find that a raising-the-bottom policy significantly enhances prosocial behavior, a result we attribute to a symbolic and normative policy signaling effect that shapes individuals’ beliefs about fairness and collective responsibility. Meanwhile, a lowering-the-top policy has a marginal or even negative impact. Furthermore, nationwide data from the Chinese Social Survey (2015–2023) show that government-led redistribution efforts targeting disadvantaged populations effectively incentivize prosocial behavior among high-income and highly educated individuals. These results have important implications for the design of social policies to foster social cooperation in China and other developing Asian economies.
To what extent do economic considerations depress support for unification in South Korea? Survey data consistently show a public supportive of unification, but research rarely captures to what extent the public considers the costs associated with this outcome, nor whether, when given the choice, they consider peaceful coexistence an acceptable alternative, especially given that South Koreans increasingly view North Koreans as not part of the same nation. Using an experiment embedded in a national survey, we find that not only does priming respondents to think of costs depress unification support, but surprisingly it also depresses support for peaceful coexistence. These patterns endure even when controlling for broader views of identity, contact, and beliefs about North Korea. The results suggest the extent to which views on the future of the Korean Peninsula may remain malleable.
The previous year-ender on Myanmar (two years ago) came at a pivotal moment in the country’s ongoing civil war. The unexpectedly well-coordinated Operation 1027 brought unprecedented victories and territorial gains by resistance forces against the military junta, seemingly putting to rest the claim that the Myanmar military could not be defeated on the battlefield. However, resistance gains have stalled since 2024, as the Myanmar military has received armament boosts from China and Russia and deployed them in indiscriminate air strikes against civilians. Federal democratic institution-building has continued among many of the ethnic revolutionary organizations, in contrast to the junta’s widely criticized elections, which were held at the end of 2025 and into 2026. This commitment to political reform also contrasts with the continued free fall of Myanmar’s economy, which was exacerbated by a devastating earthquake in March 2025 and a significant drop in international humanitarian aid during 2025.
Bangladesh’s politics in 2024–25 were marked by an abrupt regime collapse and a turbulent transition into a new era of democratic contestation. Although a national election in January 2024 reaffirmed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League’s single-party hegemony, a student-led uprising later that year escalated into a nationwide revolt that forced Hasina’s resignation and exile. An interim government headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus assumed power amid violence and demands for accountability. In 2025, caretaker authorities pursued ambitious institutional reforms crystalized in the July Charter while also preparing for fresh elections in early 2026. Bangladesh’s party system was recast with the banning of the Awami League, the rejuvenation of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and the entry of new political actors from the protest movement. Persistent violence, minority-group insecurity, and strained ties with India have all complicated the transition period.
Does health aid mitigate interstate hostility between donors and recipients? By analyzing the effects of health aid from the US and China on interstate hostility from 1990 to 2010, we test this “peace-through-aid” hypothesis. We find that US health aid significantly reduces hostility with recipient states, but see no such effect for Chinese health aid. The pacifying effect of US health aid is particularly pronounced when the aid is directed toward recipients with foreign policy preferences that differ from those of the US. These findings suggest that health aid serves as an effective policy tool for the US to improve relations with states that are otherwise unfriendly or hostile.
